

## 卷首语 From the Editor's Desk

### 文化建设中不能再阉割西学

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成为世界第二大经济体的中国,如何通过文化建设来构建其软实力,既关系到中国经济是否可持续发展,又关系到中国社会能否和谐,还关系到中国能否获得和平的国际环境。在这场文化建设中,资源主要有中(国学)、西(学)、马(克思主义)三个方面。

以前笔者曾通过构建“大国学”来解构狭隘的国学,<sup>①</sup>现在要强调的则是:“文化建设中不能再阉割西学”。

“马”是首和官方意识形态,带有政治统治力量。代表中国传统的“中”和西方传统的“西”是两翼,对“首”常显顺服与服务之态,且有时出于自信或争宠还会互相抹黑对方。这里涉及的核心,一是忠心与否,二是有能力与否。

肤浅的中西之争一般是,国学者批评西学者为崇洋媚外的“汉奸”,西学者批评国学者为狭隘无能的“土鳖”。国学热衷者往往排斥西学倡导者为“其心必异”的“非我族类”以唤起草根的盲目民族主义排外情绪,却在全球化已成现实与中国已为世界经济强国的语境中逐渐失去了说服头脑清醒之当权者的能力;因为已在强大的中国,自信心已经增加而并不担心所谓的“非我族类”,同时为了获得和平的国际环境,中国政府更加注重把自己塑造成包容与开放的形象。因此,中国政府所关心的主要是西学能否帮助中国解决自己所面临的挑战与问题。西学热衷者一般不会挑战国学倡导者的爱国之心,但却常常批评其因为迂腐和无能而最终伤害自己的国家与人民。

比较理性的论争则主要集中在西学与国学的“能力”之上,即在中国需要经济上继续发展、国内需要和谐、国际上需要和平这三件“硬件式的”大事上,国学与西学各自能贡献什么“软实力”?

自从工业革命兴起以来的几百年里,在全球化的资本主义语境中,中国传统国学已经失去了支持中国发展经济、获得和谐社会与和平国际环境的能力;真正让中国“站起来”和“富起来”的,是中国特色的“马”(克思主义)。现在国学者与西学者争论的是,“马”领导的中国经济上已经强大,但文化、道德、与软实力等方面遇到了挑战,今后谁应该与“马”一起担任核心?在笔者看来,无论是批评西学的国学者还是为西学辩护的西学者,实际上所看见的都是被阉割了的西学,而不是真实与完整的西学。

西学的古代传统主要有二,一是希腊哲学与神话传统,二是希伯来及基督教传统。自基督教兴起之后,整个欧洲都处于其影响下,希腊文化几乎被完全淹没。直到中世纪,随着拜占庭文化流入欧洲,古希腊的一些文化财富才重新被人关注而产生了文艺复兴,但它并没有根本动摇基督教在欧洲思想与精神领域的统治地位。经历了16世纪的宗教改革之后,西方的基督教分成新教与罗马天主教时,欧洲诸国的国家与民族意识逐渐被唤醒。而真正对基督教传统构成了致命挑战的,则是经历了启蒙

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<sup>①</sup> 见黄保罗 Huang Baoluo,“从欧美视角看体现中国软实力的大国学” *Cong Oumei shijue kan tixian Zhongguo ruanshili de daguoxue*[The Great Guoxue, which reflects Chinese Soft Power, in the perspectives of Europe and North-America],载《中国社会科学报》*Zhongguo shehui kexue bao*[Chinese social Sciences Today]2010年3月4日,第68期第13版域外。

运动时代而诞生的以人之理性为核心的思想与精神体系。但是,基督教并没有被摧垮或消灭掉,结果是在基督教与以理性主义为核心特征的世俗主义之间达成了一种“政教互不干涉”的妥协。从此,基督教的活动被局限于公民社会(Civil Society)与个人生活(Individual private life)层面而注重精神和形而上领域,而以理性主义为本质的世俗主义则活跃于政治、国家与大众媒体之中而注重物质与形而下领域。

正如法国社会学家莫里斯·古德利尔(Maurice Godelier)在他著名的演讲《西方会成为人类的普世模式吗?》中指出,现代西方建立在资本主义(capitalism)、议会民主制(representative democracy)和基督教(Christianity)三个轴心之上,即以资本主义自由贸易为核心的经济关系模式、以普选和代议制为核心的民主政治模式与以基督教为核心的精神生活形式。<sup>②</sup>也就是:经济生活的生产与流通方式,政治生活的组织形式和精神生活的个人皈依形式和意义建立形式。<sup>③</sup>这成了西方现、当代的核心价值观,其实它们是希腊传统、启蒙运动/理性主义/社会进化论、和犹太教/基督教的混合产物。

其中为人类物质生活带来极大便利的资本主义也带来了纵欲主义、冷漠、残酷与弱肉强食的侵略性,它主要来源于以人为核心的社会进化论,其本质是反对神权的启蒙运动所产生的人文主义(humanism)的极端发展之结果。

民主政治模式则与古希腊传统和近代契约论都有关系,其长处是发现了人性的罪恶并以民主的方式对之进行约束限制,其短处是少数服从多数的理论基础(即人类知道什么是对自己最好的以及人类可以掌握自己的命运而做出正确的政治决策)常常是不可靠的,因为从基督教的人皆罪人的视角而言,人类是无法拯救自己的。

因此,西方的经济模式与政治模式,都是长短并存、优劣共在。夸张地说,西方社会今天的物质发展和技术革新主要得益于启蒙运动以来的理性主义等人学传统,而精神颓废、家庭破碎等软件体系方面出现的灾难则主要因为对基督教的背叛。此论虽有极端之嫌,但西学内部的人学与神学之间的密切联系与紧张冲突,是欧美社会的客观现实与特点。上述二者虽有很多令人不满意之处,但在目前世界各国的经济与政治模式中,似乎它们仍然是较好的;所以,二者并没有导致西方社会的崩溃。西方社会之所以今天虽有许多消极之处,却仍然是世界上最令多数人羡慕的社会,其原因在笔者看来,主要就是它们的西学中还有第三个元素,即基督教。

近百年来,当中国被以西学传统之人的洋枪洋炮打得羞愧难忍之时,国人只注意到了西学中硬件的厉害,而没有充分关注其软件体系中的长短优劣之处。特别是五四运动以后及民国早期,深受西学之启蒙运动反宗教思潮的影响,蔡元培、陈独秀等人都极力反对在中国的教育体系中认真地学习、研究与教导宗教或神学。因此,除去明末清初利玛窦等天主教传教士与中国的平等友好交流,给国人留下屈辱之感的西学,实际是以弱肉强食的人学为根基的,它所代表的只是西学中启蒙运动以来反对基督教的人学传统,主要是强悍与负面的,虽非常强大,却并非令人完全愉悦。

所以,近百年来,国人对于被阉割而只剩下人学部分的西学传统的态度,大致分成如下诸类:一则排斥西学的全部,就是其中的技术(实学)也加以拒绝;二则主张“师夷之长以制夷”,主张学习西学中的枪炮武器等技术层面的东西以期直接有益于中国的硬件建设;三则主张在西方的技术之外,还应学习西学中的经济模式与政治模式以期有益于中国的软件建设,即使是主张全盘西化与极端自由主义的人们也往往仅限于此第三境界。总而言之,主张学习与接纳西学者,无论是学习硬件还是学习软件

<sup>②</sup> Maurice Godelier, *Wird der Westen das universale Modell der Menschheit?* Wien: Picos Verlag, 1991.

<sup>③</sup> Yang Xusheng (杨煦生), “The Transcendental Dimension of the Age of Disenchantment: The Paradox of Religion in the Contemporary Context of China”, in *International Journal of Sino-Western Studies*, No. 1, Helsinki: Nordic Forum of Sino-Western Studies, 2011:27-38.



者,他们所关注的其实也只是其中的人学传统而已,而并没有认真对待西学中的基督教神学传统这一精神层面的东西。因此,当西学在中国出现与发展的时候,已经是一个被阉割了的不完整的学术体系。

西学中的资本主义与代表制的民主政治,都是以人性的真实性为根基的,因此它们能在经济上调动人的积极性,在政治上朝着多数人的利益而努力;但这种人性的真实性之本质其实就是自私性,因此,经济上出现繁荣的同时也会有纵欲与贪婪,政治上努力为多数人谋利益的同时也会产生自私与盲目。人成了一切的基础与标准,而人本身却象一匹脱缰的野马,到处疯狂地奔驰,哪里有好处与利益,这匹马就奔向哪里。但这种疯狂还没有在西方导致失序,因为民主代表制通过妥协和少数服从多数的实践基本保证了至今面临金融危机的欧美各国仍然处于相当的和谐与稳定之中。可是,经济发展与政治公平确保给人的生存、平等与自由,却在一定程度上将人带入了虚无与意义缺乏的境地,这是经济大发展、社会大稳定之后的欧美社会所面临的巨大的后现代挑战,而填补这块空白的就是基督教这颗救心丸。因此,资本主义这匹脱缰的野马,之所以没有导致欧美社会的失序,是因为有民主政治这条缰绳在时时套紧它;被套住的野马虽然外表不再疯狂,可内心世界却面临虚无与意义缺乏的折磨。基督教则象救心丸一样,一方面从社会秩序与制度的层面,呼吁与唤醒人类的良知以降低野马疯狂的风险度,另一方面又从意义的提供者之角度为内心空虚之人提供慰藉与方向。这颗救心丸平时不需要,危机时却总起关键作用,如 911 恐怖袭击、亚洲海啸、大地震及世界金融危机等灾难发生之后,平时已显空荡的欧洲教堂就往往会充满前来寻求精神帮助的人群。

所以,百年来,中国先后经历了多个阶段,直到 1980 年代以来,国人中最主张学习西学的自由主义学者,其实仍然首先强调的是科学与技术等能在硬件建设上立竿见影的西学;其次是经济模式方面的东西;再次乃政治模式方面的民主、人权、平等、法制等内容;而至于西学中的神学传统对上帝之权威的敬畏以及人与人之间的相爱,提倡与学习的并不很多。这是近百年来国人的西学所具有的主要特点,一言以蔽之,就是主要关注启蒙运动以来的理性主义人学传统,部分或全部忽略以基督教为核心的神学传统。在大力提倡文化建设与繁荣发展的今天,我们学界应该意识到,狭隘的国学会误国误民,被阉割的西学也同样贻害无穷。一则这种被阉割的西学并不符合真正西学的实况,二则此类被阉割的西学无法解决中国问题而成为中国的软实力。

本期“人学、神学与国学”专栏收录了中国人民大学何光沪教授的“当代中国的国家信仰与宗教信仰”与燕京神学院陈驯博士的“筷子神学”,前文发表于 2011 年在赫尔辛基大学举办的“国学与西学论坛”,后文发表于 2011 年的香港道风山论坛,二文从政治和文化的视角论述了汉语语境中的神学。“实践神学与中西教会和社会”栏目收了美国神学魏克利教授的“冷战宗教:冷战对中美宗教的影响”和华东师范大学宗教社会学家李向平教授的“基督教与中国公民社会——以中国基督教组织的运作模式为中心”,前文发表于中国社科论坛(2011 宗教),后文发表于 2011 年赫尔辛基大学举办的“国学与西学论坛”,二文从社会学的视角论述了基督教及其神学在中西社会与教会的情形。“中西经典与圣经”栏目则收录了美国圣经公会彭国伟博士的“在一个追求和谐的社会里来阅读《启示录》”和爱尔兰独立神学家施文华博士的“保罗追求的和谐社群”,二文均发表于 2010 年北京大学与牛津亚洲宗教文化研究院举办的“和谐社会与古代典经”会议上,他们专门探讨了圣经经典。“教会历史与中西文明变迁”栏目特约了四川大学基督教研究中心主任陈建明教授撰写“基督徒支持孙中山发动辛亥革命的原因”、广州暨南大学中国基督教史研究专家陈才俊教授撰写“英国传教士对晚清鸦片贸易的态度与行动”,二文以历史材料为根据论证了基督教及其信徒对中国近现代社会的积极贡献,对于匡清基督教及其传教士在近代中国的被误解有重要意义。“比较宗教文化研究”栏目则收录了武汉大学哲学院副教授苏德超博士 2011 年发表于赫尔辛基大学“国学与西学论坛”的“金规则:拉平基督宗教与儒家”,与澳门圣若瑟大学的奥地利神学家田默迪教授于 2011 年发表于兰州大学第三届“和谐社会与宗

教文化学术会议”上的“以广阔历史视野看中国与西方关系之个人洞见”,前文以比较宗教学的理论分析了儒家与基督教的异同,后文以比较宗教学的理论分析了个人的实践经历。最后还收录了美国世华研究中心主席戴德理博士的书评“体现当代神学与文化运动的汉语神学”,浙江大学张新樟教授的“弘扬共同体理念,建设中华民族共有精神家园——”宗教与中国社会伦理体系的构建“学术研讨会综述,与本刊执行编辑、金陵神学院教师陈永涛的会议综述”“第一届国学与西学北欧论坛简讯”。

2012 年春天于芬兰赫尔辛基

**The English Title:**

**The Western Studies Should not be Castrated anymore in the Cultural Construction**

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**人学、神学与国学**  
**Humanities, Theology,**  
**and Chinese National Studies**



# State Faith and Religious Faith in Contemporary China<sup>①</sup>

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**Abstract:** The concept of State Faith has different meanings, which may be divided into State faith, National faith, and Faith in the State. The present article discusses the above three meanings through an exploration of their birth, existence, possible trends of development, and the relationship between them and various major religions in contemporary China. Special attention has been given to Faith in the State, which has become a quasi-religion.

**Key words:** State Faith, National Faith, quasi-Religion

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## 0. Foreword

In November 2010, Shanghai Association for Philosophy and Social Sciences held its annual symposium at Fudan University. One of the sessions took as its theme ‘Chinese Faith/Chinese Experience’, and its coordinator, Prof Li Xiangping, assigned me such a topic - ‘The Relationship of the State Faith to the Religious Faith’.

Some time before that symposium, in the presence of Prof. Li, I once criticized his concept of ‘State Faith’ as a ‘pseudo issue’ or false issue. To my surprise, however, he invited me to that symposium with such a theme and topic. Having his warmth, tolerance and persistence in mind, I felt I had to rethink this issue seriously. The conclusion of my rethinking is: this is not a ‘pseudo issue’, but really an important and serious reality which is emerging in China and before the world today, therefore, it is absolutely worth considering and discussing.

## 1. The Concept and the Reality

In fact, the Chinese phrase ‘state faith’ (guojia xinyang) is used very rarely, and its meaning is very ambiguous. Further more, people may even suppose that what it means does not exist, since they hear or see this phrase very rarely. Just for this reason, I once deemed what it refers to is a pseudo-issue or a false issue.

However, the rareness of a noun’s usage does not imply the nonexistence of what it refers to. Before the appearance of a noun, which refers to some specific thing, that thing, did not enter people’s consciousness, but we cannot say that it did absolutely not exist. For example, we cannot say that before the introduction or translation of the western words “nationalism” and “patriotism” into Chinese language in the beginning of 20th century, Chinese people had no feelings or ethos of

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<sup>①</sup> This article was presented at the Nordic workshop “Religion, Faith, State and Society”, at Lidingö, Stockholm, on June 7th, 2011. Response was made by Notto Thelle, Professor Emeritus, Faculty of Theology, University of Oslo, Norway.

such kind. However, the appearing, using and clarifying of the noun referring to a thing, enable people's knowledge of that thing rise from the perceptual to the conceptual, and make the knowledge widened and deepened greatly.

For the same reason, the fact that we rarely use the noun "state faith" does not imply that the historical or social phenomenon it refers to does not exist in reality. However, when we use this noun or the concept it means, it is indeed necessary for us to clarify its meaning, or analyse its reference.

## 2. An Analysis of the Concept

One of the two main concepts we are talking about here, the concept of "religious faith", has very clear meaning<sup>②</sup>. At least, the common people are confident that they know the meaning of "religious faith".<sup>③</sup> Therefore, we only need to analyse or clarify the other one, the concept of "state faith". And only after we grip the meaning of "state faith", can we begin discussing its relationship to "religious faith".

Then, what is the meaning of "state faith"? Of course, after answering this question, we should discuss whether the socio-historical phenomenon which it refers to exists or not.

Analysing semantically or logically, or literally, the concept "state faith" can only have the three meanings:

The first meaning is the state's faith, or the faith of state;

The second meaning is the national faith, or the faith of nationals;

The third meaning is the faith in state, or the belief in state.

Now, let us see whether the socio-historical phenomena, which "state faith" means in these three senses, do exist or not in the reality of China. Then, let us see, if they exist, what characteristics they possess, and what relationships to "religious faith" they have respectively.

## 3. The State Faith in the First Sense and the Religious Faith

The "state faith" in the first sense, the state's faith or the faith of state, does exist in today's China, but just exists in some limited sense.

As every observer of China knows, the Constitution of people's Republic of China (PRC), has continued to declare that the PRC is led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP); and the Constitution of the CCP has continued to declare that its "guiding thought" is Marxism and its "highest goal" is to realize Communism. According to the numerous official documents of propaganda issued by CCP since it was born 90 years ago, and in the common expressions to which Chinese people have been accustomed since PRC was founded 60 years ago, CCP's "guiding thought" or "highest goal" has often been referred to as "faith", that is to say, CCP has "faith" or "belief" in Marxism or Communism. Having in mind the fact that CCP has instructed all the people of the country and decided the state's policies with its own guiding thought for 60 and more years, and the fact that

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<sup>②</sup> According to the two definitions of religion in A dictionary of Religion, the meaning of "religious faith" is "the faith in the ultimate" or "the belief in mysterious superhuman power". He Guanghu, "Religion", in Ren Jiyu 任继愈 ed., 《宗教词典》*Zongjiao cidian* [A Dictionary of Religion], (上海辞书出版社 Shanghai cishu chubanshe [Shanghai Dictionary Press], 2009).

<sup>③</sup> Common Chinese people understand religion as "faith or belief in God or gods". This understanding is very close to the meaning mentioned above.

CCP has made the “guiding thought” a general principle of the state’s constitution, we can say that CCP, with its political power, has made its “faith” - Marxism or Communism - become the “state’s faith” of PRC.

This is true that there has been some state’s faith in the last 60 years in the society of Mainland China.

Nevertheless, however, we should add that this is true just in some limited sense, when we take more facts into account. By “limited sense”, I mean that such a state’s faith is mainly found in the discourse of propaganda as some official rhetoric. While talking about the intellectual nature of Marxism and communism, the ethos or morality or character of the Party members, the education or cultivation of the people, especially of the young people, and the ideals of the people or the future of the society, CCP and its propaganda organs would often utter such rhetoric as “Our faith is in Marxism-Leninism” or “We believe in Communism”, as their custom of discourse. But such rhetoric or discourses had indeed been received or accepted by millions of common people, at least had been seen as official or formal faith, for nearly 30 years since 1949 in Mainland China.

On the other hand, however, since the general disillusion (described as “loss of faith” or *sanxin weiji*, meaning crisis of faith, trust and confidence in mass media those years) brought about by the national disaster of “Cultural Revolution” (1966-1976), especially since the spreading cynicism (and moral collapse and social anomie) caused by the defeat of justice in Tiananmen catastrophe (1989), such kind of rhetoric or discourse has appeared really less and less, though has not been formally abandoned by the authority. Everybody living in today’s China knows the cause for this: nearly all the people, including Party members and Government officials, in the social circumstances of “all for money” and surrounded by the atmosphere of serious corruption, do no longer believe in such discourses, or do no longer consider them having any real meanings. So, we can say more exactly that the “state’s faith” had once existed in some limited sense, but is now approaching its actual death. <sup>④</sup>

As for the relationship of “state’s faith” to religious faith, we can argue for the two points:

A. The “state’s faith” is not really religious faith, though it has some quasi religiousness.

Firstly, such rhetoric or discourse cannot stand the test of theoretical analysis, because the founders and theorists of Marxism defined it as a kind of “science” or a “social scientific theory”, and named it as “scientific socialism”, but what science needs is reason rather than faith. As for communism, in all its three possible meanings (1. the doctrines that private property should be abandoned and equalitarianism should be realized, which were put forward from time to time in the history; 2. the socio-political system in which Communist Party masters all the powers and resources and controls the whole society, and which actually existed in a dozen more countries and continues to exist in a few countries today; 3. a kind of future society described and prophesied by some Marxist theoreticians), it is really not a faith in strict sense, therefore is not a religious faith.

Secondly, people can also point out that such rhetoric or discourses and expressions have some features, which are close to religious faith. For example, they appeal to affection more than to reason—they seem to have forgotten that Marxism is some “scientific theory” intending to convince people by reason, rather than some “sacred doctrine” demanding submission; they concern moral cultivation more than theoretical argument - they put emphasis upon the aspect of communism de-

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<sup>④</sup> In contemporary China, the authorities are still making efforts to maintain the official or dominant status of Marxism as its ideology. However, while the Central Department of Propaganda of CCP, the State Ministry of Education and the United Front Department of CCP have been spending hundreds of millions CNY to implement the “Project of Reconstruction and Propagation of Marxism”, the term “communism” and related phrases (such as “communist faith”) have been used less and less in reality at the same time.

manding everybody's selflessness for the public and sparing no efforts, rather than the aspect promising "distribution according to everybody's needs"; they refer to the future condition more than to the present situation - unlike the Communist Party of Soviet Union, CCP have not boasted of having entered the communist stage, but only refers to communism as a distant ideal.

All these and some other features, such as the worship to the leader and the demand of common people's sacrifice for "sacred" ideal or principle, have indeed made this "state's faith" look like some religious faith. But according to the strict definition of religious faith in academic study of religion (i. e. the object of religious faith should have "ultimateness", or "mysteriousness", or "superhumanness"), this "state's faith" cannot be called a religious faith.

B. The "state's faith" which has some nature of "quasi-religion" played a powerful role of expelling religious faith. In the 30 years between 1949 and 1978, all kinds of religious faith in Mainland China had withered away and disappeared from society. The direct cause for that was the series of political campaigns from above. But another important and obvious cause was that the "state's faith" had got stronger and stronger in those years, having resulted in some psychological imposition with unprecedented scale of propaganda (e. g. all education from kindergarten to graduate school, all propagation from social institution to mass media), and resulted in some social imposition with unprecedented scale of persecution (such campaigns as those from "Anti-Rightists" to "Anti-Right Trend", from "Socialist Education" to "Cultural Revolution"). In 1950s, if you asked people in China what their faith was, a very small minority of them might answer you that it was some religion. But in 1960s and 1970s, you could get only one kind of answer from nearly all the people: that was Marxism (or Communism, or Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought)! This was because that long-term and abundant positive propaganda had inculcated to all the people the "unique correctness" of this answer on the one hand, and long-term and countless terrible persecution had displayed to all the people the "high dangerousness" of other answers.

The "state's faith" of this kind shall expel religious faith, just because it is not religious faith (it even includes atheism) and it trends to monopolize the intellectual fields. And it can expel religious faith, just because it is like religious faith (it had made itself some emotional, moralistic and sacralised thing), and it has some nature of quasi-religion. Therefore, when it is approaching its actual death, in other words, when the authority is gradually becoming more "de-ideologized" and the intellectual world is actually becoming more "pluralized", it is becoming more and more unable to expel religious faith. So, it is natural that the ideological resistance to religious faith has greatly decreased in today's China.

#### **4. The State Faith in the Second Sense and the Religious Faith**

The "state faith" in the second sense, the national faith, or the faith of nationals, does not exist in today's China, if it refers to a single or unitary faith. For the faith of Chinese people or of all the nationals of China today is very complex, multiple and diversified.

Firstly, contemporary Chinese people's faiths can be divided into two types - religious faith and non-religious faith. Secondly, while the religious faith of nationals of PRC has become very complex and diversified, their non-religious faith is even more complex and multiple.

##### **A. Religious Faith**

Besides so-called "Five major religions", namely Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Protestantism and Catholicism, there are various folk religions and new religions.

Among Buddhists, there still exist traditional sects in some sense, especially the Tibetan Bud-



dhism in contrast with the Chinese Buddhism, and the Theravada Buddhism in Yunnan Province in Southwest China. And there has appeared a very striking trend of secularization of Chinese Buddhism, including commercialization and politicization, and relating competitions or strifes among sects or Shan-men.

Taoism has still influence on Chinese intellectuals through its life philosophy, but its believers are a very small minority of religious people. However, there exist two major traditional sects among them—Ch'uan-chen (or Quanzhen) Taoism and Cheng-I (or Zhengyi) Taoism.

Traditionally speaking, ten minority ethnic groups in China are Muslims. Nowadays, however, Islam is much more active than before in converting Han people who are the overwhelming majority and mostly are atheists. And it is worth noticing that many members of the ten groups are getting more and more secularized, and some of them have been converted to Christianity.

In Protestantism, while so-called “Three-Self Church” has been steadily growing, so-called “house churches” have had very surprising increase. Although Christian faith has had no place in the official mass media, it has been exerting influence upon scores of million of contemporary Chinese. In a very striking contrast to the “state’s faith” and its billions state funds consuming “propaganda project”, Christian faith has been winning more people, especially poor people and young people, and entering their hearts, even though it has found very little expression in mass media owing to the state’s censorship. On the other hand, we should notice that so-called “house churches”, as in the illegal status and therefore in the relatively closed and isolated situation, are very likely to develop diversified forms of faith.

In Catholicism, while so-called “Patriotic” or “legal” church has been slowly growing for the last 30 years, so-called “underground church” has never disappeared, even though has always been under the pressure from the state. However, because of the politicization and bureaucratization of the present institution, some leadership in the official Catholic churches, just as that in official Protestant churches, is standing in opposition to the pious believers, especially to the believers in the illegal churches. Therefore, what we have seen in Christian faith in today’s China is also a very complicated and diversified picture.

In the last 30 years, a lot of folk beliefs have been rapidly recovered, and some new religious movements have been seeking for ground. The former includes the worships of Guandi and of Wen-chang and the like which are quite popular but unorganized, and the worship of Mazu and relating temples and rites and the like which are well organized and powerful at local level. The latter refers to some variant forms of traditional religions and some new religions coming from abroad, such as Mormonism, Baha’i, Moonism and some sects or cults originated in Christianity and Hinduism and other traditions. Nearly all the new religious movements are underground or under the severe supervision of police, as they are looked down by many people and officials as xiejiao (vicious cults). So, we do not know exactly how they are getting on. But we know that in contrast with them, the Chinese traditional folk beliefs are treated with greater tolerance and even support, therefore are becoming more open and prosperous.

## **B. Non-religious Faith**

Firstly, we can find some faiths which are like and are confused with religious faith, such as “state’s faith” mentioned above (Marxist or Communist faith) and Confucian faith. Although we have found that the “state’s faith” is near to its actual death, we can find some individuals (especially some senior Party members of old age) who still keep such a faith. And while most of Confucian scholars deny that Confucianism is a religion, some of them advocate taking it as a religion,

and their influence are getting stronger.<sup>⑤</sup> It is very ironical that some famous Confucian scholars once refuted any ideas of Confucianism as a religion, but nowadays are petitioning for its religious place under the state and even for its establishment as the sole “state religion”! Such an advocacy or movement is turning away from basic academic or rational principles, tending to appeal to some preoccupation or presumption. However, as only some scholars are enthusiastic in such a movement, the common people or average masses have not become an active part in it, we cannot say that it is a religious faith. On the other hand, because that it is lifting its emotional elements above its rational elements, and it is evoking among some people much more passion rather than reflection, we can classify it as a kind of faith, namely, quasi-religious faith.

Secondly, besides the above-mentioned two quasi-religious faiths, contemporary Chinese have also numerous varieties of beliefs and superstitions, such as fortune-telling, astrology, Ba Zi, Feng Shui and so on. For their lack of overt collective activities and institutional organization, they cannot be classified as religions. We’d better call them as some kind of folk faiths or beliefs. Furthermore, if we take in account the Chinese’ enchantment with, pursuit of and indulgence in wealth, power, ranking, fame, eroticism and enjoyment, and call the values or ideals revealed in these as some beliefs or faiths, we would have more reason to say that there exists no “state faith” in the sense of national faith or faith of all nationals. What are appearing before us are indeed countless varieties of individual beliefs or their alternatives.<sup>⑥</sup>

Of course, since the “state faith” in the second sense does not exist at all, we do not need to talk about its characteristics and its relationship to religious faith and so on.

## 5. The State Faith in the Third Sense and Religious Faith

The “state faith” in the third sense, the faith in state or the belief in state, does really exist in today’ China, even though the phrase or the name is used rarely.

As statism or the similar phenomenon has had a long history of thousands of years and has been extremely powerful in China,<sup>⑦</sup> as a result, there has emerged some kind of faith or belief in the state among the Chinese people since antique age. From Qin Dynasty (221BC-206BC) and Western Han Dynasty (206BC-8AD) up to now, especially during the periods of establishment of unitary national regime, a state machinery of a huge united empire which seemed omnipresent and omnipotent has become the greatest and strongest power that all the Chinese have ever seen and experienced in this world.<sup>⑧</sup> Furthermore, as such a power has no limitation upon itself, it is very likely to sacralise itself or to be deified in the mind of common people. In fact, for centuries in China, all the imperial courts were called Tianque (Heavenly Palace), all the emperors called themselves Tianzi (the Son of the Heaven), and all the subjects called emperors as Shengshang (the Holy A-

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⑤ Recently, in Confucius’ hometown Qufu, Shandong Province, the reconstruction of a Christian church was stopped, owing to the government’s response to the Confucian scholars’ petition that the “holy place of Confucianism” should be protected from invasion of foreign religion.

⑥ We can even see such a strange belief as “Li Yuchun 李宇春 Belief or Worship” (Li is a pop singer who was elected as “super-girl” by millions of fans years ago).

⑦ I have given a particular description and analysis of Chinese statism in my essay “The Dragon and the Dove” (in “Logos and Pneuma”, Hong Kong, Spring 2011).

⑧ Much stronger is the experience or feeling of the Chinese than that of the Western people. Because in the Western civilization emerged after the fall of Roman Empire, state’s power was limited by church’s power; furthermore, owing to their faith in God who is above all the sovereigns and states, people is less likely to absolutize state and make it an object of faith.

bove), and this was true to any dynasties and empires ever existed in this country. While Christians refused to worship Roman Emperors as Lords even at expense of lives in the West, Chinese Buddhists accepted the fact that “the religious cause cannot stand without relying on the state lords”, though they once advocated the Buddhist principle that “Monks should not pay reverence to the kings” when Buddhism entered China. In sum, as social organizations were too weak<sup>⑨</sup> and the state became the supreme and sole and overwhelming power in this world, it is natural that there emerged the state worship, or the faith in state, among the Chinese who share the common weakness of human nature—the tendency to look after and to flatter power. This is almost the inevitable in such a historical situation.

The “faith in state” was strengthened to an unprecedented degree after 1949. As the social, civil, political and all other organizations, which had been hidden and weak but became utterly open and stronger with the decline of Manchurian Qing Empire and the foundation of Republic of China (1912), were taken over by or transformed into the different organs of CCP and the Government under the leadership of the Party, and became bureaucratized into the Party’s branches (e. g. “Union of Workers”, “Federation of Youth”, “Federation of Women”, and “Association of Writers and Artists”, “Communist Youth League”, etc. ), or broken or disbanded (e. g. former tribal or patriarchal and grassroots’ religious organizations) from 1949, and as even non-state enterprises, businesses and any other economical organizations - all kinds of factories, stores, companies and corporations - were taken over by the state from 1956, all the people over through China had lost all social or horizontal organization or association, and had to face directly, individually and respectively, up to a sole pyramid-like organization unified from the top leadership down to the lowest leadership.<sup>⑩</sup> All the leaders at all the levels of this organization are appointed by the above, except that the few top leaders are appointed by themselves and through distribution of offices. So-called danwei (work unit) that everybody belonged to, then, was no more than a particle or a cell of this unprecedentedly huge and rigid organization. Every individual was just like a single sand grain washed off from any stickiness and rich soil, with no support, even no connection, and had to face up to the blue sky in isolation - which was the only place where rain might drop from the cloud, though where the sun was always a scorcher!

Therefore, at that time, a Chinese who came across any difficulties or problems would say that he/she should qu zhao zuzhi (go to the organization), or would say zuzhishang hui jiejue de (the organization’s leadership can resolve it, “shang” means “above”), and his /her friends or colleagues would also say so to him/her! Then the Chinese used to say they yao yikao zuzhi (should rely on the organization) or yao xiangxin zuzhi (should believe in the organization)! Zuzhi did not imply the “unit” that you belonged to and consisted of your common colleagues, but the leadership of the “unit”, namely, the Party’s organization in it, especially the Party’s organ above.

Why does the “Party”’s organization’ have such unimaginably great power? That is because that the Party controls all the powers and all the resources of the state - not only of state’s organs or institutions of legislation, judiciary and administration, but also of the whole country, whole society and whole people. So, “the organization” represents the state (and even the society and the people). Of course, when the resolution of an individual’s problem was beyond the jurisdiction of the unit’s

<sup>⑨</sup> In the words of Wittfogel, in oriental despotism, no matter how much wealth the property holders have, “they are not able to, through organization and activity based on their property, exert any influence on the state power, and therefore form a threat to the autocratic regime.” (*Oriental Despotism, China Social Sciences Press, 1989*), 8.

<sup>⑩</sup> The then popular expressions of this are “the whole country is a single round of chess match” and “exercising unified leadership of the Party”.

Party organization, or, when the leadership of one's unit and upper unit was not willing to resolve one's problem, or even was itself maker of the problem, he/she would often say: "I believe in the Party and the State (for the matter)" or "the Party and the State will one day make a just conclusion", as his/her final or ultimate comfort. The phrase "the Party and the State" mentioned here sounds to have some abstract implication, but actually refers to the national or top leadership of the Party and the State, which has the greatest power and authority. A Chinese psychological fact that has never been explicated is: the phrase "Leader(s) of the Party and the State" which all the Chinese mass media has been repeating many times everyday for sixty years is imparting to all the nationals such a basic social reality—the Party's leaders master the state, and as the state's power is incomparably great, their power is incomparably great. Analysing in this perspective, so-called "personal worship" of Mao Zedong in nearly 30 years since 1949 is but a form of worship of state's power (or, more directly, worship of the state), a distorted form of the "faith in state".

With the existence of the faith in state (not in name, but in reality), we can explain, to some degree, why many Chinese people (especially the grassroots) are still having worship of Mao who brought to China so many terrible disasters.<sup>①</sup> Because in the eyes of the people who cannot understand rationally the relationships of the personage to the political party and the state and are not aware of the limitation of the three things and have no faith in the transcendental (God), Mao is omnipotent for he masters the power of the state, he is the state. This state is so huge and has so many organs of so enormous strength that it seems to be able to do anything at its will and to be the greatest power which the common Chinese can see around them on the earth. If such a power should have become an object of faith or worship through a certain symbol, then, it would be natural that Mao would have been made such a symbol, as he had been dictator and deified for nearly 30 years.

And to the same degree, this faith in state can be used to explain why the nationalism of many Chinese people is going to the unreasonable enthusiasm years after the death of Mao and the end of deification of top leader. For the Chinese nationalism has been actually penetrated, dominated and distorted by the statism.<sup>②</sup> That is to say, the "faith in state" expressed in the form of "personal worship of the leader" during the former 30 years of PRC, found expression in a form of unreasonable nationalism during the latter 30 years. Only this veiled faith in state, adding to very overt press control, ignorance of the West and institutional hindrance, is able to account for the fact that many Chinese, while cannot afford the expense of their children's schooling, family's medical care and even their own housing, still say they agree with Government to spend hundreds of billions of dollars in Beijing Olympic Games and Shanghai World Expo, as the two events could render glory to the state!

One of the characteristics of this "faith in state" is that it has taken "patriotism" as most popular and main expression in modern China. During the former 30 years of PRC, while the state faith in the first sense or the "communist faith" occupied a higher position in the Party's propaganda than patriotism,<sup>③</sup> the phrase *ai guo* (love the state) was often used immediately following the phrase *ai dang* (love the Party), and the slogan "Love motherland" was also found everywhere. Further-

① Cf. Li Xiangping 李向平, "An Economical Analysis of the Faith in Mao Zedong", in Wang Yan ed., *Teahouse for Sociologists*, No. 2, (Jinan, Shandong people's Publishing House, 2011).

② See He Guanghu 何光沪, "The Dragon and the Dove: Natio-Statism and Catholic-Protestant Christianity in China Today", in 道风 Daofeng [Logos and Pneuma], (Hong Kong, Spring, 2011).

③ In fact, Marxism should oppose "the faith in state", for it argued that state was only some tool and would disappear in the future; and Marxist communism advocated the elimination of state: Workers have no motherland! Communism aims at "free development of every person" as well as of humankind. K. Marx and F. Engels, *Communist Manifesto*, Chapter 2.

more, the principle that “state is above collective, collective is above individual” was propagated as basic part of communist morality. From 1980s on, with the decline of “communist faith” in the official propaganda, “patriotism” has been raised to the top. And we should know that the Chinese word *aiguo zhuyi* translated from patriotism has literally lost any sense of “patria” or country-fellows as object of love, leaving instead the sense of *guo* (meaning State) as the only object. In this way, the word “patriotism” has readily become the properly expressive symbol of the faith in state.

Actually, the “faith in state” is just one of the “non-religious faiths” or beliefs mentioned above in Section 4. Judging in the perspective of religious philosophy, these various “non-religious faiths” can be called “quasi-religions” or “pseudo-religions”, which mistake as the Ultimate those various kinds of the penultimate or non-ultimate, such as human doctrines or isms, wealth, power, rankings, fames, etc. As the worldly state itself has no ultimateness and is not God, the faith in state is nothing more than a worship of some human power.

Therefore, the “state faith” in the third sense, the “faith in state”, has the same relationship to religious faith with that of any other quasi-religion and pseudo-religion to religious faith. That is to say, firstly, it is in opposition to and competition with the religious faith, as it is not religious faith but concerns ideas of value; secondly, it is not in full competition with religious faith (especially in the country where atheists or people with no faith form a majority), as it is some kind of quasi-religious or pseudo-religious faith.

Just for this reason, we can see that many religious people are also patriots in today’s China, in other words or in terms of this paper, they have also the “state faith” in the third sense.

Of course, what we are here referring to is just a social appearance, namely, a superficial phenomenon existing among masses that are occupied by livelihood earning and cannot spare time for considering such concepts or relationships.

Of the essence, true religious faith should relativize all the worldly things and affairs, including the state. Therefore, true religious believers could have different concepts or ideas of the state, but should not absolutize it as an object of faith; instead, they should treat the state with reason. After all, living memory of the humankind tells us that the “faith in state” or statism has brought to the world enormous catastrophes in the last century; and clear reason tells us that the “faith in state” distorts the human nature and reverses the order for the state and the people, transforming the state, the tool for the purpose of people’s happiness, into the goal at the expense of people’s happiness.

The significance of discussing this topic is to remind us of the existence of this danger.

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中文题目：

## 当代中国的国家信仰与宗教信仰

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**提要：**“国家信仰”(State Faith)这一概念在其各层次有不同的意涵,可区分为:国家的信仰(state's Faith);国族信仰(National Faith);对国家的信仰(The Faith In State)。本文从概念和实际两方面分别阐述了以上三者在当今中国的产生、存在状态及其可能的走向并探讨其与各大宗教的关系。其中,本文着重论述“对国家的信仰”,认为其根源于中国传统中强大的集权力量,这种力量对社会的控制在现当代臻于顶峰,使得社会将其抽象化,以至于成为信仰对象。对这种伪宗教(Quasi-Religion)的信仰势将滋生非理性的连锁反应,进而威胁社会机体的健康,与现代社会要求理性审视国家权力之主旨不符。

**关键词(Keywords)：**国家信仰、国族信仰、伪宗教

# A Theology of Chopsticks

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**Abstract:** This article considers chopsticks as an element of Chinese culture for expressing an existent theology in contemporary China. It seems that the contemporary Christian church in China has advanced into “adolescence” and has had her own experience of growing up, but she is not yet mature, since she is so eager to receive new ideas but so often negatively influenced by them, and has frequent mood swings. She struggles under the burden of traditional authority, a complicated political context, an immature system of church organization, changes in socio-moral ideology, and disordered biblical interpretation. Contemporary China is both politically and culturally complex and the theology of chopsticks is an attempt to achieve a balance between the two. This theology of chopsticks is a form of contextual theology with four core ideas: coexistence, balance, cooperation, and two-as-one. These ideas have been utilized to examine the relationship between: 1) gospel and culture, 2) globalization and contextualization, 3) reason and faith, and 4) church and state, in terms of theological viewpoint. Since this paper is only an introduction to a theology of chopsticks, the ideas expressed here are just a starting point and a tentative exploration.

**Key words:** chopsticks, gospel and culture, globality and locality, faith and reason, church and state.

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## An Introduction: Chopsticks as an Element of Chinese Culture for Expressing an Existential Theology

In Chinese, chopsticks are *zhǔ* (箸/筴), a two-piece instrument for eating food. <sup>①</sup> We do not know when and where chopsticks were invented, but chopsticks are popular tableware in China with a history of more than 3000 years. There is no doubt that China is where chopsticks originated, and today there are many nations in Asia that use chopsticks as tableware, such as Japan, Korea and Vietnam. From the viewpoint of cultural tradition, chopsticks are not only a distinctive part of Chinese traditional culture, but also an element of Asian culture.

The materials of chopsticks are simple. We can imagine that use of chopsticks began as part of agricultural culture in ancient China, when it was easy to make chopsticks from a branch of a tree in wild country. Chopsticks are taken from nature and suggest a simple life; they are closely connected to the context of farmers and labourers. Chopsticks demonstrate how peasants cultivated their lands, farmed their fields, and enjoyed their own lives. Chopsticks are the most popularized tableware in Chinese traditional culture. Sometimes different materials for making chopsticks could identify the users' social status and the amount of wealth they possessed. Generally speaking, chopsticks represent a most popular and egalitarian form of tableware. The materials of chopsticks can be cheap or expensive, light or heavy, such as gold, silver, bronze, steel, black wood, padauk, bone, boxwood, blue-white porcelain, bamboo, ivory, plastic, and so on. Sometimes artists or rich people also try to decorate chopsticks by carving them or inlaying them with precious metals or stones.

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<sup>①</sup> 陆容 Lu Rong,《菽园杂记》*Shuyuan zhaji* [Bean Garden Notes] 卷一：“民间俗语，各处有之，而吴中为甚。如舟行讳往，讳翻，以箸为快儿，幡布为抹布”。快，谐音为“筷”。（见《辞海》*Cihai* [Cihai -dictionary], 1989 年版,2122）。

However, no matter the material or how it is decorated, the functional importance of chopsticks as tableware in food-culture remained the same. Therefore, chopsticks represent a simple and pure cultural artifact that can be enjoyed by both the high and the low because they are close to the reality of life.

Chopsticks' cultural particularities and their symbolism are significant, and they are useful for creating a Christian theology in both theory and practice when we add some socio-religious interpretation. The basic idea of this paper is that chopsticks in Chinese tradition represent not only the primary need but also the cultural equality of common people. It seems that chopsticks' purity and simplicity silently reflect the peasants' spiritual perplexity, their needs, their helplessness, their existential dignity, their pursuit of a better and more satisfying life, their eagerness, and their understanding of the fast-changing world. We can say that chopsticks are a special gift and a kind of existential wisdom given by God to Chinese people. Chopsticks can stimulate associative thinking about Jesus' disciples, their boats and their nets on the Sea of Galilee. Chopsticks also lead me to think of Moses' shepherding staff and the twelve baskets used to hold the pieces left from the "five loaves and two fish". The Chinese church needs to express the spirituality of the community of faith in a way that reflects the existential reality of "working with believing". For this reason, chopsticks are an existential sign that conveys the significance of both individual and group faith; tranquility, purity, simplicity, aspiration, and love. In this paper, I understand chopsticks as an important cultural element for developing an existential theology that is culturally contextualized. Therefore, it is entitled "a theology of chopsticks".

A theology of chopsticks is understood as seeking the proper balance between the "bitterness of laboring" and the "happiness of believing". No one can avoid the bitterness of laboring, as God punished Adam and his wife when they sinned. The Bible says, "by the sweat of your brow you shall eat bread, until you return to the ground, for out of it you were taken. You are dust, and to dust you shall return." (Gen. 3:19) Chopsticks were created and refined by peasants in China, they are as cheap and simple as dust, but they are also as expensive and dignified and sincere as dust. As human beings, laborers need faith, God, and reverence, to respect and be respected, to love and be loved. Chopsticks narrate these basic aspects of being human. Both "bitterness of laboring" and "happiness of believing" are important for expressing the originality and the innocence of human beings as well as the civilization of humankind.

Therefore, human beings can receive happiness and hope through believing in the Lord Jesus Christ. Christians neither live alone, nor avoid the real world. When Jesus left his disciples, he prayed to his Father: "now I am coming to you, and I speak these things in the world so that they may have my joy made complete in themselves." (Jn 17:13) This joy comes from belief in The Lord. The theology of chopsticks attempts to seek a harmony between material satisfaction and spiritual need, as well as to keep a balance between the helplessness of poverty and the eagerness to get rich. It is concerned about some basic questions: why do people live? How can people's lives be more significant? These questions are existential and today have become important social/religious/cultural/moral issues. Seeking faith cannot wait for material perfection; rather, pursuing human dignity and rebuilding existential conviction must occur at the same time. Hence, material satisfaction and spiritual need, as well as the helplessness of poverty and the eagerness to get rich are like chopsticks-though their lengths differ and they be neither equal nor complete, yet chopsticks must be two-piece.

The theology of chopsticks here has four core ideas: coexistence, balance, cooperation, and two-for-one. Chopsticks are plural. A single stick cannot become zh? (箸/筴/筷). Only when two sticks are combined, keep balance, mutually cooperate, and work together properly do they become



chopsticks. In this way, chopsticks symbolize bringing out the best in one another. A good Christian theologian is like a skilled user of chopsticks—he/she can proficiently handle chopsticks to take fine food and taste great theological cuisine. A pair of chopsticks cannot be separated, but depend on each other. For this reason, I suggest using these four core ideas: coexistence, balance, cooperation, and two-as-one to build a theology of chopsticks. “Coexistence” here means two sticks mutually exist in combination. “Balance” refers to a proper tension through which the efficiency of using chopsticks can be optimized. “Cooperation” has to do with “working-together” and refers to the skillful practice of using chopsticks and looking after one another. Finally, “two-as-one” means “walking-together” and implies that a theology of chopsticks is a theology of “two legs walking”, where both share a joint target. Thus, “walking together well” gradually becomes “working together well”.

It seems that the Christian church in contemporary China has entered into “adolescence”, she has had her own experience of growing up, but she is not yet mature, since she is so eager to receive new ideas, but so often negatively influenced by them, and has frequent mood swings. She struggles under the burden of traditional authority, a complicated political context, an immature system of church organization, changes in socio-moral ideology, and disordered biblical interpretation. In this article, I develop a theology of chopsticks based on the above-mentioned four core ideas—coexistence, balance, cooperation, and two-as-one—to examine theologically the relationship between: 1) gospel and culture; 2) globalization and contextualization; 3) reason and faith; and 4) church and state.

## 1. The Relationship between Gospel and Culture

Christianity has developed for 2000 years since the time of Jesus. The relationship between gospel and culture has been very complicated. In Christian history, the relationship between gospel and culture has experienced many changes, at times harmonious and at times in conflict, even to the point of causing religious wars. Do gospel and culture necessarily conflict when Christianity enters different cultures? I would rather think not.

H. Richard Niebuhr (1894-1962) in *Christ and Culture* (1951) describes five different forms that the relationship between Christianity and culture can take, namely, Christ against culture, the Christ of culture, Christ above culture, Christ and culture in paradox, and Christ the transformer of culture.<sup>②</sup> In these different forms of interaction between the gospel and culture, Niebuhr does not say that the gospel and culture must be “tit for tat” nor does he relativize them. On the contrary, his main idea is not only to promote dialogue between Christianity and local culture, but also to propose the possibility of mutual accommodation and adaptation between the gospel and culture. Niebuhr hopes to prevent conflict between Christianity and local culture, but not all conflict is unavoidable. Thus, he seeks a proper method for promoting mutual accommodation that is also applicable in the case of Christianity encountering a non-Christian cultural context.

In the past thirty years, Christian development in China has not encountered great opposition. Religious policy has been relatively tolerant, the number of Christians is increasing rapidly, theological education is blooming, the positive influence of Christianity is well recognized, and more and more Chinese people have learned from Christian civilization. At the same time, the rapid development of Christianity in China has aroused social attention, and many scholars keep a watchful

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② Niebuhr, *Christ and Culture*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1951), 45-229.

eye on the contemporary development of Christianity. Some attitudes toward Christianity are rational and calm; however, others are critical, especially those from the viewpoint of cultural-sociology. Consider the following two cases:

Case I: On 18<sup>th</sup> Dec. 2006, ten scholars from different universities published a public proposal together titled “Our Viewpoints on Christmas”.<sup>③</sup> The article argues that the Chinese people should deal cautiously with “Christmas Fever”. They see Christmas as a form of western cultural expansion in contemporary China, and are concerned that the rise of Christmas and its prevalence in China can lead to a de-emphasis on Chinese traditional culture. They urge business persons to profoundly re-think their commercial actions, and remind the younger generation of the reality of Christmas. They argue that the blind following of Christmas reflects a “mass cultural unconsciousness”, hence they propose that China should reemphasize the importance of Chinese traditional culture and strengthen traditional cultural education and be deeply concerned about folkways and customs. However, they also declare that their article does not aim at opposing the Christmas of Christians or the activities of Christmas organized by and for the Christian churches.

Case II: On 27<sup>th</sup> Dec. 2010, an author named Chixian Mingyi published an article on the Internet titled, “They Want to Crucify Confucius; A Comment on the Event of Building a Church at Qufu”.<sup>④</sup> Qufu was Confucius’ hometown 2500 years ago and is now still an attractive, well-known and symbolic place of Chinese traditional culture. The article asserts that the Confucians who worship in the Confucian temple will feel a great pressure if Christians want to build a church only three kilometers away from Confucian temple, more than ten meters above the height of the temple, and which can accommodate three thousand Christians. They feel that such a Christian church would be like a big frog in a small pond, as Qufu is a small city with an architectural style of Ming-Qing dynasties. They also suggest that the number “3000” is a sarcastic action toward Confucius. The author also argues that building a Christian church at Qufu is a plot, and that the local government does not understand that it is firstly a political event, secondly a cultural event, and thirdly an economic event. Culturally speaking, the author says that the issue of Qufu local people’s cultural mentality and emotion must be taken into consideration. Building a Christian church does consider the wishes of Qufu’s Christians, but it does not respect the feelings of Qufu’s 600,000 non-Christians. Christians at Qufu are only about 10,000. According to the author, Qufu belongs to Chinese over the world, therefore building a Christian church at Qufu needs to consult all Chinese people. They feel that they cannot tolerate the event, and they neither want to see religious-cultural conflict in Confucius’ hometown, nor to see Confucius and Mencius kneel to a foreign Christian culture. The author also asks for supporters in many ways, and the article has already attracted significant support from Confucian persons and organizations around the world.

Generally speaking, in the past 30 years, Christian development in China has not been troublesome. The above-mentioned cases are not representative of the relationship between local cultural conflict and Christian expansion in contemporary China. However, the cases do reflect how the rap-

③ The article can be seen in internet, in Chinese:《走出文化集体无意识,挺立中国文化主体性:我们对“圣诞节”问题的看法》*Zouchu wenhua jiti; wu yishi, tingli Zhongguo wenhua zhutixing: Women dui Shengdanjie wenti de kanfa* [Leave from the Collective Non-realization of Culture, Support the Objectivity of Chinese Culture: Our Opinions on the Issue of Christmas], (2010/3/12) [http://news.xinhuanet.com/edu/2006-12/21/content\\_5515642.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/edu/2006-12/21/content_5515642.htm), <http://bbs.5iyq.com/viewthread.php?tid=48640>

④ The article can be seen in internet in Chinese: “赤县明夷 Chixian mingyi”:《他们要把孔子钉死在十字架上——评曲阜建基督大教堂事件》*Tamen yao ba Kongzi dingsi zai shizajia shang ——Ping Qufu jian jidu dajiaotang shijian* [They want to crucify Confucius on the Cross ——Reflection on the Issue of Cathedral Construction in Qufu]. (2011/9/11) <http://www.tianya.cn/publicforum/content/free/1/2066811.shtml>

id revival of Christianity in China has caused many concerns, in which some are supportive, some approve, some are neutral, some oppose, and some are uncertain. All these concerns imply that the possibility of the conflicts between the gospel and culture can still be seen. At the same time, these phenomena also show that the contemporary social mentality is complicated, and they imply a lack of cultural-psychological preparation for, and anxiety and apprehension about, the development of Christianity.

Case I “Christmas Fever” as a Christian cultural phenomenon is a reality in contemporary Chinese society and reflects a commercial action under the influence of economical globalization. “Christmas Fever” indicates that a conceptual and commercial Xmas has become fashionable in metropolitan areas and that it has created many commercial chances for businessmen. Xmas has not only become a symbol of consumption and of the economic-cultural strength of upper-middle classes, but has also become an imitation of the western life-style for urban youth. For non-Christians, a commercial Xmas is the result of rapid process of urbanization in contemporary China. This phenomenon reveals the loss of identity of modern Chinese people on one hand; on the other, it displays an external cultural strength and de-emphasis of local traditional cultural. The phenomenon of “Christmas Fever” can be understood as a secularized Christian revival on the surface, as a commercial celebration of a Christian festival and a non-religious fast-food culture.

“Christmas Fever” has been causing a lot of arguments about cultural conflicts. Some people see Xmas as a chance for self-satisfaction through consumption and for getting relief from the pressure and nervousness of urban competition. Some understand Xmas as the expansion of western culture, hence they suggest that it is not only necessary to protect Chinese traditional culture, but also to reject Xmas. Some feel that the young generation is so lacking in traditional cultural education that it is possible for the youth to be blind followers of non-rational westernization. Some also say that it is not necessary to be so worried, perhaps the youth are just looking for fun and relaxation. Some regard Xmas as a phenomenon of economic globalization, and do not consider it necessary to see Xmas as a seriously religious occasion or expression of cultural conflict. Some also complain that Xmas has become a festival of the rich, and because of the gap between rich and poor is getting larger, the story of “The Little Match Girl” has been repeated in contemporary China. Some argue that the youth attending Xmas’ eve is like taking part in a temple fair during Spring Festival and that they treat Xmas the same as hip hop street dancing or as participating in Valentine’s day.

Case II obviously shows that the possibility of conflict between Christianity and Confucianism still exists. The case reveals a core problem: some (many) people in contemporary China still view Christianity more as “a foreign religion” than a Chinese religious belief. They do not accept Christianity as a Chinese religious community through which the church can be built, and Christian charity and non-profit organizations can be set up. That is why they understand building a Christian church at Qufu not only as “a political/cultural/economic event”, but also as a demeaning action towards Confucius and one that implies Confucians kneeling to a foreign religion. This view at least reflects that the process of Chinese contextualization of Christianity has a long way to go. If we can treat Christianity not as an imported religion but as a Chinese mentality, then we may see building a church in our own land as our own business. Perhaps this approach could be useful to reduce the confrontation. At the same time, this case also exposes non-Christian society’s lack of a proper attitude toward the rapid development of Christianity in China, and reveals the crisis of Chinese cultural self-confidence that makes it hard to understand, accept, or acknowledge the newcomer.

It does not necessarily matter if Xmas must be religious or if building a church at Qu-fu pressures or challenges others. But religiously speaking, these two cases remind us that Christianity should not be too closely tied to western culture and western life-style. It is not right to tie religious

Christianity to Western Christian culture, because when doing so, Christianity is easily misunderstood as foreign cultural expansion, then it consequently causes the vigilance of Chinese traditional culture, so far as to lead the possibility of so-called “cultural conflicts”. Chinese Christians not only need to avoid making Christianity a victim of globalization, but also need to seek a more harmonious existence and positive development in contemporary China within the context of globalization. It is not good to see that Christian development is unharmonious with Chinese traditional culture. It would be very bad if we find that the conflicts between Christian development and Chinese traditional culture cause mutual political distrust between China and the West, a confrontation between the gospel and culture, or cultural relativism. When the development of Christianity deeply touches local culture and ideology, the criticism could occur. Cases similar to “Xmas Fever” and building a church at some culturally influential place can also be seen other countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Therefore, we may think of the importance of chopsticks: the gospel and culture must be able to “coexist harmoniously”, “accommodate each other”, “balance each other”, “cooperate with each other”, and “walk together”. We believe that Christianity is positively alive, Chinese traditional culture is alive, too. Chinese Christians should hold the chopsticks firmly, as they are both Chinese and Christian, and integrate the identity of Christian belief and the identity of Chinese traditional culture. Cultural identity cannot replace one’s religious faith, all human beings have the right to choose their own religious belief. At the same time, one’s religious faith cannot change his/her cultural identity such as race, complexion, custom, or language. Cultural identity in this sense is congenital. All human beings are born into a certain culture, and while they may change their lives, but they cannot change where they were born. The identity of faith is given by God, and it is accepted by humans through free will and reason as well as spiritual choice. Personal faith belongs to the human pursuit of the ideal. Therefore, both cultural identity and the identity of faith are honorable and indispensable. God never demands that a Christian or a theologian give up their own cultural identity. The Christian gospel and Chinese traditional culture in contemporary China can coexist, and it is unnecessary to create or promote a disharmonious and mutually disadvantageous outcome.

From my point of view, the Christian gospel is an excellent seed, while Chinese traditional culture is a splendid soil; plant an excellent seed on some splendid soil and it is not hard to see it bloom and bear fruit. We are not to intentionally enlarge the conflicts between the gospel and culture, but should seek the wisdom given by God to avoid conflict. The gospel and culture should not war against each other, since they are not enemies, but allies.

## 2. The Relationship between Globalization and Contextualization

Globalization is defined as “a social process” that produces an existential transformation of humankind whereby people develop cross-regional interactive relationships. In this way, globalization reflects the extent and rate of progress of human civilization. Globalization sometimes is seen as “global proximity” and “global interconnectedness”. Some directly define globalization as “the world as a whole” or as “a global village” or “deterritorialization”. There is another definition given by the UN for describing a close international relationship, which is “our global neighborhood”.

The definition of contextualization is not counter to the definition of globalization, and contextualization does not mean “deglobalization”. Contextualization is from contextus in Latin, literally meaning “connection” or “coherence”. The Latin etymology of the word consists of the Latin preposition cum (with) and the verb texere (to weave), and it then accordingly becomes “weaving to-

gether”, and by extension “the time-space boundaries of understanding”. Spanish philosopher José Ortega Gasset correctly uses “I am me and my circumstances” to describe a contextualized existential reality; people do not exist outside themselves and their circumstances.<sup>⑤</sup> This philosophical interpretation constitutes an excellent definition of contextualization. In general, contemporary China is experiencing the close interaction of both globalization and contextualization. Challenge and opportunity coexist, particularity and universality are woven together, integration and de-integration, cooperation and competition, as well as independence and interdependence all intersect. Christian theology is both global and contextual. The theological thought of 2000 years of Christian history is characterized both by globality and locality, by universality and particularity. Through the close interaction of globalization and contextualization, the spirit of Christianity can settle in Chinese cultural soil and benefit the revival of China.

The theology of chopsticks is beneficial for dealing with the relationship between global and local. In contemporary China, the relationship between global and local is a hybridized cultural phenomenon, and so is hard to analyze. The global sometimes can be realized in the local; similarly, the local can exist in the global. For example, in the process of globalization, cultural universality is easily perceived, while economic globalization is also spreading. While Coca-Cola becomes more and more popular, the idea of Coca-Cola becomes a globally fashionable cultural sign. Although some Americans still regard the idea of Coca-Cola as American, many people feel that it belongs to the world. A similar phenomenon is evident with Chinese restaurants becoming popular throughout the world, and therefore Chinese food culture belonging both to China and the world. Coca-Cola and Chinese restaurants imply a cultural weaving of “global in local” and “local in global”. Coca-Cola and Chinese restaurants do not necessarily lead to cultural homogeneity or cultural hegemony, but can also produce more complicated interactions around the world, leading to greater cultural diversity and cultural heterogeneity. It is not easy to judge the good or bad of such interactive phenomenon, but we hope it will become a virtuous cycle. When the global encounters the local, both undergo a process of close interaction.

From the viewpoint of Christian theological contextualization, in contemporary China there is a reality that Christian ideas and Neo-Marxism are not effectively syncretized, but harmoniously co-exist. Transplanting Christian thought into a non-Christian context needs a localized process of digestion and acceptance. Chinese culture is so tolerant and flexible that the global and the local can become friends. The theology of chopsticks signifies a positive balance between global and local within complex interactive circumstances. Christianity is both global and local, which means that Christian faith is global, but Christian existential contexts are always local. Both global and local are co-existing, balanced, cooperative, and interactive; Christianity as a religion is “international”, but it is still “national”. In this sense, “national” can be “international”. In the past 30 years, Christianity in China has maintained independence; in the meantime, it kept a close relationship and dialogue with ecumenical Christian bodies. For Chinese Christianity, “independence” and “interdependence” can work in concert. Since the 1980s, Chinese Christianity has tried to recover diplomatic relationships with churches all over the world. Chinese Christians do not wish to see Chinese churches isolated from ecumenical churches. The churches in China are strengthening their communication with other churches around the world while stressing their own national independence. The churches in China do not want to establish a branch of Christendom that is separated from other churches around the world. In one sentence, independence and interdependence are simultaneously

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<sup>⑤</sup> Costas, Orlando E. , *Christ Outside the Gate: Mission Beyond Christendom*, (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1988), 4-5. José Ortega Gasset (1883-1955) was a Spanish philosopher, who was teaching metaphysics at the University of Madrid.

important for today's Christianity in China.

Christian theology not only attempts to express human aspirations such as human rights, dignity, freedom, and equality; it also attempts to discover the differences of human existential circumstance such as cultural context, historical background, political structure, human ethos and so on. Christianity as a global religion asks that theology be simultaneously concerned about both the global and the local. However, Christian theology as an academic discipline cannot completely rely on international or regional political transformation, as no theoretical study can always keep up with political changes. It is not right to say that the enterprise of Christian theological contextualization should follow globalization, political idealism, or westernization. China faces both opportunity and challenge, while encountering uncertainty and changeability. Hence, the development of Christian theology should be closely tied to this era, and it would not be a good choice for Chinese Christian churches to shut themselves off from global and local reality.

Chinese Christian theologians, therefore, should carefully listen to the revelation of God as it speaks to Chinese Christians and the church in this era, and keep a balance between globalization and contextualization. Doing Christian theology in contemporary China requires a proper attitude: "doing and thinking contextually and globally simultaneously". Global and local are equally important for Christianity in China, where cultural diversity has already long existed. Doing Christian theology and the practice of Christian faith are both in the process of globalization and of contextualization. They are conducive to establishing a healthy, orderly, and highly developed society. That is why Chinese Christianity should pay close attention to both the global and local aspects of contemporary transformation. Locally speaking, utilitarianism, non-realism, and blind optimism are of no use in the construction of a contextual theology; globally speaking, the uncertainty and unpredictability of globalization seem to be possibly influential factors in Chinese Christian theological construction. The emphasis on theological contextualization does not hinder China from becoming a superpower; in the same way, the stress on globalization does not exclude the achievement and constructiveness of Christian development. Chinese Christianity not only stands for contextualization, but also for globalization. Two legs, globalization and contextualization, need to be equally strong, and then they can walk together properly. This view fits with the theology of chopsticks we are considering here.

### 3. The Relationship between Faith and Reason

The relationship between faith and reason has been one of the most controversial theological issues for long time in the history of Christian theology. For Christians, "faith" not only means "belief" or "dogma", but also the acknowledgement of key Christian ideas such as the authority of the Scriptures, confessional elements, doctrinal thought, spiritual experience, the gospel, the revelation of God, personal salvation, the inner life, the fidelity of believers, and so on. "Reason" not only means "knowledge" or "learning", but it also basic human thinking abilities, such as analysis, criticism, understanding, methodology, epistemology, interpretation, and so on. In the history of Christian theological thought, many Christian theologians have kept a balance between faith and reason. Completely irrational faith easily becomes superstitious; similarly, purely rationalized belief easily declines into atheism. Some of the main viewpoints on the relationship between faith and reason are given below.

The first is "I believe because it is absurd" (*credo quia absurdum est*). It is said that this theological phrase was invented by Tertullian (ca. 196-212). We know that Tertullian was an important theological master who defended Christian orthodoxy. He stressed the idea of "the rule of faith"

(*regula fidei*), and upheld the hermeneutic principle of realism against abstract speculation, philosophy, and metaphysics. His theological thought was full of rational radiance. The phrase, “I believe because it is absurd” emphasized Christian faith as an acceptance of absolute obedience, although many interpretations of Christian dogmas (as such the Incarnation, the Resurrection, and the Trinity) could not be proved on rational grounds.

For Tertullian, the greater the absurdity of Christian faith, the more Christianity expanded. Similarly, the more difficult God is to understand, the more believers are convinced. For instance, Tertullian argued that the Son of God was crucified, dead and buried, that these things are absurd, but they must be believed. Similarly, the resurrection of the Son was undoubtedly absurd, and the resurrection goes against ordinary experience, but Christians deeply believe it. Faith is above ordinary human reason. Tertullian’s thinking of the relationship between faith and reason was highlighted paradox, as he asserted that the gospel is a foolish philosophy, yet that Christian faith and the interpretation of Christian truth can be still rational. The phrase “I believe because it is absurd” refers to a reality that some particular understanding and interpretations of Christian faith transcend reason, and even sometimes go against human reason. Christian faith cannot always be clear within the context of rational analysis, and Christian faith cannot always act in accordance with critically logical speculation.

The second is “faith prior to reason” (*fides praecedat rationem/fidei prius credamus*), which was based upon St. Augustine’s religious thought. “Natural law” is an important theological idea that was taken from Platonic philosophy. Augustine understood “natural law” as a basic principle of the rational human soul. According to Augustine, “natural law” is a result of human reason and conscience, and the created human can know the existence of “natural law” through their own reason and conscience. This is his theory of illumination, namely, God is the source of grace and of the truth, God illuminates the human spirit, God is the light of the truth, human reason may understand and interpret God’s truth through illumination from God. However, Augustine emphasizes that human reason cannot be illuminated unless human reason is under a pious faith. Therefore, faith must be prior to reason, just as the illumination of grace is prior to human cognition. For Augustine, all human cognition is decided not by human reason and conscience, but by the faith of human beings that is the result of the will and illumination of God. Hence, Augustine believes that humans cannot understand and interpret God and His truth unless they trust in and love God. Augustine stresses that faith is more important than reason in a certain sense, although reason always helps us understand and interpret the nature and substance of God. Faith and reason are coincident, and they are given through the Creator’s wisdom. Augustine argues that we should not try to understand God’s word in order to believe, but believe God’s word in order to understand.

The third is “faith seeking understanding” (*fides quaerens intellectum*), which also means “I believe in order that I may know” (*credo ut intelligam*). It is said that Clement of Alexandria (150-215) was the earliest person to put forward this idea. And later in the Middle Ages, the idea was developed by the early Scholastic theologian Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109). Anselm asserted that faith and reason are not contradictory and faith can be relied on reason, but he did not suggest that man can be converted to Christianity solely through depending on reason. He hoped that correctly using reason as an effective weapon could reduce and revise the misunderstandings of unbelievers. At the same time, reason can enrich, strengthen and deepen human faith. This view made a positive contribution to anti-heresy during the Middle Ages.

The final formulation is “I understand in order to believe” (*intelligo ut credam*), which was supported by the Scholastic theologian Peter Abelard (1079-1142). Abelard stressed the importance of human reason for Christian faith, namely, “understanding for believing”. He overturned

the idea of “faith seeking understanding” which was given by Anselm of Canterbury. Abelard’s theological methodology had a tendency toward rationalism and skepticism. He proposed that seeking and understanding the truth involves interrogation, and raising questions. Doubt is not sinful, but the beginning of the truth. Therefore, for Abelard, Christian theology was an analytical and speculative science.

The above-mentioned four typical relationships between faith and reason have influenced Christians and churches in different ways for a long time. We cannot say that one is better than the others; rather, we need to absorb and learn from all of them for building a stable foundation for our Christians and churches. From the viewpoint of Christian development in China, currently, Chinese churches need to avoid two extremes. The first is over-liberalism and pure rationalism. Since the start of the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century, western rationalism has been dominant for two hundred years. In contemporary China, the rise of Christian rationalism has caused the decline in Christian piety and division in the churches. A non-religious Christianity could result in a reduction of Christian numbers. Urban Christians and the so-called intellectual Christians have had a tendency toward Christian rationalism. The second extreme that calls for attention is Christian fundamentalism and an overly conservative faith. Chinese Christian faith is sometimes mixed with Chinese folk religious characteristics, so that they are not only uninterested in but also completely ignore church tradition, dogmatics, and church order. Sometimes they are characterized by local traditional piety, social-cultural ideological purity, and personal stubbornness. In some rural areas, Christians still maintain their simple and completely non-rational faith. Nowadays, there is an anxious phenomenon that urban Christians and rural Christians question the reality of one another’s faith; they doubt one another just as Christian fundamentalists and liberals have done in the West.

Therefore, we need to deal with this issue using the theology of chopsticks. From the viewpoints of the doctrine of Creation by God and the doctrine of human nature, human beings were created by God in God’s own image and likeness (*imago dei*). The image and likeness of God means that God has given humans reason, free will, spiritual sensitivity, conscience, emotions and so on. Faith and reason are from the same root, according to the doctrine of Creation by God. Opposing and depreciating human reason has caused believers to move toward Christian extremism, heresy, and even superstition. On the contrary, opposing and belittling Christian faith and religious experience has led rationalists toward atheism and the loss of religious faith. Faith and reason are intertwined. Like a pair of chopsticks, faith and reason should be equally important.

One would become a robot if their faith was without reason, because they would not be able to think. God has given man free will in order that human beings can use reason to think. Faith and reason should not become the victims of relativism; on the contrary, they should be maintained in a balanced and cooperative coexistence, as they influence and constrain each other. Faith and reason need to be integrated to build a whole “person”. In this sense, the theology of chopsticks is helpful. Faith and reason for Christians are like a pair of chopsticks that cannot easily be separated from each other or operate exclusive to one another. Rather, they are mutually attractive and cooperative. God delights in human beings who are reasonable, good at thinking, and full of wisdom, but did not give them reason, knowledge, and the capacity to think so they would oppose Him or give up their faith in Him or be arrogant. Similarly, God is pleased by a faithful and pious and moral person, but he does not bestow faith in order for people to degenerate into ignorance, stubbornness, unreason, and non self-control as well as superstition.



#### 4. The Relationships between Church and State

According to Sun Yat-sen, politics simply means the administration of people. Then we may say that the Christian church as a community of faith existing in the society is also political. Christian faith can be individual, but the Christian church as an assembly of believers cannot be completely isolated from society. The church is multitudinous, social, and a community of faith. It is both *ecclesia* and *koinonia*. Though the Christian church may have its own independent ideology and political system both in theory and practice, it cannot be separated from the reality of worldly politics. Even though the Christian church can have its own independent administration, it is still political as the expression of a political ideal. In the past 2000 years, the relationship between church and state has encountered many difficulties. We cannot subjectively say that one model of the relationship between church and state is better than others in different times. Similarly, we are not able to give an absolute judgment on the relationship between church and state in different contexts. What we can do is to learn from the history, which in Chinese is *yi shi weijing* 以史为镜, meaning literally “see history as looking into a mirror.”

Now let us start by presenting the different forms of relationship between church and state that have occurred over the course of the history of Christianity.

In the first century, when Christianity started, the relationship between church and state had not yet formed. The Christian church was not yet become an organized institution, but a newly born religious phenomenon that encountered many criticisms and strong opposition from different socio-cultural powers. The strongest attacks and persecution came from the dominant classes and political rulers. When Christianity came into existence, the Roman Empire had already long existed. Jesus did not participate in politics, but he did discuss politics. Paul had been a leader, persecuting Christian churches and Christians, and he knew all about politics. Later when he converted to Christianity, he was no longer interested in politics, but became an apostle of the gospel. Christianity in the time of Jesus and Paul had not yet developed a certain type of relationship between church and state.

However, we need to consider how to understand and interpret the saying given by Jesus that is recorded in the Synoptic Gospels (Matt. 22:15-22; Mark 12:13-17; Luke 20:20-26). When he was asked whether his disciples should pay taxes to Caesar, Jesus answered, “Give to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and to God the things that are God’s”. Many people understand the words as the key theoretical basis for understanding the relationship between church and state. In fact, the sentence of Jesus did not deeply touch upon the principle of the relationship between church and state, nor put forward a conclusion concerning the relationship between church and state. Rather, it was a political opinion of Jesus on the subject of whether his followers should pay taxes to the Roman government. The Jews had political rights, but were under the rule of Roman authority at the time. Jesus suggested that his disciples and followers should pay the taxes to the government and honor secular authority, while maintaining their faith in God and obeying the sovereignty of God and honoring God. This was a political viewpoint and an opinion on paying taxes. Jesus proposed that “the things that are Caesar’s” are different from “the things that are God’s”, which means that church and state belong to different realms of authority and therefore do not have to interfere with each other. According to some biblical commentators, Jesus did not clearly mention how to distinguish between the things that are “Caesar’s” and “God’s”, nor did he suggest how to deal with conflicts between the two. He did not attempt to specifically define the boundaries between government and

church or between political authority and church power. ⑥ Paul basically followed Jesus' idea when he said in Romans 13:1-7, "let every person be subject to the governing authorities." (ESV) Peter, too, took a similar viewpoint (I Peter 2:13-17). Both Paul and Peter emphasized Christian "obedience" or "subjection" to secular authority. The two reasons they gave are as follows: first, they believed that secular authority existed by God's permission; for them, secular authorities and earthly institutions are divinely appointed. The second reason is that they believed that God uses secular authorities to punish those who do evil and to praise those who do good. Therefore, the existence of political institutions is the will of God. Christians as human beings are social, too. Hence, Christians should accept the supervision, restriction, and administration of secular regimes. In this sense, earthly powers are the servants of God, too.

One influential example of the relationship between church and state we need to consider is "the combination of church and state" (in Chinese zhengjiao heyi 政教合一), also called "the integration of church and state" (in Chinese zhengjiao yitihua 政教一体化). When Constantine (288? -337) became Roman emperor, he converted to Christianity and ended the persecution of Christianity. From AD 313 until his death, he vigorously promoted Christianity as the state religion of Rome. From that time on, Christianity was officially protected and enjoyed many privileges. On the surface, making Christianity the official religion of Rome promoted the unity of church and state. However, in fact, the relationship between church and state since Constantine became a complicated and blurry affair. During the Middle Ages (5th to 15th centuries), the relationship between church and state became more ambiguous, and political authority and church power often clashed. Generally speaking, "the combination of church and state" in the Middle Ages became the mainstream model. Given the dominant influence of Roman Catholicism both in European culture and in Continental ideology, church authority and political regimes needed to be close, so that European secular politics often intervened in and infiltrated Christian church organizations and personnel systems. In theology, the thought of theocracy and Christian ethics deeply influenced people's lives. All these elements fostered the integration of church and state in the Middle Ages; the relationship between church and state as well as between secular authority and church authority was not separable.

The second model to consider is "church exceeds state" (in Chinese jiao gaoyu zheng 教高于政). In the Church Fathers era, Tertullian (active 196-212) and Cyprian (200-258?) were main supporters of Episcopacy. Practically speaking, in the aspect of church administration, Episcopacy implied that church authority could be more prior to secular authority; however, this did not lead of necessity to the idea of "church exceeds state". In the Middle Ages, there were some Christian theologians who emphasized the importance of the idea of "church exceeds state". For example, Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109) asserted that church authority must be higher than secular royalty, and he opposed the viewpoint that bishops can be appointed by the King. For this reason, he even clashed with William II (1087-1100) and had to go into exile two times, from 1097 to 1100 and from 1103 to 1106. Similarly, the Pope Gregory VII (? -1085) also emphasized that church au-

⑥ 见《圣经·串珠注释本》新约 Shengjing . Xinyue [The Bible . New Testament] 部分, (上海 Shanghai: 中国基督教协会 Zhongguo jidujiao xiehui [China Christian Council], 1995), 52。《圣经新释》新约 Shengjing . Xinyue [The Bible . New Testament] 部分 Shengjing . Xinyue [The Bible . New Testament], (南京 Nanjing: 中国基督教协会 Zhongguo jidujiao xiehui [China Christian Council], 1998), 41。《21 世纪圣经新释》21 shiji Shengjing xin shi [The New Interpretation of the Bible in the 21st Century], (香港 Xianggang: 福音证主协会 Fuyin zhengzhu xiehui [The Association of Evangelical Testimony to the Lord], 1999), 990。杨牧谷 Yang Mugu 主编,《当代神学辞典上册》Dangdai shenxue cidian . shangce [The Contemporary Dictionary of Theology, the First Volume], (台北 Beibei: 校园书房出版社 Xiaoyuan shufang chubanshe [The Campus Bookstore Press], 1997), 215。

thority should be prior to secular authority, and thought that Roman Bishops had global authority, whereas all secular regimes should be limited by political, territorial, national, and cultural factors. In this sense, church authority was above that of nations, geography, culture, and ideology. Later, in the period of Pope Innocent III (Pope 1198-1216), the Pope boasted himself without scruple as the vicar of Christ, so that he alone could lead the world.

One of the most important Christian theologians in the Middle Ages was St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), who in theological theory promoted the idea that the Pope had an absolute authority not only over the churches, but also over all nations. In 1274, the infallibility of the Pope was asserted by the Second Lyon Council. In 1302, Pope Boniface VIII even announced that the Pope has two swords: one is spiritual, and the other is secular. For him, the Pope should rule over both the worldly and spiritual realms.

The formation of the idea “church exceeds state” resulted largely from the following factors. First, in the Middle Ages, the conception of nation was not fully developed. Second, basic education, culture, and academic work depended upon the Christian church. Third, secular political science not yet became mature and practical. Therefore, the authority of the Roman Pope became so influential that church exceeded state. Of course, the relationship between church and state in the modern world is very different from that of the Middle Ages, due to the impact of the Reformation and modern civilization. Some countries still treat Christianity as a “State Religion”, and the churches still strongly influence public politics; however, in the aspect of church administration, secular and ecclesiastical power are now clearly distinct from each other and church organization has become more democratic. For instance, both Lutheranism and Anglicanism remain national religions, but stress that the church should be subject to the state.

The third example to look at is “the separation between church and state” (zhengjiao fenli 政教分离). The separation between church and state was the outcome of the Reformation after 1517. The outbreak of the Reformation in Europe was partly due to the unreasonable relationship between church and state. On the one hand, the rise of Christian humanism in the 15th century effectively helped Christians realize that church authority had become so dependent on secular political regimes that Christian faith had become dead. On the other hand, secular authority was not satisfied with having to obey church authority. Both Luther and Calvin generally proposed the principle of “the separation of church and state”, but both demanded that Christians should obey the authority of secular government, because they believed that secular regimes and national systems are from God, and that God has given rights to secular government by which social order and worldly discipline are justly maintained. Since the Reformation, the principle of “the separation of church and state” has become a consensus both in secular society and in the Christian churches. But some different interpretations on “the separation of church and state” still remain, and the types of relationship between church and state are diverse. Nevertheless, we may say that it is good to avoid opposition between the two as much as possible.

It seems that the relationship between church and state in contemporary China faces a dilemma. According to contemporary circumstances in China, it is not possible for the current relationship between church and state to be “church exceeds state” (jiao gaoyu zheng 教高于政). Similarly, the politicizing of Christianity would cause the loss of Christians in Chinese society, and the emphasis on complete separation between church and state is quite difficult, too. In other words, both “the combination of church and state” (zheng jiao heyi 政教合一) and “the separation of church and state” (zhengjiao fenli 政教分离) in the current context are not possible. Honestly speaking, in Chinese history, during the four dynasties of the Tang (618-907), Yuan (1279-1368), Ming (1368-1644), and Qing (1644-1911), the existence and development of Christian

churches were without exception under the principle of national control. It has not been possible to find a good model in Chinese history that fits the category of “separation of church and state”.

Currently, the relationship between church and state can be described as a new model: “church follows state” (zhengzhu jiaocong 政主教从), as suggested by Dr. Zhuo Xiping.<sup>⑦</sup> In my understanding, it does not mean that the Christian church in China blindly follows the government, but that the revival of Christianity in China must be closely linked to China’s national benefit and national revival. We do not have to quickly judge whether it is right or not, but it describes a proper relationship between church and state because of its social reality. It is a contextual description, which can indicate the characteristics and current political circumstances. Therefore, the idea “church follows state” is not innovative, but practical and realistic.

This description “church follows state” is also based upon and coincident with current Chinese national conditions and cultural context. National conditions here mean that the country is under the rule of the CCP (Chinese Communist Party), the mainstream ideology and central values are officially socialist and neo-Marxist; cultural context means a Chinese-centered-cultural diversity. For this reason, it is not possible for Christianity to be a so-called national religion. The description “church follows state” is useful for highlighting the priority of national benefit, of religious personnel able to participate in political activities, and of government administration of religious affairs by law. In the contemporary atmosphere of national revival, religious legalization is necessary and reasonable, as it helps to promote a national system of administration of justice, by which the personal freedom of all citizens can be protected and national politics can be reasonably carried out. Religious legalization signifies seriously considering the close connections between personal freedom, legalized social construction, and national development. There are some useful limitations on personal freedom and political groups, so that the value of harmony is neither empty propaganda nor simply a media construction, but a necessity for the development of social reality. The nature of law is only to rebuild a system of social organization. Law cannot deal with everything, but a society will fall into disorder if there is no proper legalization.

From the viewpoint of Christian churches in today’s China, the relationship between church and state may be traced back to the teaching of the Bible. Generally speaking, the Bible confirms the basic Christian attitude toward secular authority such as obedience, respect, and civil obligation (Roman 13:1-7; Titus 3:1; I Peter 2:13-14). St. Paul mentions some basic ideas such as secular authorities being appointed by God; worldly authority playing a positive role in social function for punishing evildoers and praising those who do good; and the obedience to secular authority as a witness to Christ. Therefore, Christians should be positive toward human social responsibility by protecting and respecting human dignity, for example, providing for the aged with filial piety, loving one another, and respecting other people.

The description “church follows state” is based upon the reality of the contemporary context in China but also accords with the key ideas of the theology of chopsticks, such as coexistence, balance, cooperation, and walking-together. Chinese Christianity has stressed the equal importance of the two “C”s, namely, “Christianity” and “China”. Meanwhile, the relationship between church and state in China advocates the idea of “two legs”, whereby the church develops in a healthy way and Christianity becomes more influential, while the state gets stronger. Chinese Christianity is also concerned about the two “S”s, namely, “sociability” and “spirituality”; both Christian sociability

<sup>⑦</sup> 见卓新平 Zhuo Xiping 的文章:《“全球化”的宗教与当代中国》*Quanqiuhua de zongjiao yu dangdai Zhongguo* [The Globalized Religion and the Contemporary China] (Beijing: 社会科学文献出版社 Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe [China Social Sciences Academic Press], 2008)。

and Christian spirituality are important and not opposed to each other. This is the core of the theology of chopsticks. Chopsticks are like a compass, and state benefit and national revival are the centre for all Chinese people, including Chinese Christians. The close relationship between church and state will decide the future development of Christianity in China. Chinese Christianity should not lose its witness in the revival of China in this age.

## **Conclusion**

In this article, we described the cultural elements and symbols of chopsticks, we also analyzed doing Christian contextual theology in contemporary China needs to use Chinese cultural elements, and chopsticks are just one of them. The theology of chopsticks promotes the central ideas of “coexistence”, “balance”, “cooperation”, and “walk-together”, by which we attempt to deal with the complicated relationships between gospel and culture, global and local, faith and reason, and church and state. We have to recognize that the general context in contemporary China is both politically and culturally complex, and the theology of chopsticks is an attempt to achieve a balance between these two elements. The title of this paper in Chinese uses the word *chuyi* 刍议 which means an introduction. Thus, this idea of a theology of chopsticks is just a starting point and a tentative beginning.

中文题目:

## 筷子神学刍议

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**提要:**本文借用筷子作为中华传统文化元素以表达当代中国基督教“生存神学”。当代的中国基督教会好像一个进入“青春期”的孩子,有了自己的成长经验、容易接受新鲜理念但也容易被他人影响,叛逆烦躁又无法自控;在传统权威、政治处境、不成熟的教会体制、变化异常的伦理观念以及混乱的圣经解释中茫然不知所措。在本文中,笔者借用“筷子神学”的“共存”、“平衡”、“合作”、“并行”理念来尝试讨论基督教在中国当代处境中所面对的如下关系:福音与文化的关系、全球化与处境化的关系、知识(理性)与信仰的关系以及教会与国家的关系。本文认为基督教神学有利于使用“筷子”的文化元素和象征意义来表达基督教神学的丰富内涵。当代中国的国情无论在政治还是文化上都极具复杂性,“筷子神学”只是当前的一种尝试。本文是“刍议”,因而只是一个入门的介绍和好奇的窥探,作为基督教处境化神学的抛砖引玉之工作。

**关键词:**筷子、福音与文化、全球性与本地性、信仰与理性、教会与国家

**实践神学与中西教会和社会**  
**Practical Theology and Sino-Western**  
**Views on Church and Society**





# **Cold War Religion: The Influence of the Cold War on Religion in China and the United States<sup>①</sup>**

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**Abstract:** The protracted conflict between East and West known as the Cold War (1945-1989) affected all aspects of international relationships. This paper examines the impact of the Cold War on religion in China and the United States. The Cold War politicized religious communities, especially Christianity; created a “binary” mindset in the relationship between religion and rival ideologies; shaped views on Christian mission; and undermined common religious values such as love and tolerance. Religion was manipulated by the politics of the Cold War in both the “Capitalist” West and the “Communist” East. The non-aligned movement provided space for alternative conceptions of religion, but only to an extent, and it remained an area of contestation in Cold War politics. The Cold War affected a variety of religious concerns including religious freedom, religious exchanges, theological construction, interreligious dialogue, religion and national policy, religion and economic development, etc. It is my thesis that there is a continuing legacy of what I call “Cold War Religion” that inhibits mutual understanding, interreligious dialogue, religious studies and the flourishing of religious communities. If religion is to become a factor in the creation of a more peaceful and harmonious world, then the legacy of the Cold War has to be addressed and overcome in religious communities and in the study of religion.

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**Key words:** Cold War, Christianity, Chung Hua Sheng Kung Hui, Communism, Capitalism

This paper is an initial attempt to call attention to the legacy of what I term Cold War Religion. It is a conference paper proposing further study in a neglected area of research.

The Cold War is generally understood as a period of political, economic, military, ideological and cultural conflict, competition and hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union, and their allies. This protracted conflict between East and West affected all aspects of national and international relationships between 1945 and 1991. The Yalta Conference in February 1945 may be said to mark the beginning of the Cold War, for this was when Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill met to plan the post-war world. The dissolution of the U. S. S. R. and the declarations of independence in Eastern Europe may be said to mark the end of the Cold War. Over the last two decades, this period has begun to be studied all over the world, and at least part of the purpose is to understand its continuing effect on society and politics today. Archives have been opened, conferences have been held, and books have been published, often co-operatively, by scholars and public figures in the East (the former Eastern Europe) and the West. <sup>②</sup>

Between the East and the West was the non-aligned movement, sometimes termed the “Third

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<sup>①</sup> This paper was first presented in Forum of Social Sciences (Religions), Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, 7-9 December 2011.

<sup>②</sup> For a review of some of the major studies, see the bibliography in John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History* (New York: Penguin, 2005), 299ff.

World,” and this was an important region for Cold War intervention, politically, militarily and culturally.<sup>③</sup> The “First World” encompassed the powerful capitalist nations led by the United States; the “Second World” referred to the socialist countries of the Soviet Bloc; the “Third World” encompassed the non-aligned “underdeveloped” and “developing countries” in the rest of the world, including China. The idea of a non-aligned movement was symbolized by the Bandung (Indonesia) Conference of April 1955, hosted by President Sukarno. This conference was attended by Prime Minister Nehru of India and Prime Minister Zhou Enlai of China among other leaders in Africa and Asia and was the precursor of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The Bandung conference affirmed the identity, role and cooperation of newly independent or liberated countries of Asia and Africa. The Conference made a major impact on life together of nations of Asia and Africa. The so-called “Bandung Spirit” had great influence in the region. But it was regarded with suspicion in the West, even in religious circles.

The major Cold War struggle was between the United States and the Soviet Union, but within third World, China was a central concern for each. China was in one sense part of the non-aligned movement, but because of its size and influence, it had a role of its own. The same could be said of India. China’s involvement in the Cold War has been studied by scholars in the West, and by Chinese scholars based in China and in the West. The judgment of Andrew Nathan and Robert Rees on China in the Cold War is perceptive:

During the Cold War, China was the only major country that stood at the intersection of the two superpower camps, a target of influence and enmity for each.<sup>④</sup>

The Cold War clearly had an influence on culture. One of the earliest uses of the term “Cold War” was George Orwell’s reference in a newspaper article published in 1945. He described a world living with the threat of nuclear war in a “peace that is no peace,” and thus a permanent “Cold War.”<sup>⑤</sup> From the very beginning, Cold War tensions were foreshadowed by this great British man of letters. Over the next decades, Cold War themes were reflected in all aspects of world culture: literature and film, television and the press, music and painting, religion and ideology.<sup>⑥</sup> Cold War cultural themes in the East, the West and the non-aligned world stressed ideological conflict; the threat of nuclear annihilation; “godless communism” versus liberal democracy; patriotism and intolerance of “the other.” In short, there was a particular “Cold War Culture” with definable characteristics, colored by contrasting contexts, but reflecting similar themes.

Religion was naturally one of the areas of culture and society affected by the Cold War. This essay is an exploratory study of the impact of the Cold War on religion and the study of religion, focusing on China and the United States. As such, it is an initial attempt to introduce what I term “Cold War Religion,” a subject requiring much more attention in religious circles and among scholars.

I begin with a brief consideration of religion and the Cold War in general terms, with particular respect to the Cold War in Asia. I identify three key themes and some of the subject areas for what

<sup>③</sup> Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

<sup>④</sup> quoted in Chen Jian, *Mao’s China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 2.

<sup>⑤</sup> George Orwell, “You and the Atomic Bomb,” October 19, 1945, *The Tribune*, cited in Till Geiger, *Britain and the Economic Problem of the Cold War* (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 2004), 7.

<sup>⑥</sup> Stephen J. Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War*, 2nd edition (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

I term “Cold War Religion,” themes I will then use in a brief survey of religion and the Cold War in the United States and China, focusing on the 1950s. As a case study of the impact of the Cold War on religion, I then take up the separation of the Hong Kong Sheng Kung Hui from the Chung Hua Sheng Kung Hui (中华圣公会) in 1951. In a small way, the painfulness of this separation was to some extent lessened through the use of religion. In my conclusion, I speak briefly of the continuing legacy of Cold War interpretations of religion in China and the United States. Overcoming this legacy will take a concerted effort in addressing the questions that continue to obstruct religious tolerance and love.

### **Themes and Subjects in the Study of Cold War Religion, with particular respect to Asia**

The Cold War emphasized a permanent state of conflict that existed between Capitalists (the United States and its allies, the “First World”) and Communists (the USSR and the Soviet Bloc, the “Second World”). The former saw itself as the liberal and democratic option, the latter as the progressive and revolutionary option. For the United States, the Soviet Bloc was seen as dictatorial, violent and repressive, for the Soviets, the United States was seen as exploitative, greedy and counter-revolutionary. There is truth in both the self-characterizations and the characterizations of the other, but this does not imply the moral equivalency between the two. What it does suggest is a state of permanent and irreconcilable opposition, which set forth a certain “binarism” or black and white dichotomy in cultural terms.<sup>⑦</sup> With the rise of détente between the Soviet Bloc and the West beginning in the 1970s, overt hostilities were somewhat lessened, but binary opposition continued to shape religion, religious studies and views of religion in East and West

The importance of ideas and ideology in the perpetuation of the Cold War is now generally acknowledged. The Cold War was not only about oppositional interests, economic efficiency, military build-up and geopolitical rivalry; it was also about ideas, and I would argue beliefs, that moved people and shaped their societies. Religion, religious organizations, religious studies and religious ideas in this way become important windows on the Cold War. While the Cold War does not provide a comprehensive framework for studying religion or international religious relationships in the post-World War II period, it does provide one way of understanding and problematizing national and international religious developments, a perspective that has been neglected in the past.

I want to suggest that are at least three themes that should be included in the study of Cold War religion. These are, in effect, inter-related hypotheses that need to be tested, debated and refined. Each of these themes distorted religious “values” (a problematic term, to be sure), and undermined common religious beliefs such as love and tolerance that might in other circumstances have had a greater impact on promoting dialogue and understanding.

1. *The Cold War intensified the politicization of religion and religious studies.* There is always a political dimension to religious beliefs, and religion has been fruitfully studied in its political aspects for hundred of years. However, during the Cold War, religion and religious organizations were politicized in ways they had not been before. This led to polarization and division in religious communities. Religion was manipulated by rival ideological claims. International religious organizations became subjects of government scrutiny; religious groups took stands on Cold War

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⑦ The term “binarism” has been popularized in post-colonial theory, but I am using the term as a convenient way of indicating the reduction of pluralism and nuance into polar opposite categories.

politics; theologies were examined or developed according to their political implications; institutes for religious studies and religious (or area) studies programs were set up in many countries, often with political interests in mind. The politicization of religion during the Cold War resulted in a distortion of religious belief and practice.

2. *Cold War “binarism” was reflected, intentionally and unintentionally, in religious attitudes and beliefs.* While there are many sources of binary as opposed to pluralistic attitudes in systems of religious belief, the Cold War exacerbated the opposition of differences. In so doing, complex religious ideas were simplified and put to uses that were contrary to their origins. Thus, for many in the United States, to be Christian was to be anti-Communist, and Communists in the Soviet Bloc were almost by definition anti-religious. In China, religious bodies had to demonstrate they were “patriotic,” while many churches in the United States became increasingly nationalistic. The terms were different, but categories of understanding were polarized: the spiritual versus material, good versus evil, black or white, right versus wrong. These categories became hardened during the Cold War, divided religious communities and undermined tolerance and openness to others in faith and love.

3. *The Cold War decreased the space available for the open expression of religious ideas and practices.* By space, I mean both physical space and psychological “space” in the sense of places for reflection upon non-binary and depoliticized religious ideas. The non-aligned movement was such a physical space, but it too became an area of contestation in Cold War Religion. The public sphere, especially the academy, was another such area of contestation. The reduction of religious space sometimes led to a reduction to the private sphere or to certain times and places. Although Cold War Religion decreased available space, it did not eliminate it, and the in-between places suggest hopeful areas in need of further study.

Bearing these three general themes in mind, let me turn to some of the subjects that will be important for the study of Cold War Religion, especially in Asia.

For universities and centers of religious studies, as well as for churches and religious communities, international religious organizations, Western mission agencies, the Vatican, and the Orthodox World, the role of Christianity in the Cold War is part of a continuing history. My focus is on Christianity, for it is arguably the religion most immediately influenced by (as well as influencing) the Cold War. General themes include: Christian anti-Communism; pro-Communist Christianity; Christianity in the non-aligned movement; Vatican policies in socialist and former socialist countries; and the role of Orthodox churches in Asia. All of these have only recently begun to be studied, but attention has been mainly on Europe, and the major books in the field barely touch upon Asia.<sup>⑧</sup> the focus has mainly been on Europe and the West. The international ecumenical study project, “The Christian World Community and the Cold War” has until recently had a largely European focus, but this may be changing.<sup>⑨</sup>

There is no part of the world where the Cold War had a greater impact on religion than Asia. The Chinese War of Liberation and its aftermath; the artificial separation of Taiwan from Mainland China; the Korean and Vietnam conflicts; the Bandung meeting of non-aligned nations are just the

<sup>⑧</sup> Owen Chadwick, *The Christian Church in the Cold War* (London: Penguin Books, 1993) and Diane Kirby, ed. *Religion and the Cold War* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003). The latter is part of the Cold War History Series, and of the nineteen edited volumes, not one of them deals with Asia.

<sup>⑨</sup> The project is sponsored by the Lutheran World Federation, with support coming from the World Council of Churches and some member churches. There is a small secretariat in Finland. It has a history of five years, and there has held workshops in Sweden, the United States and, this past September, in Bratislava, Slovakia.

most immediate events that come to mind. The Cold War affected Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism and other religions of Asia, not only in relationship to these events, but in the ways in which the religions developed in Asian societies. But Christianity, the dominant religion in both the former Soviet Union and in the United States, was more central to what I am terming Cold War Religion.

What follows is a list of six subject areas that will have to be considered in any study of Cold War Religion:

1.1 *The Departure of Christian Missionaries from China.* The departure of all Protestant and Catholic Missionaries from China was a defining event for Christian Churches in the early Cold war period. ⑩ It affected church-state relations in Asia and the West; it led to a redefinition of church mission policies all over the world; and it ultimately resulted in a decline of Western missionaries in Asia. Although much historical work has been done on this period, very little analysis has been done on the relationship between the departure of missionaries from China and the Cold War, including the influence of former missionaries in the United States and other countries; the effects on churches in the United States and China; and the impact on the foreign policies of those two countries.

1.2 *Vatican Relations with Churches of Asia During the Cold War.* Vatican perceptions of political developments in other parts of the world were shaped in the post war period by the changes in Eastern Europe. ⑪ This in turn had an impact on the rise of Communist governments in Asia (in Mongolia, China, Korea and Vietnam) and the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Bloc, with the Vatican strongly supporting US policies and perspectives. Vatican-China relationships were broken off in the 1950s, and there has been no normalization to this day. In addition, Roman Catholic politics has had an impact on Cross-Straits relationships for the past six decades.

1.3 *The Korean War.* The Korean War, like the Vietnam War, was in the eyes of Asian people an American War. Christianity in the US and in South Korea developed a strong anti-Communist perspective during the War, and Chinese and North Korean politics developed an Anti-Christian (or Anti-American Christian) perspective. The departure of American missionaries from North Korea, which had been the center of the missionary effort, should be compared to the departure of missionaries from China. The Cold War has not ended on the Korean peninsula, and this is reflected in religious understandings on all sides, especially in the Christian churches.

1.4 *The Non-Aligned Movement and the "Christian" Third Way.* An earlier generation of Third World Christian leadership pointed to Bandung as giving impetus to a new prophetic Christian leadership, especially in Asia. Chinese Christian leaders such as T. C. Chao and K. H. Ting were often included among these. However, Asian Christians outside of China generally sided with the West in the Cold War, although there were also prophetic Asian voices calling for re-

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⑩ Returned missionaries in English-speaking countries, and especially the United States, wrote hundreds of books and articles on their departure from China. One book which revealed deep insight into the long-term significance of the changes this heralded for China and the West was David M. Paton, *Christian Missions and the Judgment of God*, 2nd ed (Grand Rapids: Eerdmanns, 1996). The book was first published in 1953.

⑪ As early as 1849, the Roman Catholic Church was describing Marxian Communism as the Anti-Christ, see the encyclical of Pope Pius IX *Nostis et Nobiscum* (December 8, 1849).

sistance against the West, and support for China. <sup>⑫</sup>

1.5 *Christian-Marxist Dialogue in Asia.* The Christian-Marxist dialogue began in a divided Europe in the 1960s, but Asian Christians participated in the dialogue explicitly and implicitly. Christians from the Soviet Bloc helped to initiate the dialogue. Christians from the West were involved, some as militantly anti-Communist and others as outspoken supporters of the Chinese Revolution and movements of liberation in the 1960s and 70s. In Korea, India the Philippines and elsewhere, Asian Christians developed their own forms of Liberation Theology, which involved an internal Christian-Marxist dialogue, developing theologies that challenged the First World, even though they did not have the support of Asian Churches. These developments need to be re-evaluated, noting their contributions and limitations, in the effort to move beyond Cold War Religion.

1.6 *The World Council of Churches as a Forum for Cold War Debates.* From its inception in 1948, the WCC served as a forum for debates between East and West. <sup>⑬</sup> This is also true of some of the other Christian world communions, but to a lesser extent. Initially, the WCC seemed to side with the West, the key example being its endorsement of the United States (and United Nations) position at the time of the Korean War. By the late 1950s, the WCC was no longer taking consistently “pro-Western positions”, although certain departments continued to be subject to outside political influence. In subsequent decades, the WCC increasingly played a mediating and dialogical role, calling for mutual understanding and tolerance.

This list is not intended to be exhaustive, but it includes most of the big subjects, especially those involving China. Here, I have briefly described each of these areas of interest, with the intent of encouraging further research on Cold War Religion, especially Christianity.

## **Cold War Religion in the United States and in China**

In both the United States and China, the politics of the Cold War, and the intractable (binary) opposition between Communism and Liberal Democracy, politicized religion and reduced the space for the free expression of religious ideas and beliefs. In a recent paper, Swedish Bishop Jonas Jonson has written that the Chinese criticism of Christianity in the West during the Cold War period, should more accurately be characterized as criticism of American Christianity. I think he is correct. Arguably, Christianity became more polarized in the United States during the 1950s than in most parts of Western Europe. In this section, therefore, I limit my discussion to Cold War Christianity in the United States and China. My brief discussion is focused on the 1950s, and I am painting the picture in broad strokes to reflect the tenor of the times.

The Cold War was in some ways a religious war, according to historian William Imboden, especially in the United States. Presidents Truman and Eisenhower believed that human rights and freedom were endowed by God, that God had called them to uphold American values and that Communism, whether in the Soviet Bloc or in China, was evil because of its atheism and restriction of religion. Imboden presents an insightful account of how mainline Protestant theology not only pro-

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<sup>⑫</sup> Ninan Koshy, “Churches and the Cold War: A Third World Perspective with Special Reference to Asia,” conference paper, 2011, 13pp.

<sup>⑬</sup> John C. Bennett and Paul Abrecht, “Cold War,” in *Dictionary of the Ecumenical Movement*, ed. Nicolas Lossky, et. al. (Geneva: WCC Publications, 2002), 212-214.

vided the rhetoric but also helped shape the substance of American Cold War under both Truman and Eisenhower.

The ostensibly secular Cold Warriors became unlikely theologians presenting a new kind of civil religion that was nothing less than a diplomatic theology of containment. This innovative faith arose not in the churches but in the White House itself. . . They formulated a spiritual theology that provided both a “cause” justifying the Cold War and an “instrument” for winning it. <sup>⑭</sup>

In this way, the binary opposition in the United States pitted Communism not only against capitalism, but against Christianity. In this way, the United States, a “Christian country,” became the self-professed defender and protector of Christianity and religious freedom around the world. Any challenge to the United States was seen as a challenge to Christianity itself. The Korean War exacerbated all of this, and for the majority of American Christians, it deepened their faith-based criticism of China, especially after the departure of the missionaries.

Many of the former missionaries on the China mainland went to Taiwan (and to Hong Kong and other parts of Asia), where they helped shore up opposition to the newly established people’s Republic of China. <sup>⑮</sup> The activity of former China missionaries, in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Southeast Asia has barely been studied, but it is an important area for further understanding of Cold War Christianity during this period.

This challenge of Communism was cast in theological as well as political terms. And so, in September 1957, Billy Graham could write,

My own theory about Communism is that it is masterminded by Satan. . . I think there is no other explanation for the tremendous gains of Communism in which they seem to outwit us at every turn, unless they have supernatural power and wisdom and intelligence given to them. <sup>⑯</sup>

In the 1950s, with the sharp post-war rise in religious affiliation, mainline Protestantism reached its peak of influence. Anti-Communist “MaCarthyism” polarized American politics and contributed to the politicization of American Christianity. Many former China missionaries became involved in American politics and their helped shore up support for the Republic of China on Taiwan. The so-called “China Lobby,” led by former Presbyterian missionary Water Judd, was an overt expression of the political and religious Anti-Communism. <sup>⑰</sup> The religious aspects of the “China Lobby” are especially in need of further study. China had become a focus of Cold War Religion in the United States.

Protestant Christianity became closely identified with American nationalism in the 1950s. In order to demonstrate that America was a “Christian country,” the separation of Church and State notwithstanding, the phrase “one nation under God” was inserted into Pledge of Allegiance. The

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<sup>⑭</sup> William Imboden, *Religion and American Foreign Policy, 1945-1960: The Soul of Containment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 102-3

<sup>⑮</sup> Many former missionaries and Chinese Christians from the mainland went to Hong Kong and Taiwan after 1951. In Taiwan, Roman Catholics, Lutherans and Methodists tended to support the Guomindang.

<sup>⑯</sup> Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War*, 81. To be fair to the Rev. Graham, he began to modify his ideas in the 1970s, and became increasingly less political in later years. Even though he changed his mind, it is certainly not the case that all his followers did.

<sup>⑰</sup> Ross Y. Koen, *The China Lobby in American Politics* (New York: Harper and Row, 1974).

Congressional bill authorizing this change was signed into law on Flag Day, June 14, 1954.<sup>18</sup> This was to distinguish American nationalism from the nationalism of the Soviet Bloc. Two years later, Congress made “In God we Trust” the official motto of the United States, with similar intent.

There were significant dissenting voices in the United States, in the churches and among theologians, so the diminished space for prophetic religious expression was not completely eliminated. Also, by the 1960s, the politicization of American religion had begun to wane, and some churches began speaking out against the manipulation of Christianity by Cold War politics. Still, most American the churches had already been politicized in Cold War terms, and for many of the more conservative denominations, this politicization has continued.

The situation of Christianity in China in the early 1950s was very different, and Cold War politics were secondary to consolidating the new government. The reduction of space and the politicization of religious communities was also much more intense, especially after the outbreak of the Korean War. Chinese Christians had to demonstrate that they were patriotic, and a Cold War “binarism” of religious beliefs and attitudes emerged. Although the contexts were vastly different, the effects on Christianity were in some ways comparable.

I have written elsewhere about Chinese Christianity in the early 1950s, and there is no need to repeat what I have said there.<sup>19</sup> But by way of comparison with the United States, it is important to indicate some elements in the Chinese version of what I am calling Cold War Religion. In 1951, Y. T. Wu and others drafted the “Christian Manifesto” which expressed support for the new government and its effort “to build an independent, democratic, peaceable, unified, prosperous and powerful New China” in which Christians would be required to be independent and free from overseas support and control.<sup>20</sup> They then began a campaign for signatures in support of the “Manifesto” in the churches. The statement itself was published on the front page of people’s Daily, showing government endorsement and encouraging Christians to support the ideas of the manifesto.

After the outbreak of the Korean War, the government intensified its criticism of the churches’ dependence on foreign funds and personnel, but more direct action was called for. President Truman had frozen all Chinese assets in the United States in December, and the Chinese government responded in kind by cutting off overseas funding for the churches, universities, American companies and other Western assets in China. This decision was presented to the 151 church leaders at their meeting in Beijing in April, 1951. There would no longer be foreign interference in the work of the Chinese churches. By this time, most of the missionaries had already left China, and the churches were in the hands of Chinese Christian leaders themselves. The Chinese Christian Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM) Preparatory Committee was organized at this same meeting, led by Y. T. Wu and twenty-five other Christian leaders. It was based in Shanghai and staffed by former YM and YWCA workers. This committee was the key structure for the political involvement of Chi-

<sup>18</sup> Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War*, 89.

<sup>19</sup> Philip L. Wickeri, “Contested Legacy: The Formative Years of the Chinese Christian Three Self-Patriotic Movement of the Protestant Churches of China, 1950-1954,” *Studies in Christianity in Chinese Society and Culture from the Fourth International Young Scholars Symposium*, ed. Lau Chingming and Wu Xiaoxin (Hong Kong: Centre for the Study of Religion and Chinese Society, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010), 55-71.

<sup>20</sup> For my earlier discussions of “The Christian Manifesto,” see Philip L. Wickeri, *Seeking the Common Ground: Protestant Christianity, the Three Self-Movement and China’s United Front* (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1988), 127-133 and Philip L. Wickeri, *Reconstructing Christianity in China; K. H. Ting and the Chinese Church* (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 2007), 98, 103.



nese Protestants until the First National Christian Conference in 1954.

One of the first tasks of the TSPM was to oversee the “Denunciation Movement” that was launched to sever the connection between Christianity and imperialism beginning in the spring of 1951.<sup>④</sup> It is clear that the Party and the government urged the initiation of the movement.<sup>⑤</sup> Unlike other mass movements of the early 1950s, in the campaign to denounce missionaries, Chinese church leaders and other Christian institutions was conducted by Christians, although in many cities and towns beyond Shanghai, it was initiated or directed by government officials. The course of the movement was similar to other mass movements of the time. For fifteen months, denunciation meetings were held in churches and public places all across China.

The movements in the early years of the TSPM may be analyzed using the three characteristics I have indicated for Cold War Religion. While the situation was vastly different in the United States, the categories and at times the terminology used was similar. I am not suggesting that the Cold War explains everything about religion in this period, but it helps us understand the different ways in which a Cold War culture shaped both national and international religious relationships in the United States as well as China.

### **The Separation of “The Diocese of Hong Kong and Macau” from the Chung Hua Sheng Kung Hui**

The Cold War had an influence on all aspects of world Christianity in the early 1950s, but this did not mean that everything was politicized and what I would call “binarized” all the time. There was a push back from the churches to play down the political, retain their religious identities and continue to function as ecclesial bodies. What follows is an example of this in the case of the relationship between the Anglican Church in Hong Kong and the mainland. The fact that the Church involved was primarily related to England in the Chinese territory of Hong Kong was a key factor in the way in which the situation was handled. (This is part of a much larger study I am working on dealing with the history of the Anglican-Episcopal tradition in China.) I focus here on the Sheng Kung Hui, but in fact all Protestant denominations in Hong Kong, not to mention the Roman Catholic Church, were shaped by the Cold War in Asia.

The separation of “The Diocese of Hong Kong and Macau” from the Chung Hua Sheng Kung Hui (中华圣公会 CHSKH) in 1951 was part of the more general change in the policy of the newly established government of the people’s Republic of China vis-à-vis religion in general, and foreign religious bodies in particular. This policy was influenced by the outbreak of the Korea War and efforts to consolidate the new government, as noted above. This separation was naturally related to the politics of the Chinese Revolution, but it was also shaped by the Cold War

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④ On the “Denunciation Movement” for this and what follows see *Seeking the Common Ground*, 134-139, and supplemented by 邢福增 Xinf Fuzeng, “打掃房子-1951 年的基督教控訴運動 Dasao fangzi -1951 nian de jidujiao kongsu yundong” (Clean the house - The Christian Movement of Indictment in 1951), in 邢福增 Xinf Fuzeng, *基督教在中國的失敗? -中國共產運動與基督教史論 Jidujiao zai zhongguo de shibai - Zhongguo gongchan yundong yu Jidujiao shi lun* (The Fail of Christianity in China - A Review on the History of Communist Movement and Christianity) (香港 Xianggang: 道風書社 Daofeng shushe, 2008)。

⑤ See for example, “關於解放初期至 1956 年國內漢民族宗教工作路線是非問題的資料 Guanyu jiefang chuqi zhi 1956 nian guonei han minzu zongjiao gongzuo luxian shifei wenti de ziliao” (Materials on the Question of Right and Wrong in Religious Work among Han Chinese, from the early years of Liberation to 1956). Copy of handwritten manuscript, circa 1989. 21pp. Also, 羅廣武 Luo Guangwu 編著, *新中國宗教工作大事概覽 Xin zhongguo zongjiao gongzuo dashi gailan*, 1949-1999 (*An Overview of Major Events in Religious Work in New China*, 1949 - 1999) (北京 Beijing: 華文出版社 Huawen chubanshe, 2001)。

In December, 1950, seven months after the outbreak of the Korean War, the State Administrative Council (SAC) of the people's Republic of China issued a ten point document entitled: "Regulations Governing the Registration of All Cultural, Educational and Relief and Religious Organizations Receiving Foreign Financial Assistance and Managed with Foreign Funds."<sup>23</sup> The stipulations in these policies would of course apply to the CHSKH, which was dependent on foreign funding. In the then Diocese of South China, which included Hong Kong and Guangdong, all salaries and other subsidies were paid by funds under the authority of the Bishop of Victoria, R. O. Hall.

In April, 1951, the SAC invited 151 Protestant leaders to Beijing, and issued a new set of regulations, "Methods for Dealing with Christian Organizations Receiving Financial Assistance from America."<sup>24</sup> These went further than before, calling for an immediate severance of relationships between Chinese churches and overseas mission boards, but insofar as they were aimed at American-funded organizations, they would not be directly related to the work of the Diocese of South China. Nevertheless, a number of CHSKH bishops were at this meeting, and the new regulations would have an immediate affect on the CHSKH, its dioceses and organizations.

On May 13, 1951, Bishop Murong Xian (慕容贤) sent a letter to his friend, the Revd. Chung Laap Yan (钟仁立), Secretary of the Standing Committee of the Synod, informing him of the instructions he had received from a Mr. Law Wah, a government official.<sup>25</sup> This is an extremely important document, only recently rediscovered, and it spells out most clearly the reasons for and methods of the separation of Hong Kong from the CHSKH. Although it is informal, this is the letter that says most about the separation, and in hard copy, it has comments by Bishop Hall in the margins.

In the letter, Bishop Murong writes that "the church should in the shortest possible time break all relationship with Hong Kong," that "Bishop Hall should tender his resignation to the House of Bishops of the CHSKH in order to save trouble in the House of Bishops and in the Diocese of South China," and various other matters, mostly dealing with funds and finance. The various stipulations should be settled before July, 1951. Toward the end of the letter, Bishop Murong writes in a very moving way about his love for the church and Bishop Hall:

I can separate from Hong Kong and the church work can be reorganized, but my spirit towards Bishop Hall could never be separated. This promise I repeat again before God that though the Government authority strongly urged me not to see Bishop Hall again, it is possible in the church organization, but it is impossible in personal spirit. Every morning I pray for Bishop Hall in my private devotion, for over ten years. No matter in whatever environment, I will continue to do so. And I also hope that Bishop Hall will also find sometime to pray for me daily, so in spirit we have intimate communion. I have a lot of things which I would like to talk to Bishop Hall, but in my troublous mind, I could not stop my tears and could therefore write no more. Though I could write our my opinions, but I could not send out my endless tears to Bishop Hall. I pray God

<sup>23</sup> An English version of the text was promulgated by the New China News Agency, reprinted in *Documents of the Three-Self Movement* (New York: Far Eastern Office of the NCCCUSA, 1963), pp. 22-24. Also see 羅廣武 Luo Guangwu 編著, 新中國宗教工作大事概覽 *Xin zhongguo zongjiao gongzuo dashi gailan, 1949-1999* (*An Overview of Major Events in Religious Work in New China, 1949 - 1999*) (北京 Beijing: 華文出版社 Huawen chubanshe, 2001).

<sup>24</sup> 天风 *Tianfeng* 262 - 263 (May 8th, 1951), 202.

<sup>25</sup> Memo and Letter from Bishop Mu Yung In to the Revd. Chung Yan Laap, May 13, 1951, Hong Kong Public Records Office, HKMS 96-1-29. 3pp. The translation of the letter is marked CONFIDENTIAL and there is a note to SKL (Shiu Keung Lee, 李兆強) initialed ROH saying the letter should be preserved as an historical document. I have not been able to find the Chinese original of the letter and I do not know if it exists.

would bless you and our fellow-workers with health and happiness.

This account shows that not everything was reduced to politics, and that need not be binarized and that religious relationships could transcend the politics of the Cold War.

On July 6, a Joint Meeting of the Bishops of in Shanghai (which Bishop Hall did not attend) and the Standing Committee of the CHSKH agreed to the proposals put forth by Bishop Murong and the resultant decisions of the Synod that were made in Hong Kong. On July 7, Bishop Hall received a formal letter from the Standing Committee of the CHSKH, turning over all jurisdiction for the Church in Hong Kong to Bishop Hall.<sup>26</sup> Around the same time Ta Kung Pao, a pro-China newspaper in Hong Kong carried a report on the separation of Hong Kong from the Chung Hua Sheng Kung Hui, but this did not indicate anything about the ecclesial processes that were at work.<sup>27</sup>

On July 8, the Standing Committee of the newly established Synod announced the separation of Hong Kong and Macau from the Diocese of South China with immediate effect. It also called for a meeting of the 20<sup>th</sup> Diocesan Synod from August 6 - 9, 1951. I do not know if there was other communications between Bishop Hall and the CHSKH beyond this. It is not clear from the evidence we have whether Bishop Hall ever formally resigned from the House of Bishops, although we must assume that he did, *de facto* if not *de jure*.<sup>28</sup>

At the 20<sup>th</sup> Diocesan Synod, two resolutions were passed

1. That the Chinese name of the diocese shall be the Hongkong-Macao diocese of the Sheng Kung Hui;

2. That this Synod petitions His Grace, the Archbishop of Canterbury, in his Capacity as Chairman of the International Anglican Communion (Sheng Kung Hui) to supply the Metropolitan functions prescribed in the Constitution and Canons of the Chung Hua Sheng Kung Hui acting as Trustee for the same Constitution and Canons.

It should be noted that in the letter to Archbishop Geoffrey Fisher, the request to serve as Trustee was made to him in his capacity as Chairman of the worldwide Anglican Communion, not as Primate of All England. In his reply to Bishop Hall, the Archbishop consented to the request that he serve as trustee. He indicated that the new diocese was detached “for the time being” and that he would be guided in his Metropolitan functions by the Constitution and Canons of the Chung Hua Sheng Kung Hui, as he prayed for the Church in China.

And so, the Diocese of Hong Kong and Macau came into being. It was a political necessity, but done with a concern for proper Anglican order and religious sensibilities. It should also be noted that Bishop Hall indicated that the HKSKH would temporarily withdraw as part of the CHSKH, im-

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<sup>26</sup> 港奧聖公會月刊 *Gang'ao shenggonghui yuekan*, 1:3 (July 15th, 1951 年7), 1。I have not been able to locate the letter mentioned here. More importantly, I have seen no record of the July 6 meeting in Shanghai mentioned here.

<sup>27</sup> 大公報 *Dagongbao* (Aug. 5th, 1951)。

<sup>28</sup> Bishop Hall was very sympathetic to New China, but this did not prevent his being criticized by the government in the early years of the PRC. One of the reasons for the criticism of Chinese Theologian T. C. Chao in the early 1950s was his relationship with Bishop Hall. According to Wu Zongsu (son of TSPM Leader Y. T. Wu), “他(趙紫宸)的問題似乎是和香港聖公會會督何明華的關係, 基督教立場和《用愛心建立團契》一書。” 趙的聖職是何明華所按立, 又擔任反動的世界基督教協進會的副主席, 帝國主義代理人即由此而來。吳宗素 Wu Zongsu, “落花有意, 流水無情: 我所知道的父親 Hualuo youyi, liushui wuqing: Wo de fuqin Wu Yaozong” (The flower jumps to its romance while water does not echo the affection of drifting water: My father whom I knew), June 2010, 27。

plying that in one way, it was still, in spirit, part of the one church in China. ⑳

### **In summary, we may say the following:**

In 1951, the Standing Committee of the CHSKH, acting on behalf of the General Synod, petitioned the House of Bishops to create a new diocese of “South China” within the jurisdiction of the people’s Republic of China, and to allow a new “Diocese of Hong Kong and Macau” to become a detached diocese, faithful in its order and worship to the Canons and Constitutions of the CHSKH (another indication that in spirit the HKSKH and CHSKH were still one church). A Joint Meeting of the Bishops of in Shanghai and the Standing Committee of the CHSKH agreed to this proposal. The Standing Committee of the HKSKH Synod accepted the separation of Hong Kong and Macau from the Diocese of South China, and the 20th Synod created the new Diocese of Hong Kong and Macau.

I have gone into considerable detail in this case study, for it is part of a broader project I am working on. The separation of the HKSKH from mainland China was not the only example of a hopeful way of approaching the difficult issues brought on by the Cold War, but it shows that there were countervailing forces at work even at the height of the Cold War, and therefore hopeful signs for the renewal of religious love and tolerance in areas at opposite sides of the Cold War divide.

### **Conclusion: The Continuing Legacy of Cold War Religion**

The Cold War is over, and only now are we beginning to understand its history and lingering effects. In the case of religion, and relationships between religious bodies in China and the United States, the effects of the Cold War are still with us.

Since the period of openness and reform, there has been a revival of religious life in China that has been widely written about. The policy of religious freedom was restored; religious organizations were re-established; religious people were rehabilitated, and all religions have experienced significant growth and renewal. To be sure, there are still problems in some areas with the full implementation of religious policy, as well as internal problems in some religious communities. But there has been a fundamental change in direction from the Cold War Years. Since the 1990s, there has also been a significant development of religious studies in China, and this conference is a testimony to that. Overall what I have been calling “Cold War Religion” is no longer a significant factor in China, although some of the rhetoric of the Cold War is sometimes evident in official statements.

In the United States, the situation of the churches has also changed in significant ways since the 1950s. There is no longer a Cold War aura with regard to Christianity and Communism, although this has not yet been fully overcome at either the official or the popular level. (Some have argued that Islam rather than Communism is the new subject of Cold War enmity in the United States.) The lingering effects of Cold War Religion with regard to religion in China are still evident in many churches, government bodies, the news media and other areas. Almost forty years after the establishment of US-China relations, there is still the common perception among American Christians that there is little or no religious freedom in China. I find this astonishing. In official and unofficial “dialogues,” questions about religious freedom are pointedly raised by the American side, with little recognition of the progress that has been made since the period of openness and reform.

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⑳ “Correspondence with the Archbishop of Canterbury,” *South China*, VIII:2 (October, 1951), 11-13.

This is quite different than the situation among Christians in Europe. American scholars, as well as some religious and social leaders, have countered such perceptions, but the legacy of Cold War religion continues.

If religion is to become more of a factor in the creation of mutual understanding and a more harmonious world, then the legacy of the Cold War has to be more directly addressed and overcome in religious communities and in the study of religion. This is important for both countries, and academic conferences have a role to play. More scholarly attention should be given to the Cold War in religious and academic circles. One concrete approach would be an international conference focusing on the Cold War and its impact on religion and religious studies, and this paper is intended, in part, as a contribution toward that end.

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中文题目:

## 冷战宗教:冷战对中美宗教的影响

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**提要:** 东西方向持续的冲突即所谓的冷战(1945-1989)反映了国际关系的方方面面。这篇论文将考察冷战对中国与美国宗教方面的影响。冷战使宗教团体政治化,这在基督宗教教方面表现得尤为突出。同时,冷战在宗教与竞争意识形态关系方面创造了一个二元观念模式,塑造了基督教的使命观点,又削弱了像爱与宽容这样普遍的宗教价值。宗教在“资本主义”的西方及“共产主义”的东方同时被冷战的政所操纵。不结盟运动为非正统的宗教概念提供了空间——但这仅仅是从某一程度而言,并且它为冷战政治保留了一块争鸣的领域。冷战反映出各种对宗教的关注,包括宗教信仰自由、宗教交流、神学建构、宗教间对话、宗教与国家政策,宗教与经济发展等等。拙文将指出,一种本人所定义的“冷战宗教”所留下的持续遗产抑制了相互理解,宗教间对话,宗教研究及宗教团体的繁荣。如果宗教是创建和平以及和谐世界的重要因素,那么冷战所留下的遗产则应在宗教团体及宗教研究中被着重指出及克服。

**关键词:** 冷战、基督教、中华圣公会、共产主义、资本主义

# 基督教与中国公民社会 ——以中国基督教组织的运作模式为中心

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**提要:**当代中国基督教与公民社会的建设,至今尚未呈现直接的、富有成效的互动关系。与此相应,“公民社会”及其相关问题在中国学界的讨论,一直也是见仁见智,众说纷纭。本文以个案研究为基础,结合文献研究,从对公民社会概念的相关讨论入手,论述当代中国基督教与公民社会直接或间接的关系。文章通过基督教教会组织的运作模式,以及这些运作模式与社会公共事业、政府权力等层面的互动关系,讨论基督教作为社会中间团体或信仰共同体,如何成为建设当代中国所亟需的公民社会要素。

**关键词:** 公民社会要素 中介团体 宗教运作模式 公民身份的信仰基础 共同体成员资格

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本文以“公民社会要素”作为基本概念工具,并且以“公民身份的信仰基础”、“宗教-信仰共同体”及“共同体成员资格”等关系的梳理,分析当代中国基督教能否孕育、培养这些公民社会要素,进而论及中国基督教在公民社会方兴未艾的前提能发挥的一定作用。

## 一、“公民社会”在中国的讨论

关于“公民社会”的讨论,曾经有共和主义的或自由主义等方面的公民社会定义,或者是民间社会对抗国家的关系架构,甚至是作为政治哲学的规范概念、社会学的概念工具等等。

一方面,这说明来自西方的公民社会概念,定义方法并不一致,具有经济、社团与文化等若干层面。经济层面的公民社会概念来自于市场经济的发展,强调经济领域是独立于国家权力领域的自主领域,如黑格尔、马克思等人的论述。

强调社团自治的公民社会,主张独立于国家之外的社会自治,突出社团组织对于公民社会的重要性。其思想主要源自于托克维尔,并使许多学者受其影响而讨论公民社会,认为公民社会是国家与家庭之间的中介性社团领域。至于从文化层面讨论公民社会,则主要源自于阿伦特、哈贝马斯的价值观念及其公共领域理论。

另一方面,是这些问题在中国学界的落地,中国学界也同样难有定论,对某些关键问题的认识也尚未达成共识。政治学意义上的公民社会,强调它的“公民性”,公民社会主要是由那些保护公民权利和公民政治参与的民间组织构成;而社会学意义上的公民社会功能,则强调它的“中间性”,公民社会是介于国家和企业之间的中间领域。<sup>①</sup>

<sup>①</sup> 俞可平 Yu Keping,《中国公民社会的兴起及其对治理的意义》*Zhongguo gongmin shehui de xingqi jiqi dui zhili de yiyi* [The Rise of Chinese Civil Society and Its Meaning to Administration],载俞可平 Yu Keping 等著《中国公民社会的兴起与治理的变迁》*Zhongguo gongmin shehui de xingqi yu zhili de bianqian* [The Rise of Chinese Civil Society and the Development of Administration],(北京 Beijing:社科文献出版社 Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe [China Social Sciences Academic Press],2002),189。

然而,当我们“从公民社会这一术语的大多数用法来看,其主要思想是,公民社会是处于国家和家庭之间的大众组织,它独立于国家,享有对于国家的自主性,它由众多旨在保护和促进自身利益或价值的社会成员自愿结合而成”。<sup>②</sup>只是因为当代中国政府有关公民社会的法律制度建设比较滞后,从而使中国公民社会的发育,更多的是一个“民间”的事业。<sup>③</sup>

虽然,公民社会是指非强制性、围绕共同利益、目的及价值的集体行动的社会场所。在理论上,它的建制形式与国家、家庭与市场不同;但在实际上,国家、公民社会、家庭与市场的界限,常常是复杂、模糊可变的。公民社会常常包括了多样的空间、行动者及建制形式,它们的建构程度、自主程度及权力有很大的不同。公民社会常常是由那些慈善团体、非政府的发展组织、社区团体、妇女团体、信仰团体、专业协会、商会、自助组织、社运组织、行业协会、联盟及倡导组织所组成。

改革开放三十年的社会变迁,使国家与家庭之间的界限可以基本定义,但在国家与市场、国家与社会之间却具有难分难解的合作关系。而这一有关公民社会的思想及其实践,恰好也是当代中国三十年来改革开放以来最需要补足的一个层面。为此,要想在当代中国寻找到一个基本独立于国家权力之外的社会领域,的确是很困难的事情。

诚然,我们也不必认为,公民社会是一个不适用于中国问题研究的概念工具。相反,我们应对公民社会相关理论进行再次讨论和诠释,使之与中国公民社会的建设需要真正吻合。基于这些考虑,本文拟不使用“公民社会”作为一个完整概念,用来分析中国宗教与公民社会的关系,而是从公民社会理论的相关讨论中分理出若干公民社会要素,进而分析中国基督教组织运作中能否建构公民社会要素。如果中国基督教的组织运作,能够建构出公民社会建设亟需的若干要素,那么,这就说明以基督教为主体的中国宗教与中国公民社会具有某种内在关系;反之,如果中国宗教的基本运作缺乏这些公民社会要素,那么,中国宗教则可能与公民社会无缘。

## 二、“公民社会要素”及其构成

虽然公民社会作为一个普遍性的整全概念,很难直接使用到有关中国公民社会的讨论中,但对于那些能够对普遍性概念或社会变迁产生影响的那些关系与条件,我们可以加以特别地注意。如果这些关系与条件的变化,能够影响到整个社会的变迁与构成,那么,这些关系和条件也就是不可或缺的社会要素了。为此,本文拟在佛教、基督教的基本运作模式中,寻找那些能够影响公民社会构成的关系及要素,进而讨论公民社会得以构成的基本因素,试图拓展一条研究中国宗教与公民社会内在关系的新进路。

本文认为,“公民身份的信仰基础”、“宗教信仰共同体”及“共同体成员资格”等关系,似能构成中国语境中、宗教运作过程中的“公民社会要素”。而这些要素的培育和发展,无疑会促进中国公民社会的逐步演进,建构为中国宗教与公民社会的必然关联。

自从马歇尔提出公民身份三维体,如公民权利、政治权利和社会权利等概念之后,继而出现了公民身份的文化维度及“文化公民身份”的概念。公民社会理论已经在公民权利、政治

<sup>②</sup> Gordon White, “Civil Society, Democratization and Development”, *Democratization*, No. 3, (Autumn 1994), 375-390.

<sup>③</sup> 高丙中 Gao Bingzhong,《民间文化与公民社会 - 中国现代历程的文化研究》*Minjian wenhua yu gongmin shehui - Zhongguo xiandai licheng de wenhua yanjiu* [Folk Culture and Civil Society], (北京 Beijing: 北京大学出版社 Beijing daxue chubanshe [Peking University Press], 2008), 308。



权利和社会权利之外,开始讨论公民文化权利,<sup>④</sup>从而使公民身份标准的达成取决于文化类型。

在这里,公民文化可以看作是公民身份得以实践的文化舞台,而那些通称为“公民道德”的东西,实际上就是作为一个共同体成员之间的关系集合,至于在宗教与公民社会、公民身份的关系层面之上,这一“文化舞台”就能转换为宗教及其信仰所提供的伦理规范、行动原则,再加上如法律地位、资源、共同体成员的认同方法等等,它们就形成了公民身份特定的道德行为、社会实践和文化信仰的范围,构成了一位“公民”必须具备的公民道德。所以,现代社会中的公民身份、或文化公民身份,它必以一种信仰为基础,或者是在宗教与公民社会的关系层面,必须有一种宗教信仰作为社会交往的中介。这就引出了“公民身份的信仰基础”问题。

其次,宗教信仰体系作为一种社会共同体,它的成员资格的获得,亦能被视为公民社会要素。因为,“在拥有公民身份的地位与拥有共同体成员资格(community membership)之间,存在着一种重要的互补关系。”而“共同体成员资格和个人认同显然是现代公民身份的文化属性”,<sup>⑤</sup>这说明,在公民文化身份与“共同体成员资格”之间,存在着一种相辅相成的互动关系。公民文化身份的获得,首先就是以共同体成员资格的获得作为基础的。

不可讳言,宗教信仰体系同样是一种共同体,是人们理解社会关系的一种重要方式,是人际交往、相互联系的重要方式,亦是塑造人们理解社会世界的重要方式,并能为这种理解方式赋予意义的方式和象征。如果说,这一共同体的所有成员身处同一群体,那么,他们在表达其群体认同感的时候,他们就会吸收一组相同的符号资源,同时也获得了相应的成员资格。而就其群体成员之间的认同功能来说,它就不仅仅是与认同的其他形式相匹敌的一种认同形式,而且还是塑造社会认同的一种共同手段。为此,只要是这些成员具有了身处同一个共同体的体验,这也就是在以同一种方式解释他们所共同面对的社会世界了。<sup>⑥</sup>他们就基本构成了一个共同体的成员资格及其认同。

在此过程中,一个宗教信仰体系,不但能够为文化公民身份提供信仰的基础,而且还能将具有同一种文化身份的公民,定义为同一种信仰共同体的成员资格,最后把“信仰基础”、“信仰共同体”及“共同体成员资格”等关系整合为一体,共同建构了若干公民社会要素,将宗教与公民社会的建设紧紧地捆绑在一起。

虽然,“公民社会”作为政治社会学的一种解析性概念,它是一种分析性定义,偏重于在

<sup>④</sup> 尼克·史蒂文森 Nike Shidiwensen [Nick Stevenson],《引论:文化与公民身份》Yinlun: Wenhua yu gongmin shenfen [Introduction: Culture and Citizenship],载尼克·史蒂文森 Nike Shidiwensen [Nick Stevenson] 编,陈志杰 Chen Zhijie 译《文化与公民身份》Wenhua yu gongmin shenfen [Culture and Citizenship],(长春 Changchun: 吉林出版集团有限责任公司 Jilin chuban jituan youxian zeren gongsi [Jilin Publishing Company Limited],2007),1。

<sup>⑤</sup> 布赖恩·特纳 Bulaian . Tena [Bryan S Turner],《文化公民身份的理论概要》Wenhua gongmin shenfen de lilun gaiyao [Culture and Identity: Critical Theories],载尼克·史蒂文森 Nike Shidiwensen [Nick Stevenson] 编,陈志杰 Chen Zhijie 译《文化与公民身份》Wenhua yu gongmin shenfen [Culture and Citizenship],(长春 Changchun: 吉林出版集团有限责任公司 Jilin chuban jituan youxian zeren gongsi [Jilin Publishing Company Limited],2007),15-16。

<sup>⑥</sup> 阿兰·芬利森 Alan . Fenlisen[Alan Finlayson],《想象的共同体》Xiangxiang de gongtongti [Imagined Communities],载凯特·纳什 Kate . Nashi [Kate Nash]、阿兰·斯科特 Alan . Sikete[Alan Scott] 主编,李雪 Li Xue 等译,《布莱克维尔政治社会学指南》Bulaikeweier zhengzhi shehuixue zhinan [The Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology],(杭州 Hangzhou: 浙江人民出版社 Zhejiang renmin chubanshe [Zhejiang people's Publishing House],2007),298-297。

社会组织方式上的使用。但是,公民社会概念亦能作为一种社会学概念而加以使用。这种用法是,其一,是在某种政治社会学的制度或组织的水平上使用;其二,是使它成为价值和信仰领域的一种现象。<sup>⑦</sup>而本文使用的“公民社会要素”概念工具,则希望把价值、信仰领域与制度或组织的关系整合起来,视宗教为一种社会信仰或信仰社会的社会事实,才能从中孕育出一定的公民社会要素。

### 三、宗教组织:中间社会团体

就宗教与中国公民社会建设的关系而言,我们的问题是:在没有公民结社自由的情况下,如何能够在宗教组织的运作基础上,建构一个具有公民社会特征的信仰共同体,进而建构公民社会建设需要的公民社会要素?

一种共同的宗教信仰,如何能够培育公民社会必备的共同利益和共同共识?如何能够建立一种利益共享、维护共同权利的社群?而缺乏信仰共同体及公民社会要素的培育,会不会使正常的社会交往关系产生断裂?这可能是本文所要讨论的核心问题。

依据当今的理论,公民身份的建构要素,就是必须在市民社会即家庭和国家之间的领域寻找一种中间团体。而中间团体如教堂、社区中心、工会、家长-教师联合会——即能打破会隔离,允许人们相互合作,以发现不然就会被忽视的共同利益(common interests)。如托克维尔所言,它们是“巨大的免费学校”,在这里,公民“不再纯粹关注他们自己。”<sup>⑧</sup>

换言之,公民社会概念即能被理解为国家与市场、个人与家庭之间的一个中介性社团领域,由经济、宗教、文化、知识、政治活动及其他公共领域中的自主性社团和机构所组成。而这些社团成员的自愿结合,在国家关系上享有自主权,以保证或增进团体成员的利益或价值。所以,在公民自由结社的条件尚未具备的前提下,中国公民社会的基本要素,就可能在国家与市场间的“中间团体”中才能找到。因为这种中间团体,能够充分体现目前公民社会的一个重点,即是保持不同群体的参与性,由此而维持社会的开放性。<sup>⑨</sup>

这应当就是近年来学术界的社团研究,常常要与公民社会的研究联系在一起,<sup>⑩</sup>进而把公民社会的相关研究回归到“公民社团”、“民间社团”、“民间组织”等范畴上<sup>⑪</sup>的主要缘由。

在宗教社会学理论看来,所谓宗教组织即是“一种与统一的宗教信仰目标与行为体系相联系的、

⑦ Seligman Adam B. *The Idea of Civil Society*, (The Free Press, 1992).

⑧ 丹尼尔·贝尔 Daniel . Beier [Daniel Bell],《市民社会与公德》Shimin shehui yu gongde [Civil Society vs. Civic Virtue],载阿米·古特曼 Ami . Guteman [Amy Gutmann] 等编,吴玉章 Wu Yuzhang 等译,《结社:理论与实践》Jieshe: Lilun yu shijian [The Politics of Community: Theory and Practice], (北京 Beijing:三联书店 Sanlian shudian [Sanlian Bookstore Press],2006),202。

⑨ Robert Wuthnow, *Christianity and Civil Society: The Contemporary Debate*, (Valley Forge: Trinity, 1996), 93.

⑩ 王名 Wang Ming 等:《中国社团改革:从政府选择到社会选择》Zhongguo she tuan gaige: Cong zhengfu xuanze dao shehui xuanze [The Reform of Chinese Community], (北京 Beijing:社会科学文献出版社 Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe [China Social Sciences Academic Press],2001)。

⑪ 王名 Wang Ming,《民间组织的发展及通向公民社会的道路》Minjian zuzhi de fazhan ji tongxiang gongmin shehui de daolu [The Development of Non-Government Organizations and the Road to the Civil Society];载王名 Wang Ming 主编《中国民间组织 30 年——走向公民社会:1978-2008》Zhongguo minjian zuzhi 30nian ——Zouxiang gongmin shehui: 1978-2008 [The 30 Years of Chinese Non-Government Organizations: Towards the Civil Society 1978-2008], (北京 Beijing:社科文献出版社 Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe [China Social Sciences Academic Press],2008),9。

共同遵照一定的制度规范的信奉者所结成的社会群体。”<sup>⑫</sup>它们作为一种宗教信仰在社会上的存在形式,大多是以中间团体形式的组织实体才有其存在的意义,才能实现宗教的社会功能。因此,宗教组织倘若能具有一种社团式的功能,通过信仰的共享而使所有信仰者的利益正当化,使个人利益能够在社团内或通过该组织而在社会中得以实现,同时也使个人的身份和信仰得到社会的认同,进而让每一个信仰者习惯于在该宗教中的共享方式,建构一种共同体意识。

一般地说来,当代中国宗教组织的基本特征,基本属于国家与市场之间的“中间团体”。虽然其结构特征具有民政部门主管登记,行政部门负责日常管理,即所谓“分级登记,双重管理”模式。<sup>⑬</sup>但是,这些宗教组织能够提供准公共物品,即使是在政府的管理和控制之下,也能开展宗教信仰及其相关活动。所以,它们在一定程度上能够满足信众的信仰需求,实现宗教团体之间的合作与交流,特别是能够在一定程度上,从宗教与国家、宗教与社会的互动关系之中体现出公民社会元素的逐步构成。

#### 四、基督教“堂-点”模式与共同体成员关系

现行中国基督教的组织形态,基本处于一种“后宗派”时期,基本不存在宗派那样的组织体系。中国基督教的宗教团体特性,作为教会和教会联合会之间的协会组织,似难等同于欧美基督教那样的教会组织,本来意义上的教会组织及其与国家、社会结构间的二元对应关系似已不复存在。与宗教团体对应的,则是宗教活动场所。实际上,在中国基督教的基层运作模式中,人们对于基督教的活动场所的管理和强调,已经使基督教活动场所发挥了教会组织的实际功能,而类似于教会组织的“宗教团体”,则演变为一种基督教内部行政管理机构,乃至基督教进入社会、从事社会活动的组织中介。

在中国基督教的基层运作模式中,我们发现了宗教活动和宗教组织的两种制度设置,特别是教派的取消,使宗教团体和宗教活动场所的相对分离,从而把宗教组织悬置起来了,同时也使基督教的活动场所如教堂、聚会点这种并非完全意义上的宗教组织,发挥了类似于民法概念中的“宗教组织体”的多种功能,成为实际的宗教活动团体。因此,当人们言及基督教宗教活动时,往往是一种空间化的基督教活动形式。可以说,宗教团体与宗教活动场所之间的这种空间化倾向,以及对宗教活动场所的过度强化,促使基督教逐步建构了一种与此紧密对应的“堂-点”模式。

据学者的观察和研究,到1949年为止,基督教本土群体占中国基督教徒约二成。主流宗派植堂的努力只是得到部分成功,大多依靠外国资源,或在1949年后依靠“三自”、“基协”的资源。<sup>⑭</sup>在以上两个情形之中,以教堂为中心的教会,大多以城市为基地,难以直接反映当地信徒的灵性需求。自1980年后,中国基督教逐步形成以“点”为中心、或直接以信徒之需要为中心的基督教信仰群体,反而在中国社会生活中找到了合适的位置。因此,当代中国基督教的教会结构及其存在模式,既不同于欧

<sup>⑫</sup> 戴康生 Dai Kangsheng、彭耀 Peng Yao 主编,《宗教社会学》Zongjiao shehuixue [Religious Sociology],(北京 Beijing:社会科学文献出版社 Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe [China Social Sciences Academic Press],2000),113。

<sup>⑬</sup> 俞可平 Yu Keping,《中国公民社会的兴起及其对治理的意义》Zhongguo gongmin shehui de xingqi jiqi dui zhili de yiyi [The Rise of Chinese Civil Society and Its Meaning to Administration],载俞可平 Yu Keping 等著《中国公民社会的兴起与治理的变迁》Zhongguo gongmin shehui de xingqi yu zhili de bianqian [The Rise of Chinese Civil Society and the Development of Administration],(北京 Beijing:社科文献出版社 Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe [China Social Sciences Academic Press],2002),205。

<sup>⑭</sup> 陈剑光 Chen Jianguang、韩德 Han De 著,庄婉芳 Zhuang Wanfang 译,《成形中的巨流:九十年代中国教会》Chengxing zhong de juliu: Joushi niandai Zhongguo jiaohui [The Huge Stream in Forming: Chinese Church in the 1990s],(香港 Xianggang:天道书楼有限公司 Tiandao shulou youxian gongsi [Tiandao Bookhouse Company Limited],1992),32。

美基督教的主教制、长老制、公理制、乃至无教制等教会制度,亦不同于马克斯·韦伯、恩斯特·特洛尔奇总结的教会—教派(church—sect)模式,而是“后宗派”时期的“堂-点模式”。<sup>⑤</sup>

### (1) 基督教的堂—点运作模式

中国基督教的“堂—点模式”,已演变出圣徒相通、“细胞教会”的团契模式,甚至还能区分出若干级关系结构,以配合更高级科层组织实施统一管理。<sup>⑥</sup>教堂与教堂之间,并非教会组织间关系,而是一种行政管理间的互动形式。只有教堂,才在一定程度上具有教会的组织模式。所以,各个地方基督教的教徒、堂—点的增加现象,直接左右了教会制度与信仰认同之间的复杂关系。

其中,“堂”(church building)的模式,是指以基督教活动场所为中心的教堂或堂会制度,教会的信仰和崇拜均以教堂为中心。崇拜空间的处理,是中国基督教组织活动的一个基本原则。其制度原则是经济、圣工、人事的相对统一,并以规模比较大的教堂连带若干个聚会点,有的还在“点”的下面附带着若干个祈祷会等等。“点”(spot for fellowship)的模式,是指那些在固定教堂之外的崇拜与聚会点,所谓祈祷处、聚会点、家庭教会、独立教会等等。它们不具备教堂的格局,主要以信徒的聚会为核心。<sup>⑦</sup>在此聚会形式之中,人际关系、地方利益、权力秩序等因素,决定了这种聚会的形式和规模。就堂—点间的关系来说,它们之间呈现有一种演变倾向。这就是堂点分立式和堂点升级式。

堂—点分立式:一个教堂,常常会隶属有若干个聚会点。它主要采用以堂带点的管理模式,以教堂为中心。教堂实行圣工、人事、经济的统一管理方式。在此基础上,隶属于教堂的聚会点,一般无法自由升级、扩大为教堂。

堂—点升级式:堂—点之间的宗教资源能够两处流动,信徒也可以在堂—点之间自由走动,但堂—点的活动空间基本固定。惟有空间的大小在改变、依据信徒的多少而进行调整。比如,传道人的流动,能够解决不同堂—点之间的教牧关系,而信徒的去向则基本不会流动,固定在某堂某点。在条件允许的情况之下,聚会点可以扩大为教堂。

这种“堂—点”运作关系,可说是中国基督教信仰群体的基本聚会模式。它使群体型的宗教活动,主要环绕堂—点来进行。既非单纯的教会组织,亦非直接的政府行政管理。“堂—点”之间,或可变化,或由“点”扩大为“堂”,或者是“堂—点”并立,或者以“点”的形式长期存在。

### (2) 上海基督教的教堂为中心模式。

以上海市基督教的运作而言,可说是教堂为中心、或以堂带点的模式。它主要以教堂布局为基础,内涵了政府、信徒与宗教团体在一定情境下的互动关系。教堂活动场所及信徒人数的能否自由增加,可通过行政安排获得一定的缓解。其基本情况是,整个上海市共有教牧人员近200名,基督教堂

<sup>⑤</sup> 1996年12月28日颁布的《中国基督教教会章程》Zhongguo jidujiao jiaohui zhangcheng [Constitution of Chinese Protestant Christian Church],第五章第2节“堂点组织的产生”：“堂点组织是指教堂或聚会点的管理机构。教堂建立堂务组织(至少七人以上),聚会点组织教务小组(至少三人组成)。”

<sup>⑥</sup> 以上海基督教为例,它在近年来已基本形成两级教会、四级管理模式。两级教会指基督教市两会与区两会,对基层基督教堂—点进行集中管理;四级管理则指:1,市两会对全市基督教事务的统合管理;2,区两会对本区基督教事务的综合管理;3,教堂对各聚会点的管理;4,堂或点对其它形式的小型聚会点、祷告点的代行管理。

<sup>⑦</sup> 李向平 Li Xiangping,《“场所”为中心的宗教活动空间——变迁中的中国“宗教制度”》“Changsuo” wei zhongxin de zongjiao huodong kongjian —— Bianqian zhong de Zhongguo “zongjiao zhidu” [The “Place” Centered “Space of Religious Activity” —— The Changes of “Religious System” in China],《道风:基督教文化评论:宗教社会学专辑》Daofeng: Jidujiao wenhua pinglun; Zongjiao shehuixue zhuanji [Logos & Pneuma],第26期,(香港 Xianggang: 2007),93-112。

点 165 处,其中教堂 103 座,聚会点 62 处,基本采用了以堂带点的管理模式。在教堂活动中,大抵是几百个专业教牧人员或义工,服事近 20 万名左右的信徒。其中,属于市中心区的黄浦、徐汇、卢湾、虹口、闸北、普陀、长宁、杨浦、静安等九个区共有基督教堂点 27 处,占全市堂点总数的 16%;闵行等 10 个郊区共有堂点 138 处,占总数的 84%。大教堂一般都维修得比较好,特别是那些用来接待海内外访客的教堂,圣经、赞美诗和乐器无不齐备。

如果分区来看,各个区的堂点数量差异很大。拥有堂点数最多的南汇区,共有教堂 9 座,聚会点 20 处,总计 29 个堂点;其次为奉贤,共有堂点 24 处。这两个区的堂点数占了全部堂点数的 32%。长宁、黄浦、卢湾、闸北、静安五个市中心区各自有 2 个教堂,是拥有教堂数最少的五个区。如果单纯从行政区划的角度,每个区的堂点数量相差很大。下表是将这十一个区域按堂点数排序,并计算其向下累积次数与向下累积频率,可以简单反映整个上海市基督教堂 - 点的分布概况。

区域名	堂点数	所占比例	cf ↓	C% ↓
闵行	7	4.2%	7	4.2%
嘉定	8	4.8%	15	9%
浦东	9	5.5%	24	14.5%
金山	10	6.1%	34	20.6%
松江	10	6.1%	44	26.7%
青浦	12	7.3%	56	34%
宝山	14	8.5%	70	42.5%
崇明	15	9.1%	85	51.6%
奉贤	24	14.5%	109	66.1%
市中区	27	16.4%	136	82.5%
南汇	29	17.5%	165	100
总计	165	100		

从表中可看出,上海各区域基督教堂点数分布不平衡,极差为 22 个堂点;中位数是青浦区,既有一半的区域其堂点数低于青浦区所拥有的堂点数(12 处),另一半高于青浦区的堂点数;平均数为 15 个堂点,七个区域的堂点数低于平均数;闵行等八个区域所拥有堂点数占总数的 51.6%,而奉贤、市中区和南汇三个区域的堂点数就占到总数一半即 48.4%。

特别是 1980 年代之后,上海社会经济及其城市的发展,使城乡格局发生了重大变化,因此在一些历史上就没有堂点的地区,由于人口聚集,信徒增加,只好新设了部分堂点。为此,上海基督教的大多数聚会点,均在 1980 年代后才出现。其中,闵行区莘庄聚会点、浦东新区张江聚会点最是典型。

闵行区莘庄聚会点,最初是居民家中一个人仅二、三十人的小聚会,后因聚会信徒增加,在当地租用了一座废弃的蘑菇房,并在其后数年不断扩建,人数增长到近千人。其后是在政府部门的指导下,扩建为莘庄教堂。张江聚会点,则是为了满足该地区集成电子集团外来员工中基督徒的宗教生活需要,在公司会议楼内设立的。近年来也向当地居民开放,聚会人数已近千人,结果也被扩建为正式大教堂。

### (3) “点”为中心温州基督教模式

大都市之外的教徒聚会,却因神职人员和经济资源的普遍缺乏,使教堂之外的以“点”为中心的聚会形式,成为了中国基督教得以发展的一大补充。它们在许多地方教会的基础,最能适应中国社会的变化。

就温州基督教而言,“文化大革命”时期,牧师和传道人大量流失,信徒们只好秘密聚会,在没有牧养人员、没有圣经、没有赞美诗的情况下,坚持聚会。那时,大家只能推举识字较多的信徒给大家读经,做些简单的经典解释。这些聚会的召集人,从平信徒中推选出来,从而积累有丰富的牧会经验,自然成为了地方、家庭教会的领袖。他们成为了教徒模式之外的信仰群体。

此处以温州永嘉教会为例,讨论中国基督教堂-点模式在不同地区的变化。永嘉教会设有十大牧区,两个教派,一个聚会处,一个安息日会。已登记的教堂216个,没登记聚会点,正式的有61处,非正式的有两百多处,堂点加起来,一共六百多处。其中牧师5位、教师7位,长老6位,义务传道、讲道员约一千多人,加上各个聚会点的探访人员,共有3000人。而全县受洗的信徒5万人,慕道友8万人,一共13万人。

在该县的堂-点模式中,教堂也是由上一级组织直接管理,同上海基本一样。教堂内部事务,一般由堂委会进行管理,下设事务组。堂委会一般有十几人,或七八个人,小的只有5个人。堂委会一季开一次议会。但教堂管理模式与上海不太一样,大多数教堂间各自独立,不相隶属。

与上海基督教比较,温州基督徒大都是以家庭为单位的信仰方式,甚至可用一家一户为单位,来统计温州基督教的信徒人数。这已给温州基督教堂点为中心的模式带来重大影响。所以,温州基督教的堂-点关系,似是各自自立。教堂组织是垂直系统,而每一个聚会点则自成体系。在堂-点关系处理上,温州基督教的“点”,虽然还接收来自所属教堂的“主日派单”,但它们却很容易扩展为独立的教堂。新建立的教堂,常常就不再带点,似乎就中断了堂-点演变关系。值得指出的是,温州基督教堂点为中心的模式,它往往不是由隶属于教堂的聚会点拓展为教堂,却往往是把独立的点扩大为教堂。

比如,温州市南区的蒲鞋市教会,历史上具有西方循道公会背景,原是温州市南门教会。这在1970年代是一个老教堂,信徒多是老人。但附近的年轻信徒,常不到教堂,而喜欢聚会在家里。后因城市改建,南门堂搬迁,他们从此租赁了一个1700平方米大小的写字楼,成为一个具有教堂规模的聚会点。聚会的信徒则由老年人为主,转变为以中青年信徒为主,而蒲鞋市教会则经历了一个由合法到非法、又由非法到合法的过程,名义上接受温州鹿城区基督教“两会”的指导,但这个聚会点形式的教堂,它的堂务、教务、人事、财政完全独立,并不受区“两会”的影响。

蒲鞋市教会是温州基督教堂-点关系的一个典型实例。温州教会进入写字楼,变成聚会点的方式,近年在温州还有较大的发展。不仅仅是写字楼,还有住宅楼、居民小区,许多不同大小的家庭教会,亦采取了这种活动方式。温州地区有很多家传的基督徒,有的基督教家庭传统,如今已是第四、五代了。这个传统的主要影响,应当就是点为中心运作方式主要基础。

### (4) 公民社会要素的某些构成

实际上,基督教在中国社会200多年来本土化过程中,早已逐步呈现了一种适应于中国信徒的信仰方式。基督教虽来自西方,却也能在中国本土扎根,其主要的缘由,是中国信徒着重于敬虔主义和个人救恩,淡化了基督教原有的教派、宗派组织倾向。他们强调属灵原则,综合了属灵崇拜及其相关的自组织方法,使之成为基层教会组织比较普遍的运作方式。所以,它们的运作,基本上没有复制西方教会,采取教会与社会二元相分的社会学途径。

温州基督教徒,个人救恩倾向明显,个人传教和给个人传教的理念根深蒂固。虽然近年来基层教会在社会服务方面有所发展,但这些服务都带有传布福音的基督教倾向。然而,把福音外传到每一个人,使每人得救,即是温州绝大多数信徒的目标,同时也建构了一种分享信仰的群体要求。相反,以教堂为主的运作方式,对个人救恩的要求不很明显,更强调对信仰活动的统一。

由此看来,基督教徒的灵性满足、信仰认同,与信仰群体或共同体的运作方式紧密相关。它们说明了一种与堂-点运作紧密关联的信仰互动关系、甚至是成员资格认同。教会科层制越强,教会管理的行政权力就越强,官僚性亦会越强;教会制度化越强,行政权力就越强;聚会点的制度化越弱,信仰的个人性就越强,行政管理的权力性就越弱,而基督教信仰成员资格的表现就越是自由,最终使基督教信徒,能够依赖其信仰实践关系而自成群体、甚至产生对该群体成员资格的认同。

正是这种“堂-点”运作模式,建构了基督教徒的双重认同方式。一种是基督徒自己能把握的内在认同,内在于他们的信仰中,使他们获得一定的“个人自主性”;另一种认同是外在认同取向,不一定出自于基督徒的内心信仰,却不得不与外在的环境、秩序予以整合。<sup>⑩</sup>

这种双重认同倾向,本属国家与社会关系的范畴,此时却因其认同倾向的双重,似可认定为一种内向型建构的社会成员关系。它们基于中国基督教基层运作的基本关系。在外在的基督教管理制度下,他们更注重信仰者及信仰者之间的内在认同,并能把这种认同方式,建构为一种“圣徒相通”的团契关系,乃至一个共同体的成员关系。

## 五、宗教型“公民社会要素”的可能

转型期的中国人已经看到了公共交往的必要性,同时也看到了基于一种共同信仰而构成的社会交往方式。因此,宗教组织通过将陌生人聚集在一起形成的“信仰共同体”,可以作为中国社会从差序格局转向公民社会的社会资源。

当然,就这些宗教组织的社会特征而言,它们作为社团,但不是社团会员制;宗教活动场所作为宗教活动的运作型实体,已非会员制,亦非资助型的基金会,而是以民办非企业单位的方法民间运作的事业单位。为此,当代中国宗教组织是一种很难直接定义的组织形态,的确是一种中间团体。更严重的是,因公共权力过于强势,吞噬社会所造成“社会”缺席的现象,使中国宗教常常被悬置起来,无法落地。<sup>⑪</sup>

然而,国家主导下的宗教运作关系,它们或许无法直接作用于为公民社会的建设,却能被视为“公民社会要素”而得以具体呈现,是“社会缺席”中的社会要素。通过社会要素,把社会组织起来。一旦它们具有了社会支撑,它们就将会是公民社会要素的直接培育。

在此意义上,国家认可的个人信仰,应当就是这样一个公民社会的细胞,在信仰者身份认同之间,实现信仰共同体的有机互动。它们在共同信仰中所生产的规范的有效性,无不涉及社会,无不涉及到

<sup>⑩</sup> 李向平 Li Xiangping,《身份·伦理·认同-当代中国基督教徒的伦理精神》*Shenfen Lunli Rentong —— Dangdai Zhongguo jidujiaotu de lunli jingshen* [Citizenship . Ethics . Identity ——The Ethic Spirit of Chinese Contemporary Christians](上 Shang、下 Xia),《天风》杂志 Tianfeng zhazhi [The Journal of Heavenly Wind], Vols. 4 and 5, (上海 Shanghai: 中国基督教协会 Zhongguo jidujiao xiehui [China Christian Council], 2007)。

<sup>⑪</sup> 李向平 Li Xiangping,《社会缺席,宗教安在?》*Shehui quexi, zongjiao anzai?* [When Society is Absent, where is Religion?],载罗国栋 Luo Guodong、文军 Wen Jun 主编《现代意识与都市发展》*Xiandai yishi yu dushi fazhan* [Modern Awareness and the Development of Cities],(上海 Shanghai: 华东师范大学出版社 Huadong shifan daxue chubanshe [East China Normal University Press], 2006)。

社会认同与个人信仰的互动。这就是说,只有在互动基础上建构并提供了规范,提供了人际交往的价值标准,从而促成了一个行动与其他人的行动相互联结时,社会才能够产生。这是因为,现代社会中个体的公民活动,他们的信仰及利益互动,只有被当作一个“当为的秩序”<sup>①</sup>来加以解释之时,社会才能呈现。这个“当为的秩序”,实际上就是信仰社会化、政治民主化、宗教社会化的核心。

公民社会组织应当具有四个显著特点,非官方性、非营利性、相对独立性、自愿性。<sup>②</sup>这些特点,基督教的教会组织皆已大致具备。唯有非官方性的特点比较弱小。但是,它们所构成的信仰共同体、共同体的成员资格认同,大多是自发出现、自动形成的。它们以自己的信仰为基础,不但有助于培育信仰者的社会交往技艺,还能“关注社会问题在私域生活中的反响,将这些反响放大并集中和传达到公共领域之中。”其关键就是在于,它们可以形成一种社团式的网络,对公共领域中人们普遍感兴趣的问题,形成一种解决问题的话语体制。<sup>③</sup>

其次,是它们基于共同信仰而打造的信仰共同体意识,使每个人都有的信仰,作为“一个团体的信仰、倾向和习俗的共同的方面,”就此而言,它们就在此层面具有了真正的社会现象的特征。<sup>④</sup>

传统社会的基本特点是,“‘百人聚,未有不公’。而况天下乎?”只要有组织关系的呈现,就会使人担忧,国家不稳定,权力秩序被动摇。“聚则为君民,散则为仇讎,聚散之间,不容毫厘。故天下归往唯之王,人各有心谓之独夫。”

所以,“一个主题的社会可能具有许多潜在的认同和结社的渠道。其中有些渠道可能在现代化进程中遭到了破坏和摧毁。而剩下的则可能获取新的意识并成为新组织的基础,因为对现代化进程所造就的个人认同、社会福利和经济发展等,这些老渠道也有办法来满足,……如果和尚将他们对当地寺庙的效忠扩及到全国性的佛教运动——凡此皆可视为效忠范围的扩大。在这个意义上,又何尝不是对政治现代化的贡献呢。”<sup>⑤</sup>

再次,当代中国基督教组织的最大功能,实际上就是与三十年来中国民间组织的发展同步,共同填补了中国社会缺席现象中“能动性组织的真空”,<sup>⑥</sup>构成了人们熟悉、等待的、自发性的社会组织形态。这些意义丰富的宗教组织,一方面是能为现代公民社会和公民身份的建立提供一种文化信仰基础;另一方面,它们作为一种信仰共同体,同时也是一种伦理共同体。凭借着这一信仰共同体,信仰者

<sup>①</sup> 京特·雅科布斯 Jingté. Yakebusi [Guenter Jakobs],《规范·人格体·社会——法哲学前思》*Guifan rengeti shehui — Fazhexue qiansi* [Norm, Person, Gesellschaft; Vorüberlegungen zu einer Rechtsphilosophie], (北京 Beijing: 法律出版社 Falü chubanshe [Law Publishing House], 2001), 42, 45。

<sup>②</sup> 俞可平 Yu Keping,《中国公民社会的兴起及其对治理的意义》*Zhongguo gongmin shehui de xingqi jiqi dui zhili de yiyi* [The Rise of Chinese Civil Society and Its Meaning to Administration],载俞可平 Yu Keping 等著《中国公民社会的兴起与治理的变迁》*Zhongguo gongmin shehui de xingqi yu zhili de bianqian* [The Rise of Chinese Civil Society and the Development of Administration], (北京 Beijing: 社科文献出版社 Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe [China Social Sciences Academic Press], 2002), 190。

<sup>③</sup> Jürgen Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 367。

<sup>④</sup> 尼古拉斯·布宁 Nigulasi. Buning [Nicolas Burning]、余纪元 Yu Jiyuan 编著,《西方哲学英汉对照辞典》*Xifang zhexue yinghan duizhao cidian* [Dictionary of Western Philosophy: English-Chinese], (北京 Beijing: 人民出版社 Renmin chubanshe [people's Publishing House], 2001), 422。

<sup>⑤</sup> 塞缪尔·P 亨廷顿 Saimiuer P. Hengtingdun [Samuel Phillips Huntington] 著,王冠华 Wang Guanhua 等译,《变化社会中的政治秩序》*Bianhua shehui zhong de zhengzhi zhixu* [Political Order in Changing], (北京 Beijing: 三联书店 Sanlian shudian [Sanlian Bookstore Press], 1992), 36。

<sup>⑥</sup> 塞缪尔·P 亨廷顿 Saimiuer P. Hengtingdun [Samuel Phillips Huntington] 著,王冠华 Wang Guanhua 等译,《变化社会中的政治秩序》*Bianhua shehui zhong de zhengzhi zhixu* [Political Order in Changing], (北京 Beijing: 三联书店 Sanlian shudian [Sanlian Bookstore Press], 1992), 29。



能够与其他社会成员彼此交往,进而在这些基层宗教组织的运作中,训练了群体参与技能,自我管理,服务人群及身份认同的基本方法。

美国宗教社会学家伍斯诺曾认为,基督教的教会应该是社会的“砖”-既坚硬又具有建设性。<sup>②⑥</sup>而现代中国神学家赵紫宸也说过,教会应当是“群体中的群体”或“社会中的社会”,“能够不后顾,脱离了旧历史的专制;不下垂,脱离了宗教权的专制;不上浮,脱离了多数人的专制;不左偏,脱离了无神论的专制;不右倾,脱离了唯物观的专制。”<sup>②⑦</sup>这无疑也是中国宗教孕育公民社会要素的基本原则。

不过,我们应明白的事实是,“在今天的背景下,公民身份不是产生于社会已贮备的成果。它是把多元社会中各种因素连接起来的一种公共责任,并且是以这样一种方式而进行的,即他们在公共领域中的相互交往产生公民身份。公民身份主要通过一起运作和在多元性的组织中加以学习和巩固。家庭、教堂、学校和其他相互关联的场所是重要且不可少的贡献,但在一个多元社会中,这些明确公民身份并形成公民的地方,从不可能是官方指定的场所。”<sup>②⑧</sup>

中国宗教与公民社会之关系,亦大抵如是而已矣。

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<sup>②⑥</sup> Robert Wuthnow, *Christianity and Civil Society: The Contemporary Debate*, (Valley Forge: Trinity, 1996), 90.

<sup>②⑦</sup> 赵紫宸 Zhao Zichen, 《基督教哲学》Jidujiao zhexue [Christian Philosophy], 载《赵紫宸文集》Zhao Zichen wenji [Collection of Zhao Zichen's Articles] 第1卷, (北京 Beijing: 商务印书馆 Shangwu yinshuguan [The Commercial Press], 2004), 154.

<sup>②⑧</sup> 赫曼·范·冈斯特仁 Heman . Fan . Gangsite [Herman van Gunsteren] 著, 郭台辉 Guo Taihui 译,《公民身份的四种概念》Gongmin shenfen de sizhong gainian [The Four Conceptions of Citizenship], 载 伯特·范·斯廷博根 Bate . Fan . Sitingbogen [Bart van Steenberg] 编《公民身份的条件》Gongmin shenfen de tiaojian [The Condition of Citizenship], (长春 Changchun 吉林出版集团有限责任公司 Jilin chubanshituan youxian zeren gongsi [Jilin Publishing Company Limited], 2007), 56.

**English Title:**

**Christianity and Chinese Civil Society**

——Taking the Working Mode of Chinese Protestant Organizations as the Center

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**Abstract:** In contemporary China there is as yet no direct and effective mutual relationship between Christianity and the construction of civil society. As a result, there are different opinions on discussions of civil society and related issues. The present article takes a case study as its basis and combines this with literature studies, starting from the discussion of the concept of civil society. In this way, it explores the direct and indirect relationship between Christianity and civil society in contemporary China. Through study of the functioning of the Christian church and its relationship with social public affairs and official power, the present article has discussed how a faith community such as Christianity can become a vital part of constructing civil society in contemporary China.

**Key words:** civil society, faith community, the functioning of religion, the faith basis of civil identity, qualifications of community members

**中西经典与圣经**  
**Chinese and Western Classics**  
**and the Bible**



# Reading Revelation in a Society Seeking Harmony

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**Abstract:** Despite the fact that Revelation is not a work intended for the promotion of a harmonious society, this book and its impact on history provide issues to ponder regarding the societal quest for harmony. The discussion will start with the politico-critical nature of warfare imagery in Revelation. This political critique will then be analyzed in light of how the book of Daniel is used in the book of Revelation, the theme of the Lamb that was slain as the Lion of Judah in Revelation, the rhetorical situation of Revelation, and a comparison between the warfare in Ephesians and that in Revelation. The conclusion will be that the book of Revelation contributes (indirectly) to the construction of societal harmony.

**Key words:** Harmonious Society, the Book of Revelation, the Book of Daniel, Maccabean Literature, history of effects

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## Warfare Imageries in the Book of Revelation

There is no need to argue that the aim of the Book of Revelation is probably not the promotion of societal harmony. A quick glance through the book will show that this book is full of depictions of conflicts and warfare. In Rev 6 when the first six of the seven seals were opened, the first, the second, and the fourth were to do with warfare and killing (6:2,4,8) while the fifth one was to do with those who were slain for the word of God and the witness they had borne (6:10). In Rev 9 when the fifth of the seven angels blew the trumpet, the locusts out of the smoke from the shaft of the bottomless pit were depicted as an army (9:7-10) and when the sixth angel blew the trumpet, it brought the troops of cavalry who would kill one third of mankind (9:15-16). In Rev 12-13, the defeat of dragon and his angels in heaven lead to their being thrown down to the earth (12:7-9) and this brought the conflict between the saints, i. e., the Christians, and the “evil trinity”<sup>①</sup> of the dragon, the beast rising out of the sea and the beast rising out of the earth (13:13-18). These evil forces would eventually be destroyed by the one who is the “Lord of the Lords and King of Kings” (17:14; 19:11-21 NRSV). To Richard Bauckham, this book can actually be seen as a Christian War Scroll.<sup>②</sup> The vision of the 144,000 and the innumerable multitude in 7:2-14, he argues, is a vision of the messianic army,<sup>③</sup> and the vocabulary of conquest (“to everyone who conquers” NRSV) at the end of each of the seven messages to the churches in Asia Minor (2:7,11,17,26; 3:5,12,21) is to invite the readers to participate in the eschatological holy war depicted in the latter part of the book.<sup>④</sup>

A closer look at the book could generate even more discomfort for those who want to pursue societal harmony. Several modern scholars have identified the beast rising from the sea in 13:1,

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① See 罗伟 Luo Wei:《启示录注释》Qishilu zhushi [The Interpretation of Revelation], Quan san ce 全三册, (Taipei 台北: Zhonghua fuyin shenxue yuan 中华福音神学院 [Chinese Evangelical Theological Seminary], 2007), 2:1145。

② Richard Bauckham, *The Climax of Prophecy*, (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1993), 210-37.

③ Bauckham, *The Climax*, 215ff.

④ Bauckham, *The Climax*, 213.

which alludes to the four beasts in Dan 7:3 – 7,<sup>⑤</sup> with Roman Empire,<sup>⑥</sup> or the Roman power and the imperial cult of that time.<sup>⑦</sup> The title “Babylon the great” in 14:8, which is another allusion to the book of Daniel (4:30), is used as a metaphor or symbol to represent Rome.<sup>⑧</sup> With these identifications, the book of Revelation was actually a political critique of the first – century Roman imperial power.<sup>⑨</sup> When reading this book in a contemporary context, it could become the basis for a critique of the political power that be and it could generate the fear that it might hinder the society’s quest for harmony.

It is not necessary the case, though. The Book of Revelation may not be a book that bears the concern of promoting societal harmony, while this book and its effect in history do offer something to ponder in the construction of a harmonious society.

### The Book of Revelation as Historical Effect of the Book of Daniel

Our exploration will start with the use of the book of Daniel in Revelation. Earlier we have mentioned two instances of the use of Daniel in Revelation: the use of Dan 7:3 – 7 in Rev 13:1 and the use of Dan 4:30 in Rev 14:8, but the use of Daniel in Revelation is more than that. Among the Old Testament books, Daniel and Ezekiel are the two most used in the book of Revelation<sup>⑩</sup> and it can therefore be said that the book of Revelation represents a historical effect of these books in their history of reception.

Here our interest lies more with the side of the book of Daniel. As far as extent documents are concerned, Revelation was only one of the several books being influenced by the book of Daniel and its tradition. In the Maccabean literature,<sup>⑪</sup> the influence of the book of Daniel can also be detected. Daniel and his friends are treated in these books as role models for those who want to be faithful to the Lord. In 1Macc 2:60; 3Macc 6:7; 4Macc 16:3,21; 18:13, the reference is to the account in Dan 6 that Daniel, being faithful to God, was thrown into the den of the lions but eventually came out unharmed. In 1Macc 2:59; 3Macc 6:6; 4Macc 16:3,21; 18:12, the reference is to the account in Dan 3 that the three friends of Daniel, Hananiah, Azariah, and Mishael, being unwilling to worship the golden image installed by King Nebuchadnezzar, were thrown into the fiery furnace but they walked out unharmed.

Daniel and his friends are not the only examples of faithfulness to the Lord in the Maccabean literature. They are used normally with other examples in the Old Testaments and it is noteworthy that in 1Macc 2, they are listed with Phinehas (1Macc 2:54) and in 4Macc 18:12 – 13 the zeal of

⑤ See, e. g., G. K. Beale, *The Book of Revelation* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 683; David E. Aune, *Revelation 6 – 16* (WBC 52B; Dallas: Word, 2002), 732 – 35; Luo Wei, *Qishilu zhushi*, 2:1150.

⑥ Aune, *Revelation 6 – 16*, 74 – 35; Luo Wei, *Qishilu zhushi*, 2:1152.

⑦ Beale, *Revelation*, 684 – 85; Bauckham, *The Climax*, 193.

⑧ See, e. g., Aune, *Revelation 6 – 16*, 829, 900 – 1; Beale, *Revelation*, 685, 754 – 55; Luo Wei, *Qishilu zhushi*, 2:1256.

⑨ See, e. g., Richard Bauckham, *The Theology of the Book of Revelation*, (New Testament Theology; Cambridge: CUP, 1993), 17 – 18.

⑩ G. K. Beale, “The Use of the Old Testament in Revelation,” in *idem* (ed.), *The Right Doctrine from the Wrong Texts?* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1994), 258; see also Beale, *Revelation*, 77. For a fuller study of the use of Daniel in Revelation, see G. K. Beale, *The Use of Daniel in Jewish Apocalyptic Literature and in the Revelation of St. John* (New York: University Press of America, 1984). For a survey of the use of the OT in Revelation, see Luo Wei, *Qishilu zhushi*, 1:76 – 110.

⑪ These four works (1Macc, 2Macc, 3Macc and 4Macc) are works of different periods of time and by authors who were probably unrelated. However, as far as the use of Daniel is concerned, they bear certain similarity. Hence, we discuss them together under one rubric.

Phinehas, the fiery furnace of Hananiah, Azariah, and Mishael, and the den of the lions of Daniel are the last three examples of faithfulness in the list. The juxtaposition of Phinehas, who used weapon to strike his fellow Israelite on behalf of the Lord (Num 25:6 – 13) and has become an example of zeal for the law (Psa 106:29 – 31; Sir 45:23; 1Macc 2:26), and Daniel and his friends, who were willing to surrender their lives to be faithful to the Lord, shows two distinctive ways to be faithful to the Lord, or two different facets of the same idea of being faithful to the Lord. Phinehas represents the model for armed engagement, while Daniel and his friends represent the model for martyrdom. Since these two come out of the same spring – i. e. , for the sake of being faithful to the Lord, it is not surprising that they are listed together in the last words of Mattathias (1Macc 2:49 – 68) to his sons to encourage them to continue their armed resistance; and they are also listed together as the last words of the mother to her seven sons (4Macc 18:6 – 19) when they became martyrs under the tyrant Antiochus (cf. 4Macc 17:23).

In comparison with the use of Daniel in the Maccabean literature, there are differences and similarity in the use of Daniel in Revelation. Unlike the Maccabean literature, Revelation does not refer to Daniel and his friends' deeds as the model of faithfulness. It is the vision that Daniel saw in Dan 7 that plays an important role in the book of Revelation.<sup>12</sup> The four beasts in Dan 7 are alluded to in the description of the beast rising from the sea in Rev 13, as we have already mentioned earlier. Both the beasts in Dan 7 and the beast rising from the sea in Rev 13 represent earthly imperial powers that oppress and wage war against those who are faithful to the Lord (Dan 7:17,25; Rev 13:2,7). Despite the different ways in using Daniel, the concern of the Maccabean literature and that of Revelation are very similar when they use the book of Daniel; both are concerned with the issue of political oppression that the faithful were facing.

In their dealing with this political concern, another difference between the Maccabean literature and Revelation should be noted. In the Maccabean literature, Daniel and his friends are listed among other Old Testament heroes and their examples are used to endorse armed resistance as well as to vindicate the value of martyrdom, whereas in Rev 13 armed resistance is never mentioned; what can be seen is only the martyrdom of the faithful (Rev 13:7,9,15). As a matter of fact, Revelation as a whole never promotes the idea of armed resistance in the face of political oppression; the only way to resist is through non – violent means and those who engage in such kind of resistance should prepare for the consequence of martyrdom. The historical effect of Revelation suggests that this message seems to be well taken by the early church. From the first persecution which Christians endured under Emperor Nero (starting from 64 CE) to the issue of the Edict of Milan in the names of Emperor Constantine and Emperor Licinius in 313 CE, there is no record that Christians ever engaged themselves in military rebellion against the Roman Empire due to the warfare imageries and language in the book of Revelation.

When the book of Revelation is seen as a reading of the book of Daniel, from the point of view of history of effect, the historical effect of the book of Revelation can actually also be seen as a particular historical effect of the book of Daniel. With its non – violent stance in expressing the faithfulness to the Lord when the faithful people are confronted with challenges, this particular historical effect of the book of Daniel distinguishes itself from the historical effect revealed in the Maccabean literature.

<sup>12</sup> See, e. g. , Beale, *Revelation*, 77.

## Slaughtered Lamb as the Lion of Judah in the Book of Revelation

A question, then, has to be asked: what would be the factor that contributes to this non-violent reading of the book of Daniel in Revelation? Bauckham rightly points out that in Rev 5:5-6 the juxtaposition of the image of the Lion of Judah, which is a symbol of destructiveness and conquest, and the image of the slaughtered Lamb, which is a symbol of sacrifice, is to forge “a symbol of conquest by sacrificial death”<sup>⑬</sup> and, in such a way, the book of Revelation reinterprets the Jewish messianic hopes in the first century and replaces the militaristic Messiah with a non-violent, and even a suffering, one.<sup>⑭</sup>

Because of this replacement, the warfare imageries in Revelation need to be interpreted in the light of this symbol of slaughtered Lamb as the Lion of Judah. The messianic army depicted in Rev 7 (i. e., the 144,000 and the innumerable multitude) can only be “an army of martyrs who triumph through their martyrdoms, because they are followers of the Lamb who participate in his victory by following his path to death.”<sup>⑮</sup> This holy war can only be won by sacrificial death.<sup>⑯</sup> Thus, Revelation uses the holy war language but transforms its meaning to non-military means of triumph over evil in terms of faithful witness to the point of death.<sup>⑰</sup>

## The Rhetorical Situation of the Book of Revelation

When the book of Revelation is situated in the New Testament canon in which we can find the message of a gospel of peace and reconciliation, not only for the relationship between humans and God but also for those among humans (e. g., Eph 2:11-18), an inevitable question must be raised: why was there a need to talk about holy war in the book of Revelation? From a rhetorical point of view, the question can be asked in another way: what was the “rhetorical situation” or “rhetorical exigence”<sup>⑱</sup> that lead to the composition of this message of holy war in Revelation?

The traditional answer to these questions is that it was because of actual or threatened persecution of Christians by the local Roman imperial power in Asia Minor in the latter part of the first century.<sup>⑲</sup> Surely persecution would be an important contributing factor to the writing of Revelation, but

<sup>⑬</sup> Bauckham, *The Climax*, 183.

<sup>⑭</sup> Bauckham, *The Climax*, 214.

<sup>⑮</sup> Bauckham, *The Climax*, 229.

<sup>⑯</sup> See Bauckham, *The Climax*, 230, 232.

<sup>⑰</sup> Bauckham, *The Climax*, 233.

<sup>⑱</sup> As defined by Lloyd F. Bitzer, a rhetorical situation is “a complex of persons, events, objects, and relations presenting an actual or potential exigence which can be completely or partially removed if discourse, introduced into the situation, can so constrain human decision or action as to bring about the significant modification of the exigence.” Lloyd F. Bitzer, “The Rhetorical Situation,” *Philosophy and Rhetoric* (1968): 1-14 (4-6), quoted in George A. Kennedy, *New Testament Interpretation through Rhetorical Criticism* (Chapel Hill: The Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1984), 34-35.

<sup>⑲</sup> E. g., John M. Court, “Revelation of John,” in R. J. Coggins and J. L. Houlden (eds), *A Dictionary of Biblical Interpretation*, (London: SCM, 1990), 593.



scholars have identified more factors that contributed to the rhetorical situation of this book.<sup>20</sup>

To Schüssler Fiorenza, the rhetorical situation can be summed up by a single word: tribulation.<sup>21</sup> In the latter part of the first century for Christians this tribulation came out of the deep tensions between their belief in the ultimate power of God and Christ and the reality that most of them were not beneficiaries of the economic prosperity that Pax Romana brought about but victims of the colonial injustices of oppressive taxation, the widening gap between the rich and the poor, and Roman repression of disturbances, paranoid prohibition of private associates, and suspicious surveillance by neighbors and informants.<sup>22</sup>

Bauckham also sees Rome's economic exploitation as one of the major reasons in Revelation's critique of the Roman Empire.<sup>23</sup> To him, this economic dimension interplayed with Rome's military and political might and they joined together to become the justification of Rome's self – deification in the Roman imperial cult; the subjects of the Emperor should worship him as a divine Savior because it was him who had the power to bring them the wealth and splendor of the Pax Romana.<sup>24</sup> For Christians, this imperial propaganda presented serious theological and ethical issues. Theologically, the absolutization of Rome's power and prosperity was seriously in conflict with Christians' belief of one True God,<sup>25</sup> and the expense of Rome's victims at which the pursuit and maintenance of this power and prosperity was achieved was in itself a serious ethical issue.<sup>26</sup>

To Bauckham, the rhetorical situation of the book of Revelation was more than tribulation, as Schüssler Fiorenza sees it. It was also to do with temptation. Many of Rome's subjects, Christians included, who were actually exploited by the Pax Romana yet failed to see its true nature; on the contrary, they were dazzled by Rome's glory and seduced by the promised benefits of the Pax Romana.<sup>27</sup> Therefore, Revelation has a two – fold purpose: for those who believed in the ultimate power of God and Christ but endured injustice and hardship as the result of the Roman system in their daily life, Revelation brought the vindication of their faithfulness and perseverance, while for those who started to be seduced by the propaganda of the Pax Romana and began to compromise their faith, Revelation brought the warning.<sup>28</sup>

## Comparison between the Warfare in Ephesians and that in Revelation

The above analysis of the rhetorical situation of Revelation has yet fully answered the questions we posed earlier on the relationship between the book of Revelation and the gospel of peace and reconciliation. A comparison between the warfare in Eph 6:10 – 20 and the warfare in Revelation

<sup>20</sup> The major objection to viewing persecution as the determining factor for the writing of Revelation is that during the reign of Emperor Domitian, which is the time that many scholars believe this book was written, there is short of evidence that Christians were persecuted more severely by him than by the emperors before or after him. See, e. g. , David E. Aune, *Revelation 1 – 5*, (WBC 52A; Dallas: Word, 2002), lxiv – lxix.

<sup>21</sup> Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, *Revelation: Vision of a Just World*, (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), 124.

<sup>22</sup> Schüssler Fiorenza, *Revelation*, 124, 127.

<sup>23</sup> Bauckham, *The Climax*, 338 – 83.

<sup>24</sup> See Bauckham, *The Climax*, 348, 349.

<sup>25</sup> See Bauckham, *The Theology*, 39.

<sup>26</sup> See Bauckham, *The Theology*, 38 – 39.

<sup>27</sup> Bauckham, *The Climax*, 347.

<sup>28</sup> Both elements can be found in the messages to the seven churches in Rev 2:1 – 3:22; for the former, e. g. , Rev 2:2 – 3, 9 – 10, 13, 19; 3:10 – 11; and for the latter, e. g. , Rev 2:20; 3:17 – 18.

could shed some light on the relationship between Revelation and the gospel of peace and reconciliation.

For readers of Ephesians, after having read the reconciliation of humans to God and the reconciliation of humans to one another in 2:11 – 18, the unity coming out of this reconciliation in 2:19 – 22 and 3:6, as well as the calling for the formation of a community that is to be based upon this unity in 4:1 – 16, the military metaphors and warfare language in 6:10 – 20 could take them by surprise because in this passage they are not called to continue their pursuit of peace and reconciliation but to put on the whole armor of God to engage in the battle against the spiritual forces of evil in the heavenly places. This unexpectedness raises at least one practical question: if the gospel is about peacemaking between humans and God and among people, would the use of these militant descriptions eventually defeat the purpose?

Eph 6:12 may have the key to the answer of this question. Eph 6:12 states that this “struggle is not against enemies of blood and flesh” (NRSV); in other words, this battle should not be waged against any human being. This is because the gospel of peace (Eph 2:17) should be made known to “everyone” (Eph 3:9). Waging war against any human being will practically exclude that person from knowing the good news of reconciliation as it is unthinkable that we can make peace with someone against whom we have been waging a war at the same time. On the other hand, the existence of evil in its various forms in everyday life is still a reality. It can hinder the reconciliation that the Christians are called to achieve. It can also damage the reconciliation that has been achieved. Therefore, reconciliation is not incompatible with the military metaphors used in Eph 6. The battle here is not a battle against some other humans but a spiritual warfare that is waged against those supernatural powers which are “of this present darkness” and “evil” (Eph 6:12).

The warfare in Revelation seems to bear a similar characteristic. Although for the Christians in the latter part of the first century their hardships and temptations came from the visible administration of the Roman Empire, the power that brought these on earth was not merely human. It was the invisible spiritual power behind the visible political domination of the imperial power; and it was the great dragon of Rev 12:9 that worked behind the two beasts of Rev 13.<sup>⑳</sup> Therefore, it would miss the target by treating humans or human institutions as the ultimate enemies because they are only the agents of the spiritual powers of evil, against whom Christian should wage the war. The decisive battle, therefore, has to be won, and has been won, in the heaven, the spiritual sphere (Rev 12:7 – 9).

Not only does the warfare in Revelation share similar characteristic to the warfare in Eph 6, their causes, or concerns, are also not unrelated. At first appearance, the cause of the warfare in Revelation seems to be a different one from that in Eph 6. In Revelation, the concern behind the warfare imageries is very much with the social injustice caused by economic exploitation as well as the oppression caused by absolutization of political power, whereas in Eph 6 the battle is more to do with the prevention of hindrance to the pursuit of reconciliation or of damage done to the reconciliation already achieved. The relation between these two causes or concerns probably can be appreciated in the light of the role of Christians in God’s purpose. Bauckham has argued at length that Revelation has the expectation that the church will eventually play the role in God’s purpose of establishing his rule on earth.<sup>㉑</sup> To establish this rule, it has to start with the reconciliation of humans to God and of humans to one another, as described in Eph 2:11 – 18. However, as long as the social, economic, political systemic evils continue to exist, they will hinder and damage the reconciliation

⑳ See Schüssler Fiorenza, *Revelation*, 120.

㉑ See Bauckham, *The Climax*, 238 – 337.

that is required for the establishment of God's just rule on earth. The battle against these systemic evils, from this perspective, is actually one of the very first steps in Christians' pursuit of reconciliation and the establishment of God's just rule on earth.

### **The Book of Revelation and Harmonious Society**

The aspiration to the construction of a harmonious society is a desirable and noble ideal but this aspiration also reflects the reality that we actually live in a world where there are things undesirable. In order to fulfill this aspiration, the challenge will always be with the charting of a roadmap by which we can move away from those which are undesirable and construct the harmonious society that we aspire to live in. This task requires a proper understanding of the issues that cause the undesirable state of our society today and it needs the critical assessment of the society that we are in. For this purpose, the issues exposed in the book of Revelation and its effect in history, which we have briefly discussed above, become relevant to us and they offer us something to ponder.

The issue of social injustice caused by economic exploitation exposed in Revelation does not happen only in the first century. It repeats again and again throughout the history. The economic exploitation of the developing world by the developed world and the economic exploitation of the rural societies by the urban societies are two obvious examples happening today globally. However, the social injustices that the exploitation causes are easily ignored by those who benefit from them and those who are dazzled by the wealth and splendor of the societies benefit from them; but these social injustices often sow hatred that would eventually hinder, or even undermine, the quest for social harmony.

The issue of oppression caused by absolutization of political power also happens throughout the history. One of the difficulties that this issue produces for those who are under the domination is that absolutization of political power creates intolerance which is more than often realized by the prohibition and oppression of beliefs or thoughts that are not in line with the political agenda. That was exactly the situation that Christians in the latter part of the first century were facing. Because of the absolutization of Rome's power in a religious form, early Christians experienced an irony that, although they were called to be peacemakers for the reconciliation of humans to God and humans to one another, their belief of one True God was in deep conflict with Rome's self – deification and their refusal to surrender their own belief to the worship of the Roman Emperor as a divine Savior eventually brought about persecution and caused their martyrdoms. This particular case should make us to ponder in what way a harmonious society should be constructed; should it be constructed by oppressing all unwanted voices and persecute all those whose beliefs are not sanctioned by the political power? Or, should it be constructed by tolerance and encouragement of diversity in providing each group within the society adequate rooms for their own belief and practice and, at the same time, in promoting mutual respect to one another between different groups? Even for some of the so – called democratic societies in the developed world today, this is still an urgent question that requires response.

Being convinced of their role in God's purpose of establishing his just rule and the genuine peace on earth, Christians inevitably have to engage themselves in social, economic, and political critiques for the benefit of the society that they are in. However, their voices should not become a worry for a society seeking harmony. Christians, who are followers of the slaughtered Lamb as the Lion of Judah, would see their cause being undermined if their engagement in the critiques eventually leads to the use of violent means or ends up in violent conflict. They have the long tradition of non – violent engagement which encourages them to overcome systemic evils by suffering, even to

the point of death, for the benefit of the society. They believe that their blood and sacrificial death, just like the blood and death of their Master, will witness the urgent need of eliminating the systemic evils in a society.

The contribution of Revelation and its effect in history to the construction of a harmonious society is an indirect, but crucial, one. Revelation and its effect in history do not tell us much about what concepts or methods would be useful to achieve the noble ideal of a harmonious society; but rather, they expose the dangers of the systemic evils that stand in our path to the fulfillment of that aspiration. Without attention to and serious treatment for these systemic evils exposed by Revelation, the aspiration of a harmonious society would be an ideal difficult to fulfill.

中文题目:

## 在一个追求和谐的社会里来阅读《启示录》

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**提要:**虽然《启示录》的写作目的并非是要促成和谐的社会,但对于追求社会和谐,本书并其在历史中的效应,确提供值得深思的议题。本文的探讨将始于启示录中战争意象的政治批判本质,进而根据《启示录》使用《但以理书》的方式、《启示录》中被杀羔羊为犹太之狮的主题、启示录的修辞处境、并以弗所书与启示录中战争意象的比较,来理解该政治批判的本质。本文最后将以启示录在建构社会和谐方面的(间接)贡献作结。

**关键词:**和谐社会,启示录,但以理书,马喀比文献,效应史

# 保罗追求的和谐社群

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**提要:** 本篇论文尝试探讨保罗在一世纪的希腊罗马社会的背景下所追求的和谐社群。本文的重点是将哥林多书信放置在它原有的社会-政治处境中去理解。保罗以平等的认真态度对待他的公民责任和基督徒身份。当然公民的责任是包括在基督徒的身份之内。保罗是两个国度的公民,但他天上的公民身份显然超越了这个尘世的公民身份。保罗自己没有任何议程或计划去发动任何社会运动。可是,他的十字架神学和随之而来的社会道德以及价值观,以及他自己的人生哲学和操作方式却不知不觉地成为一个伟大的社会“革命”。古罗马帝国和日益壮大的中国之间的差异是巨大的。然而,人们可能会注意到,他们各自对维护政治的团结和社会稳定的特别关注与承诺显然有着相似之处。本文并不假设保罗追求的和谐社群是一个简单而直接的方案可以用来解决中国的复杂的问题和困境。因为这样的想法是非常幼稚和不实际的。然而,保罗那富有创意和极富挑战性的“古老的智慧”,极有可能为当代中国所追求的和谐社会提供一个很有参考价值的信息。

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**关键词:** 罗马太平, 和谐社群, 社会伦理, 公民义务, 双重身份

## 序言

中国政府于2004年确立了构建“社会主义和谐社会”的目标,简称“和谐社会”。它的宗旨是为了回应改革开放政策实行以来的市场经济对现代中国所带来的巨大社会和政治挑战。尽管市场经济毫无疑问地为国家和人民带来了有目共睹的利益和财富、贫穷和富裕之间与特权和边缘化之间日益产生的差距,如果不能有效处理的话,将会加剧已经潜在的社会动荡和不安。虽然“和谐社会”的基本理念是中国固有的传统儒家思想,现行的新方案可能还涵盖着其他的意识形态因素,以符合具有中国“特色”的社会主义。

中国今天的处境显然与使徒保罗时代的处境有很明显的差异。本文的基本假设是,通过研究保罗所构思的和谐社群理念可以为中国提供一些相关的见解和参考。虽然“罗马的太平”(Pax Romana)的大同思想成功地统一了辽阔的罗马帝国,但是,罗马社会是以等级、种族、宗教和文化划分的,致使政治的统一与真正的和谐显然有很大的差异。在这种情况下,保罗对和谐社群的异象和追求,对罗马帝国和现代的中国都同样是非常有挑战性和启发性的。

本文首先以介绍第一世纪的罗马社会作为历史研究的背景,如罗马的法律制度、经济、职业和社会地位的理念和操作等。文章重点在于理解保罗及其会众的社会背景和保罗所构思的和谐社群的异象。纵使保罗尽力尝试通过宣教,建立爱好和谐及有见证的信众,教导基督徒尊重政府的权力,但是,他的十字架神学以及自己个人的生活方式,最终却是与当时的文化,社会和伦理观截然不同的。再者,

保罗对强者(富裕)和弱者(贫穷)等的看法也是与当时的希罗文化有必然的冲突和差距的。使得保罗的教导,最终倒置了希罗社会核心的价值与伦理道德观。基督徒对中国社会的建设以及和谐社会肯定是有参与的责任和义务的。但是,基督徒的神学底线、终极的视野和普世的价值观,最终又必然是超越现实社会和政治思想体系的。这也是“两个国度”之间所存在以及不可回避的张力与吊诡。可是,这里所指的张力与吊诡却不表示必然是冲突和矛盾。

## 一、一世纪罗马的社会背景

### 1. 罗马历史背景简介

罗马是由意大利拉丁乌姆的一个狭小的“城邦”逐步扩张而成。罗马人于公元前753年建城,处于伊特拉斯坎人的君主统治,被称为罗马王政时期。公元前510年罗马人驱逐了罗马王政时期的第七任君主苏佩布斯,建立了罗马共和国。罗马共和国是由控制实权,并以贵族为代表的元老院,执行行政权力的执政官,和罗马公民组成的部族会议三权分立。至公元前二世纪中期,罗马已经成为跨欧、亚,非三大洲的地中海地区的大帝国。虽然它在这一时期的经济发展迅速,社会矛盾却日益激化。公元前二世纪30年代罗马陷入了百年的内战时代,共和体制趋于瓦解。公元前27年屋大维实行元首制,独揽政治、军事、司法、宗教大权于一身,结束了一个世纪的内战,致使罗马共和国彻底告终。罗马从此进入了帝国时期(公元前27年-公元476年)。按照希腊来源,屋大维拥有多种称号,亦称凯撒、奥古斯都、或者尊崇者。奥古斯都原意为“神圣、至尊”。这个尊号与当时宗教的权威和预言有关。奥古斯都开启了罗马的太平盛世时代,即“奥古斯都太平”,在他长达43年的统治期间(公元前27-公元14),罗马呈现了太平与辉煌的景象。罗马帝国的文人哲士借题献诗赋词,讴歌太平盛世,皇上英明。<sup>①</sup>所以,从公元前27年奥古斯都建立罗马帝国至公元180年奥勒留去世大约200年左右的时间,史称“罗马太平时期”。因为这一时期,帝国内部政治局势稳定、社会安宁、秩序井然、交通便利、经济繁荣、文化兴盛,一片天下太平、国泰民安、歌舞升平的景象。罗马帝国的经济、文化、军事、艺术都达到了前所未有的辉煌顶峰。

然而,为了维护帝国的太平罗马政府对社会秩序的关注几乎成为病态。即使是开明的哲学家也不例外。罗马政府为了保护其有利于社会上层阶级的法制体系而不惜一切代价镇压底下平民的抱怨及动乱。

### 2. 罗马社会的等级制度

社会阶层在古罗马人的生活中发挥了重大作用。古罗马社会是分等级的。自由的罗马公民通过血统和财产被分成几个社会阶层如贵族和庶民。非公民身份的则分为几个不同的类别及拥有不同的法律权利如妇女、外国人、自由人和奴隶,其中奴隶不享有任何权利。奴隶制度是古希腊罗马体系中不可或缺的一部分。<sup>②</sup>二世纪罗马法学家盖尤斯在他的《法学阶梯》(Institutes)中,清楚指出人在法律中所处的不同地位:“人的主要区别是:所有的人不是自由人就是奴隶。”<sup>③</sup>

甘塞(Garnsey)的著作在理解罗马社会的社会地位和法律特权方面作出了很大贡献。罗马人结果把社会分为两个主要类别:上层阶级和下层阶级。甘塞指出,罗马帝国中人的社会地位和法律特权

<sup>①</sup> 罗马文学方面也被誉为黄金时期,著名的人物包括西塞罗(Cicero)、李维(Livy)、卡图卢斯(Catullus)、维吉尔(Virgil)、奥维德(Ovid)、贺拉斯(Horace)和卡西乌斯·狄奥(Cassius Dio)。

<sup>②</sup> A. A. Rupprecht, "Slave, Slavery", in G. Hawthorne, et al., (eds.), *Dictionary of Paul and His Letters* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1993), 881-3.

<sup>③</sup> Gaius, *Institutes*, vol. 1. 9.

彼此挂钩。法官本身属于上层阶级，他们无疑会偏袒在社会中有身份地位的贵族人士。<sup>④</sup> 罗马在当时是文明的首都：因此俗称条条大路通罗马。拥有罗马公民身份享有一定的权力，这些权力包括上诉权和豁免权。其次，罗马公民被控告时，有权选择在本地或在罗马听审。不但如此，罗马公民通常还获有免遭鞭打的特权。

### 3. 罗马的法律制度

第一世纪的罗马法律与许多古代法律系统相似。政府权柄是社会权力的中心，由社会中拥有权力的团体赋予其立法权及执法权。政府权柄的范围从罗马皇帝、到由皇帝或元老院指派任命的行省总督（或称方伯）及巡抚和地方性的官长。罗马法律制度在帝国各地推广。早于公元前二世纪，执政官已经开始享有有关法律的决定权力——即听审个案，凭双方的控诉作出裁决。

罗马的政治和社会经济结构基于父权制。家庭是希腊罗马社会架构中的最基本单位，同时也被视为整个社会的基础。罗马城邦的和谐稳定有赖于经营有方的家庭。罗马家庭的组织建构非常庞大，以父亲为权威中心。家庭成员除了直系亲属之外，还包括奴仆，业务上的客户及其社会依赖者或隶属者。自希腊罗马以来，奴隶制已经变成一个庞大的制度化体系。<sup>⑤</sup> 奴隶主要来源于战争、海盗、国际奴隶贸易、绑架、婴儿、罪犯和战俘。然而，一世纪罗马帝国中的大多数奴隶都是在以前的战争中被奴役的儿童。奴隶之间的婚姻可能是奴隶的最大来源，他们的儿女无任何主权仍受役于主人。奴隶们的工作根据处境各有不同。高、中级的奴隶属于赞助—客户契约的社会结构的一部分，有利于当前希腊罗马社会的赞助—客户结构。在罗马法律中奴隶制代表了一个明显的事例，其中万民法违背了自然法。奴隶制被定义为一个万民法的制度。根据罗马法律，奴隶被视为一项财产与土地和牲畜同类。<sup>⑥</sup> 一言以蔽之，奴隶在罗马法律中一无所有。

一世纪的巴勒斯坦处境比较复杂，同时受犹太省长和罗马帝国的行政管辖。为了稳定政治局势和控制不同的派系，罗马皇帝派遣军队驻扎于耶路撒冷和其他重要区域。皇帝特使直接听命于皇帝。罗马政府容许各省的地方官职去维持秩序。省长遵守罗马的法律制度，对省民有绝对的权柄。自亚历山大大大帝以来，希腊罗马盛行帝王崇拜——即享有与诸神相同的荣誉，如祭司、神庙、祭祀、节庆及比赛。早期基督徒的崇拜与罗马帝国及其思想体系因此有着明显的冲突。

### 3. 经济、职业与社会地位

罗马的政治法律和社会等级制度对经济方面的发展产生了深远的影响。罗马从建立城邦，建立共和国到建立帝国，完全选择了一条以武力征服的道路。而在征服的这一过程中积累了大量的民族和经济问题，无形中为帝国的发展设置了障碍。罗马公民多数不参与政治，连年的战争和沉重的税收使他们对帝国充满抱怨和不满。伴随着罗马政治形态从共和走向帝制，罗马原有的小规模奴隶制经济向大奴隶制经济形态演变，这种经济形态的演变不但致使原有的经济基础遭到破坏，而且造成了严重的环境和社会结构问题——自然资源流失、劳动力短缺、农业发展不平衡；政治遇到危机，社会道德沦丧。罗马帝国主要依靠奴隶生产的产品，但是奴隶承担的劳动、过于繁重，以致无法通过繁衍后代来补充奴隶队伍，随着战争的结束，断绝了战俘奴隶的来源，结果乡村生产的剩余产品越来越少。奴隶的广泛使用不仅阻碍了生产力的增加，还促使从事经济活动不多的罗马人破产。这些问题深化了罗马本身深层次的矛盾，使庞大的帝国难堪重负。

在希腊罗马时代，手工劳动被鄙视为社会低层阶级的职业。罗马哲学家西塞罗明确表达了他蔑

<sup>④</sup> P. Garnsey, *Social Status and Legal Privilege in the Roman Empire*, (Oxford: OUP, 1970), 4.

<sup>⑤</sup> M. I. Finley, *Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology*, (London: Chatto & Windus, 1980), 67.

<sup>⑥</sup> W. W. Buckland, *The Roman Law of Slavery*, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 1, 10.

视手工劳动的态度，“所有雇用工人的谋生手段都是庸俗低级的，我们仅仅支付他们的手工劳动，而不是他们的手艺技巧；按照他们的案例，他们获得的工资是他们的奴役保证”（Off. 1. 150）。罗马讽刺大师琉善（Lucian）也持守同样的态度，认为手工劳动者只有他的双手，除了靠他的身体生活和劳役以外，别无所有（Somn. 9）。便西拉（Ben Sira）认为工匠之所以不能获得智慧是因为他们必须日夜工作（Sir. 38. 27）。因此任何职业都会影响和分散研究律法的注意力。

豪克指出，保罗的体力劳动是一个奴隶或社会地位很低的人的工作。他在哥林多书信中提到的饥饿和干渴，也暗示了这种劳作并不能提供他足够的需要。换言之，保罗制造帐棚的手工作在当时地位意识强烈的社会中也视为一个绊脚石。<sup>⑦</sup>

保罗很可能已经敏锐地意识到，为了维持自夸的资本，他需要继续作体力劳作。如果是这样的情况，保罗就必须为这个奴役工作在当时受到鄙视的社会付上高昂的代价。但是，他也为此做好了准备，并通过如此吊诡性的低贱和软弱彰显上帝的能力，正如上帝通过基督十字架的低贱和软弱彰显他的能力一样。然而，为了做到这一点，保罗不得不处理哥林多人对他的误解和批评。这些批评者根据当时盛行的社会风气，把保罗的手工作完全视为负面的。

## 二、罗及其会众的社会背景

### 1. 保罗会众的社会背景

自1980年代以来，新约学者开始采用社会学的研究成果来分析保罗的会众背景。例如：泰森和米克斯的研究为哥林多的社会经济状况的深入了解提供了丰富的资料，特别是有关等级观念及其冲突的性质。他们赞成贾奇的研究成果。<sup>⑧</sup> 他们的学术立场现在被称为“新共识”，其观点为：保罗的会众是由跨阶层的社会成员组成的，其中包括一些来自较高阶层的人士。<sup>⑨</sup>

圣经学者在研究早期基督教的社会背景时，哥林多前书1. 26节成了一个关键性的参考章节。在此借用维尔纳的评论：“整本新约全书中没有任何其他一个章节比哥林多前书1. 26节在有关早期教会起源的研究上，更有影响力地塑造了流行的见解和释经的判断。”<sup>⑩</sup>梅杰特认为，最引人注目的，是新与旧的共识都在这里发现了各自重建基督教起源的基石。<sup>⑪</sup>

20世纪初，戴斯曼提出，早期的基督教，包括保罗的会众，都是来自社会的较低阶层。<sup>⑫</sup> 这个观点被称为“旧共识”。与此相反，贾奇则认为，基督教是当地的庇护人或赞助者对他们的社会依赖者或隶属者提供赞助的一个运动。<sup>⑬</sup> 周健文加强了贾奇的观点，认为通过保护或赞助所建立的关系，是第一世纪哥林多社会的重要运作方式之一。<sup>⑭</sup> 克拉克因此认为哥林多会众中一些成员是来自社会的统治

<sup>⑦</sup> R. F. Hock, *The Social Context of Paul's Ministry: Tentmaking and Apostleship*, (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980), 26-35, 67.

<sup>⑧</sup> E. A. Judge, *The Social Pattern of Christian Groups in the First Century*, (London: The Tyndale Press, 1960).

<sup>⑨</sup> G. Theissen, *The Social Setting of Pauline Christianity*, (Philadelphia: T. & T. Clark, 1982). W. A. Meeks, *The First Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul*, (New Haven: Yale University, 1983).

<sup>⑩</sup> W. H. Wuellner, "The Sociological Implications of 1 Corinthians 1:26-28 Reconsidered", in E. A. Livingstone (ed.), *Studia Evangelica IV*, (Berlin: Akademie, 1973), 666-72, at 666.

<sup>⑪</sup> J. J. Meggitt, *Paul, Poverty and Survival*, (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998), 102.

<sup>⑫</sup> Deissmann, *Paul, A Study in Social and Religious History*, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1926), 29-51.

<sup>⑬</sup> Judge, "Cultural Conformity and Innovation in Paul: Some Clues from Contemporary Documents", *TynBul* 35, (1984), 3-24, at 23.

<sup>⑭</sup> J. K. Chow, *Patronage and Power: A Study of Social Networks in Corinth*, (*Journal for the Study of the New Testament Supplement Series* 75; Sheffield: JSOT, 1992), 188.



阶级的。<sup>15</sup> 巴克莱也同样认为，哥林多教会有少数基督教徒处于较高的社会地位。<sup>16</sup> 温特也因此提出建议说，1.26 节所指的是哥林多的统治阶级，并且还是源于演讲家和辩士。<sup>17</sup>

在哥林多书信的研究上，“新”和“旧”立场之间的辩论仍在进行。梅杰特继承戴斯曼的观点，认为保罗的会众应属于罗马帝国中的穷人和非精英阶层。按照梅杰特的评估，罗马人口的百分之九十九维持于只求生存的生活水平上。<sup>18</sup> 傅瑞生也提出了类似于梅杰特的立场，但有些细微上的区别。傅瑞生的结论显示保罗的会众绝大部分处于生存的边缘，但至少有几位拥有过剩的资源。<sup>19</sup> 因此有关保罗会众的社会和经济层面的问题在学术界中仍会展开激烈辩论。

## 2. 保罗的社会背景

尽管路加在使徒行传中几次提到了保罗的公民身份（16.37；21.39；22.3；25-29；25.7-12），保罗自己却从来没有提及到这个问题。由于保罗是否拥有大数和罗马公民的身份与他的社会出身和地位息息相关，学者们对此课题的兴趣及辩论持久不衰。

根据耶柔米的记载，保罗随同父母从犹太地迁移到大数城作殖民，后来他的父母获得自由及罗马公民籍。<sup>20</sup> 大多数的新约学者持守的立场是，保罗在皈依基督之前享受他作为罗马和大数公民的特权。<sup>21</sup> 贾奇指出保罗来自一个杰出的犹太人圈子，属于“希腊化家庭的特权集团”并同时拥有一系列优越的社会资格。<sup>22</sup> 亨格尔认为保罗来自“中等的小资产阶级家庭”。戴尔表明保罗出生于一个“小康之家”。<sup>23</sup> 桑德斯强调保罗是在一个中产阶级的家庭氛围中长大的。<sup>24</sup> 拉姆塞和泰森一致认为，保罗属于更高的社会阶层，拥有大数和罗马的公民身份，因此享有罕见的“特权地位”。<sup>25</sup> 马歇尔坚信，“保罗与他的竞争对手的社会地位和教育是平等的”。<sup>26</sup> 萨尔得出的结论是，保罗自己提到他忍受了三次罗马的鞭打刑罚（林后 11.25；参徒 22.25-29）而没有对他罗马公民身份的声称表示任何质疑。各种外在环境和内在动机的一种混合，使得保罗充分认定在每种情况下为他所拥有的国籍保持沉默。<sup>27</sup> 亨格尔特别指出，保罗在遭受罗马的三次鞭打刑罚时之所以故意隐瞒他罗马公民身份是为了效

<sup>15</sup> A. D. Clarke, *Secular and Christian Leadership in Corinth: A Socio-Historical and Exegetical Study of 1 Corinthians 1-6*, (Leiden: Brill, 1993), 45.

<sup>16</sup> J. M. G. Barclay, "Thessalonica and Corinth: Social Contrasts in Pauline Christianity", *Journal for the Study of the New Testament* 47, (1992), 49-74, at 57.

<sup>17</sup> B. W. Winter, *Paul and Philo among the Sophists*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 191.

<sup>18</sup> Meggitt, *Poverty*, 75-153.

<sup>19</sup> Steven Frisen, "Poverty in Pauline Studies: Beyond the So-Called New Consensus", *Journal for the Study of the New Testament* 26 (2004), 323-61.

<sup>20</sup> 耶柔米,《名人传》Mingren Zhuan (De Viris Illustribus, On Illustrious Men) 5.

<sup>21</sup> See C. K. Barrett, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles*, (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1998), 2.801-02; J. D. G. Dunn, *The Acts of the Apostles*, (Peterborough: Epworth Press, 1996), p. 223; F. F. Bruce, *The Acts of the Apostles*, (London: Tyndale Press, 1965), 340-41.

<sup>22</sup> Judge, *The Social Pattern*, 57-58.

<sup>23</sup> M. Hengel, *The Pre-Christian Paul*, (London: SCM Press, 1991), 17. N. Dahl, *Studies in Paul: Theology for the Early Christian Mission*, (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1977), 35.

<sup>24</sup> E. P. Sanders, *Paul: A Very Short Introduction*, (Oxford: OUP, 1991), 10.

<sup>25</sup> W. M. Ramsay, *St. Paul the Traveller and the Roman Citizen*, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1895), 30-31; Theissen, *The Social Setting*, 36.

<sup>26</sup> P. Marshall, *Enmity in Corinth: Social Conventions in Paul's Relations with the Corinthians*, (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1987), 400.

<sup>27</sup> M. E. Thrall, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Second Epistle to the Corinthians* (2 vols.; International Critical Commentary; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994-2000) 2.742.

法基督的受苦。对保罗来说,“他身上所带的耶稣的印记”是光荣战役中得胜的符号(加 6.17)。<sup>⑳</sup> 有一些证据非常确实的表明:即使那些身份毫无疑问的罗马公民也有遭遇罗马当局鞭打,甚至被钉十字架酷刑的待遇。<sup>㉑</sup> 墨菲-奥康纳的结论是:“保罗的罗马公民身份是应该被承认的。”<sup>㉒</sup>

但是在希腊罗马社会风气的盛行下,保罗作为一个罗马公民的确是作了一件被认为有损于自己社会地位的异常选择。由于保罗的劳作,他被诬蔑为劳动阶级,也就是当时的希罗社会所鄙视的下层阶级。保罗在林前 4:12 节提到了我们“亲手做工”。路加在徒 18:3 节中提到保罗制造帐棚的职业。这个职业往往被解释为正面的-即保罗有能力支持自己并引以为豪,从而使福音免费传给他人。可是当制造帐棚被当作是保罗的一种“副业”时,可能就忽略了它是保罗作为基督的仆人的自我认同和生活方式。

### 三、保罗构建的和谐社群

#### 1. 保罗的政治神学

既然保罗及其会众所处的社会背景与一世纪的罗马帝国息息相关,了解罗马帝国的政治体系、法律制度、宗教及社会风俗将有助于理解保罗书信和早期基督徒的社会处境。学者们开始注重到这方面的研究应当追述到 20 世纪初的德国新约学者戴斯曼。他特别强调新约中罗马帝国背景的重要性,就戴斯曼所言,早期基督徒每天面对的处境,构成了基督教信息形成的特定背景。新约圣经是一部帝国时代的书籍。因为基督徒在崇拜中向基督所表达的词汇和术语也是熟悉地运用于罗马皇帝的崇拜中。由此出现了皇帝崇拜和基督崇拜的并行论战。<sup>㉓</sup> 遗憾的是,随着时代的发展,学者们在这方面的兴趣逐渐减弱。直至 80 年代,新约学者对罗马帝国和新约方面的研究兴趣才开始复苏。皇帝崇拜描述了种类繁多的实践和习俗,包括把皇帝崇奉为人们祈祷、奉献、和崇拜的对象。古代历史学家开始强调在保罗的帝国时代这种现象的重要性,从而促使它对保罗和早期基督徒的重新审议。<sup>㉔</sup>

#### 1.1 遵守法律和服从权柄的教导

保罗的政治立场通常被认为是相当保守和循规蹈矩的,因为他认为基督徒有义务顺服犹太人和罗马人的政治制度。罗马书十三章一至七节成为最有影响力的经文,在此保罗公开劝勉所有基督徒应当顺服罗马的执政当局。这里他不但鼓励基督徒顺服政府,而且把帝国的权柄积极地视作是上帝在世界上的公义工具。学者对罗马书十三章的诠释有不同的见解。一种解释认为保罗的这段经文与彼得前书二章十三至十七节非常相似,两位作者可能采用的是同一个传统-即源自希腊化的犹太教。保罗在罗马书十三章所要处理的,是有关基督徒的自由与责任的问题。这也是当时教会中普遍存在的问题,诸如婚姻、家庭、丈夫与妻子、及奴隶与主人之间的关系和职责。保罗警告基督徒勿滥用基督里的自由,他在哥林多前书六章指责哥林多信徒在世俗法庭上的彼此控诉。保罗在罗马书十三章这里特别指出基督徒与政府民法之间存在的问题。保罗把执政掌权者描述为“神的用人”,因为他们的权柄来自于神,是被神所任命和委派的。保罗在希腊原文使用的是命令式语气:所以你们必须顺服地上的权柄,当尽一切的责任/本分,诸如纳粮、上税等等。彼得前书的作者在 2:13-14 节似乎是使用同

<sup>⑳</sup> Hengel, *The Pre-Christian Paul*, 6-7.

<sup>㉑</sup> Shi Wenhua, *Paul's Message of the Cross as Body Language*, *WUNT II/254* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 33-36. Josephus, B. J. 2.308; 5.449-51; Cicero, *Verr.* 5.165-68; Rab. *Perd.* 4.13-16; Cal. 12.2; Livy 30.43.13; 29.9.10; Suetonius, *Gal.* 9.2.

<sup>㉒</sup> J. Murphy-O'Connor, *Paul: A Critical Life*, (Oxford: OUP, 1996), 41.

<sup>㉓</sup> Deissmann, *Light from the ancient East*, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1910), 344-46.

<sup>㉔</sup> S. R. F. Price, *Rituals and Power: The Roman Imperial Cult in Asia Minor*, (Cambridge: CUP, 1984).

样的语调：顺服人的一切制度，或是在上的君王，或是君王所派罚恶赏善的臣宰。但作者在这里指出基督徒如此行的一个重要前提是“为主的缘故”。此外，保罗在罗马书十三章强调执政掌权者是神的用人，而彼得书信的作者则指出基督徒作为神的仆人的身份，告诫基督徒虽有自由，却不可滥用自由。<sup>⑳</sup>

另有一种假设是把罗马书十三章置于当时罗马帝国的特殊政治背景之中。罗马皇帝革老丢（公元41年-54年）当政期间下令驱逐在罗马的犹太人。罗马史学家苏多纽斯在他的著作《革老丢传》（*Vita Claudii*, 25.4）中描述了这个历史事件：“他将犹太人驱逐罗马，因为他们常受基里斯督的教唆而起骚动。”根据苏多纽斯的描述，在持续动荡之后革老丢对罗马的犹太人实施了驱逐令。与苏多纽斯同时代的塔西佗也证实了二世纪初，作为一个受过罗马教育的人是非常熟悉这些情况的。<sup>㉑</sup> 苏多纽斯可能属于小普林尼的随行人员，在小普林尼治理俾西尼亚期间，他不得不处理基督徒的问题。<sup>㉒</sup> 有学者认为基里斯督（*Chrestus*）是基督（*Christus*）的另一种拼法。遗憾的是苏多纽斯没有提供任何精确的动乱原因。通过他所表达的方式（*tumultuantis*）可以推测，这个情况不仅仅是争议性的问题，而是导致罗马当局把它作为扰乱公共秩序的事件处置。“基督徒”的绰号显然被外界（甚至可能被罗马当局）用于指一个新的政治或社会运动。<sup>㉓</sup>

塔西佗记载了在罗马尼禄皇帝统治期间（公元54年-68年），民众曾抗议重税（*Annals*, xiii.50）。保罗可能是在这种背景下，在罗马书十三章警告基督徒不应当参与任何被视为扰乱公共秩序的事件，包括抗税，并以命令的语气要求他们顺服罗马政府。

## 2.2 基督徒的双重身份和职责：为寻求他人的社会福利

多数学者都一致认同圣经文本的上下文在诠释学中的重要性。罗马书也不例外，保罗在12:1-2节劝勉基督徒要将身体献上，当作活祭，蒙神悦纳。其用意也是在勉励基督徒要视地上的身份和职责在生活中为荣神益人。因此纳粮和上税既表示顺服地上的权柄，同时也是尽公民的职责和本分。基督徒当以国家利益为重，顺服执政当局。

古代匿名作者在其《致丢格那妥书》中，描述了基督徒在城邦中既是捐助人又是公民的双重角色，同时反映了基督徒的吊诡处境：“他们住在自己的国家，但只是作为寄居者；他们作为国家的公民，分享所有的责任和义务，忍受一切困难如同外国人。每片外国土地是他们的家乡，每个家乡又是他们的异乡。他们发现自己生活在肉体之中，却不按照肉体生活。他们遵守既定的法律，热爱和尊敬他人。”<sup>㉔</sup>

保罗在书信中强调基督徒作为捐助人和公民的双重身份。基督徒的教导旨在同时肯定自己在天上和在地上的双重身份，并且要认真完成这身份所赋予的职责。天上的身份鼓励他们作为上帝散居或流放的子民，应当完全专注他们在基督的恩典中那永恒的盼望，最终可以继承那已经在基督里得到保证的天国的福分和基业。这个焦点有助于基督徒应付当前身份的不确定性。基督徒在地上的生活所要面对的，是一个无法回避的吊诡与张力。那就是，基督徒虽“活在肉体中”却要时刻选择一个不受肉体所指导和捆绑的人生哲学与生活方式。基督徒的使命有责任确保他人和社会以及个人领域里的福利（彼前2.11-17）。社会福利也必须同时重视物质和精神两个领域。对基督徒而言，前者在某些方面可说是具有一定的社会革新意义的：因为它把城市里那些富裕的基督徒带入公民捐献的行动中，

<sup>⑳</sup> 加5:1, 13.

<sup>㉑</sup> 塔西佗，《罗马编年史》*Luoma biannianshi* [ *Annals* ] xv. 44.

<sup>㉒</sup> 《书信集》（*Shuxin ji, Epistulae, Letters*）10. 96.

<sup>㉓</sup> Riesner, *Paul's Early Period: Chronology, Mission Strategy, Theology*, 166.

<sup>㉔</sup> 《致丢格那妥书》（*Zhi diugenatuo shu, The Epistle to Diogenetus*）5.5-11。它是公元二世纪左右的一份早期基督教护教士文献。

因此扩大和强化了“捐助者”的意义。在保罗那个时代,捐助者包括基督徒群体中那些有能力以自我生产的资源去满足他人生活需要的富裕者。结果基督徒这个作为公民的身份便可以在社会中起良好的带头作用。

保罗呼吁基督徒去寻求他人在物质和精神上的社会福利,并使它成为基督徒群体关注的焦点。基督徒寻求那些世俗居民的利益和幸福,其实是在效法保罗的生活方式,因为保罗首先是效法基督的(林前 8-11.1)。保罗提到了一个基督徒的典范,那就是,“城内管银库的以拉都”。在保罗看来,这位“管银库”的基督徒是真正履行了基督徒作为公民,在他人的物质和精神和精神两方面的需要所尽的职责(罗 16.23)。初期使徒们的传统,已经为历代的基督徒建立了一个积极的生活态度,并指导他们如何为居住的城市居民作出贡献。

尽管一世纪的罗马社会风气强调阶层、地位和贫富之分。基督教的社会伦理恰好相反,可以被看作是古代社会前所未有的,并具某种特色的一场社会革命。基督徒热衷于他们的城市居民的利益,尽管这个城市对他们来说可能是一个“异乡”。因为按照他们的社会伦理:“每个家庭都是他们的家”。基督徒认为这是他们当时在罗马城市生活中的一个卓越和异乎寻常的特征。<sup>③</sup>

### 2.3 倒置了罗马的社会风尚

郝斯理和其他学者曾提出了不同的观点,认为保罗有意负起一项政治任务。他们认为保罗坚决反对当时的罗马帝国社会,企图建立一个新的社会,去替代占主导地位的帝国社会。例如:保罗在哥林多前书八至十章要求哥林多信徒避免食用那些祭拜过偶像的肉类,劝戒不要参与主流社会中的某些社会活动。他们以家庭为核心的基础的组织,在经济上成为独立的群体,结果与广泛的政治社会格格不入,针锋相对。<sup>④</sup>

上面提及的一些学者对保罗的社会政治观的看法显然是有问题的。他们让人怀疑是受了当代的某些政治信念的影响,过多地把保罗塑造为一位坚决反帝的人物。结果是严重的误会了保罗的使命。不过,在把保罗政治化的同时,这些学者们对保罗的研究,即提醒人们要重视保罗的社会和历史背景,也即是要对大一统的罗马帝国有深入的认识。奥古斯都也曾被广泛地捧为救世主,为和平和世界好消息的化身。这个把政治和统治者宗教与神圣化的历史背景,肯定会给政治神学及其诠释带来新的意义。<sup>⑤</sup> 保罗书信中许多有关政治的经文曾经长期被忽视。当代一些学者们对罗马帝国政治神学某些层面的揭露,在一定的程度上可能会改变人们今后对保罗书信中有关方面的认识。

### 富裕与贫穷

哥林多教会贫富之间的悬殊和两极分化的现象是导致教会分裂的原因之一。早期教会中一些富有的基督徒家庭也是聚集敬拜的场所。<sup>⑥</sup> 有些富有的信徒却滥用他们的自由和权利,甚至导致圣餐的混乱。富人将世俗的作法带入常与圣餐先后在一起开设的信徒聚餐里,藉此大吃大喝,使得贫富之间的分歧激化。保罗因此在林前 11 章中特别阐明圣餐的真义——纪念主耶稣的牺牲和舍己的大爱。保罗劝勉信众们应当彼此相顾合一,排除社会等级和其他人为的区别。在保罗的教导中,除了灵性方面的劝勉外,还经常涉及到基督徒的物资需要。捐款赈灾周济穷人等,是保罗在外邦宣教中不可或缺的事工。他鼓励基督徒应以爱心

<sup>③</sup> Bruce Winter, *Seek the Welfare of the City: Christians as Benefactors and Citizens* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 201-9.

<sup>④</sup> R. A. Horsley, "1 Corinthians: A Case Study of Paul's Assembly as an Alternative Society", in *Paul and Empire*, 242-51.

<sup>⑤</sup> N. T. Wright, "Paul's Gospel and Caesar's Empire", in Horsley (ed.), *Paul and Politics*, 160-83.

<sup>⑥</sup> 罗 16.5; 林前 16.19; 西 4.15; 门 2.

的行为来回应基督舍己的爱。

保罗告诫基督徒应当禁止世俗地位的邪恶争夺,避免肢体间的分歧和权力竞争并要放弃使用为确保社会特权的世俗手段之一的民事诉讼。保罗有关自由和奴隶方面的教导,似乎也与当时的等级制度和主流思想大相径庭。保罗特别使用“仆人”这个比喻来表达作为信徒的新地位以及自己作为领袖角色的认识和理解。保罗在书信中自称为“基督的仆人”。这个角色不局限于保罗本人的自我认同,而且关系到所有基督徒的地位和身份。保罗的神学悖论是,奴隶和自由不应该被看作是不可调和的对立面,而是在基督十字架神学里的奥秘。“基督的仆人”即是效法基督的意思。尽管保罗拥有罗马公民的优越身份,他却为福音的缘故亲手做工,选择清贫的巡回传道者的生活方式 – 即效法基督的十字架生活方式。

### 基督徒家庭规范和伦理

保罗书信中非常强调基督徒家庭中应有的关系和行为准则。这些教导具有固定的形式被称为家庭规范(household codes, Haustafeln)。弗 5:22 – 6:9 和西 3:18 – 4:1 这两段经文被认为是新约中最完整的家庭规范。家庭规范的特征呈现对等的互惠关系模式:丈夫 – 妻子;父母 – 儿女;主人 – 奴仆。这些教导针对家中成员不同的地位和角色,妻子被劝诫当顺服她的丈夫,儿女应听从他们的父母,奴仆应服从他们的主人。丈夫、父母、和主人被督促要体贴和公正,而不滥用他们主导地位的权力。以上这些家庭规范被视为是基督徒合宜的行为举止。歌罗西书的家庭规范和一些后期的基督教文献,都一致表明早期基督徒日益意识到他们被怀疑为社会破坏分子。在一个外来宗教被质疑的处境中,基督教接受社会的弱者如妻子和奴隶这一事实就很可能被视为是对罗马社会良好秩序的一个威胁 – 尤其是性别和主仆之间的平等。

新约学者对保罗使用家庭规范的动机仍旧不能完全理解。保罗是否与世俗的伦理学家持同样的态度,即从家庭开始,扩展至整体教会,最终成为社会的基石? 泰森总结当时的基督徒家庭观为“爱的家长制”(love patriachalism)是否完全正确? 有人说,保罗是一个社会和宗教理论者,宣传妇女和奴隶的自由和平等的信息。相反的,也有其他学者争议,说保罗是一位保守主义者应对维持妇女和奴隶原有的社会地位负责。又有学者认为保罗有意纠正当时基督徒过度要求社会自由和解放的倾向? 女权主义学者修茨勒·费奥伦莎认为,最早期的基督教,包括“耶稣运动”和保罗所建立的教会,曾试图阐明生命平等的观念以及所有信徒在圣灵里的平等。

保罗在加拉太书三章 6 至 29 节的焦点,是外邦信徒因信基督已经被接纳为神的子民,而与基督联合为一了,因此在基督徒的团契里不应该再有种族、阶级和性别的分别了。源自外邦的信徒与犹太基督徒一样享有平等的地位,因为他们现在都已经是神的儿女和亚伯拉罕的后裔了。从今以后没有人可以以割礼或遵守律法宣称自己有优越的地位。

保罗使用的家庭规范,似乎不仅显示了早期教会对家庭伦理的兴趣,而且也表明了保罗及教会清楚的认识社会一般大众的心态及期望。再者,教牧书信中所强调的得体合宜的行为,似乎也暗示保罗希望教会能够尽量满足当时社会的期望,使教外的人会因此尊重他们。保罗似乎很清楚的意识到,持守社会上公认的家庭伦理规范所带来的循规蹈矩的生活方式,有助于基督徒在所处的社会上见证福音。

## 结语

罗马帝国的太平为早期教会福音的散播提供了一个有利的政治和社会背景和条件,如井然有序的法律制度、交通便利的地理优势、商业贸易的繁荣昌盛及安定的社会环境。罗马太平的大同思想成功地统一了辽阔的罗马帝国。然而,罗马帝国的“太平”和“统一”主要是依赖政治的权力和军事的镇压维持的。“太平”和“统一”并不表示当时的社会有名副其实的和谐与公正。罗马社会的基本结构、等级制度、种族、宗教和文化的明显划分和差异,造成了贫富悬殊和其他方面的两极分化。这些矛盾和冲突日渐激化,尽管罗马为了维持帝国的权力竭力镇压各种叛乱,罗马最终还是走向衰亡。

本文一开始就说明中国今天的处境显然与使徒保罗时代那个罗马帝国的处境有很大的差异。本文基本的假设是,通过研究保罗构建和谐社群的意愿,可以为中国“构建社会主义和谐社会”的目标,提供一些相关的见解和参考,对现代中国的处境可能会有某些挑战性和启发性。中国构建和谐社会的目标不应该是“统一”而已,也应该是和谐、公正和自由。虽然罗马和平的大同思想成功地统一了辽阔的罗马帝国,但是,因为罗马社会是以等级、种族、宗教和文化划分的,罗马帝国的政治“统一”与真的“和谐”是有极大差异的。现代的中国对政治统一与社会和谐的追求基本上与古罗马帝国类似。中国的统一主要也是通过政治的权力和军力来维持的。同样的,中国的政治稳定与社会和谐有助于不同宗教的发展和实践。正常的宗教发展和实践不应该被看作是对国家安全和社会稳定的严重威胁。

中国在经济方面产生贫富不均的因素很多。最严重的是在实践法制上的诸多漏洞,出现贪官污吏,贿赂并行,社会风气衰败等现象,使得劳苦大众被边缘化,导致社会矛盾激化,冲突加剧,国家安全和社会稳定受到严重威胁。

保罗在构建和谐社群方面的追求和教导,当然不可能与现代中国“构建社会主义和谐社会”的目标相比。然而,保罗以基督十字架舍己的信息以及以亲身效法基督十字架的生活方式来劝勉信徒平等互爱的教导,肯定具有一定的启发性。保罗关注的,是基督徒的生活方式应当体现福音的价值和意义。这生活方式确保他们之间的和睦及合一,以致成为社会中的福音见证。

自50年代,中国基督教就非常着重参与社会主义社会的建设,鼓励信徒彼此相爱,促进中国社会的共同利益,并弘扬“新人”的发展。许多政府官员,甚至共产党员,也表示宗教,包括基督教,有益于社会的整体利益,承认基督教可以创造出尽心尽力的劳动力为社会造福,同时促进良好和谐的社会。

保罗通过宣教及教导,尝试建立和谐的社群及有见证的信众,教导基督徒遵纪守法,尽双重公民的职责。但是,保罗的十字架神学及其生活方式,最终是与当时的文化、社会观念截然相反的。再者,保罗对强者(富裕)和弱者(贫穷)等的看法与当时的希罗文化也是有冲突和差距的。保罗的教导最终是纠正了希罗社会一些核心的伦理和道德价值观。中国基督徒的神学和信仰,必然是赞同信徒参与社会服务的,也是有份于和谐社会的建设的。但是,与保罗的处境一样,今天中国基督徒的神学和生活方式、视野和价值观,正如基督所传的福音一样,最终也是普世和超越国界与时空的。

**English Title:**  
**Paul's Quest for a Harmonious Community**

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**Abstract:** This article focuses on Paul's quest in the context of first – century Greco – Roman society. Pauline correspondence——this paper examines his letters to the Corinthians——is best understood within its original socio – political context. There is appreciation too of the complexity and “otherness” of Paul's setting. Paul took his civil responsibility and Christian identity with equal seriousness, although the former was subsumed under the latter. He was a citizen of two kingdoms, but his heavenly citizenship clearly transcended his earthly one. Without intending to lead a social movement, Paul's theology of the cross and its attendant social ethics as well as his own modus operandi unwittingly created a great social “revolution”. This paper readily acknowledges the vast differences between the ancient Roman Empire and rising modern China; however, their respective commitments to maintaining socio – political unity and stability bear some remarkable similarities. It is not naively assumed here that Paul's quest for a harmonious community represents a simple and straightforward solution to China's complex dilemma. However, the apostle's vision and “ancient wisdom” may serve as a useful reference point for modern China in the quest for a harmonious society. Indeed, considering the work of the apostle Paul within the Roman Empire can stimulate and challenge us to creatively assess and address the needs of China today.

**Key words:** Pax Romana, harmony, social ethos, civil responsibility, dual identity





**教会历史与中西文明变迁**  
**Church History**  
**in the West and in China**



# 基督徒支持孙中山发动辛亥革命的原因

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**提要:**1892年至1911年辛亥革命爆发期间,基督徒对于孙中山革命活动给予了有力支持。基督徒支持孙中山革命的原因有:基督教教义中具有反抗压迫奴役的精神,中国基督徒具有强烈的爱国主义情怀,外国基督徒中有许多人同情和支持中国的社会进步事业,孙中山的基督徒身份和革命主张对教友富有吸引力。

**关键词:**辛亥革命 孙中山 基督徒

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据国民党元老、基督徒徐谦说:“革命的同志有一半是基督徒”。<sup>①</sup>这个数字目前无法核实,但可以肯定,基督徒的确是孙中山革命队伍的重要成分。1892年至1911年辛亥革命爆发期间,孙中山建立兴中会和同盟会,发动反清武装起义,在人力财力上均得到了中外基督徒的支持。本文探讨孙中山的基督教信仰及基督徒支持孙中山发动辛亥革命的原因。至于中外基督徒参加辛亥革命的具体行动,囿于篇幅所限,将另文详细探讨。

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建立一个反清的秘密组织是孙中山十分重视的问题。1893年冬,孙中山邀集陆皓东、郑士良、尤列等8人,聚会于广州广雅书局内的南园抗风轩,举行的秘密会议,酝酿成立一个以“驱逐鞑虏、恢复华夏”为宗旨的兴中会团体,但因条件尚未成熟,没有付诸实施。<sup>②</sup>按照冯自由的叙述,截至1894年檀香山兴中会成立前,直接参与孙中山反清密谋者达15人,其中有8人是基督徒,即郑士良、陈少白、谢纘泰、左斗山、王质甫、陆皓东、区凤墀、孙中山。<sup>③</sup>1894年10月孙中山到达檀香山,在华侨中宣传革命。在少数亲友和教友的帮助下,孙中山于11月成立了中国资产阶级革命的第一个小团体——檀香山兴中会。这年冬天和次年初又有一些华侨陆续入会,总数近130人,其中有部份人是基督教徒。之后兴中会在海内外不断扩展,其存在的11年中,发展了将近500名会员,在有姓名可查的290人中,

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① 徐谦 Xu Qian,《我对于孙中山先生的信仰为耶稣所传之真道作证》*Wo duiyu Sun Zhongshan xiansheng de xinyang wei Yesu suochuan zhi zhendao zuozheng* [My Testimony on that the Faith of Mr. Sun Yat-sen is the Truth Proclaimed by Jesus],《真理周刊》*Zhenli xhoukan* [Truth Weekly],(第3年第3期,1925年4月19日第二版)。

② 冯自由 Feng Ziyou,“尤列事略”*You Lie shilue* [Some Events about You Lie],冯自由 Feng Ziyou,《革命逸史》*Geming yishi* [The Unofficial History of Revolution] 初集 *Chuji* [Preliminary edition],(北京 Beijing:中华书局 *Zhonghua shuju*, 1981),26。

③ 冯自由 Feng Ziyou,“兴中会初期孙总理之友好及同志”*Xingzhonghui chuqi Sun Zongli zhi youhao ji tongzhi* [Premier Sun's Friends and Comrades in the Early Days of Xingzhonghui],同上引书 *tongshang yinshu* [Ibid] 第3集 [Volume 3],(1981)。

至少有 34 人是基督教徒,占 12%<sup>④</sup>。基督徒所占比例不大,但大都受过良好教育,在组织中处于领导和骨干地位。1905 年 7 月,孙中山联合全国各派革命党在东京创建中国同盟会,参加成立大会的有日本友人宫崎滔天、中国革命党人曹亚伯,二人为基督徒。曹亚伯首先签名立誓约,其他人和之。<sup>⑤</sup>同盟会成立后,领导集团基本上是非基督徒身份的青年知识分子。由于加入革命的社会力量日益广泛,基督徒在革命团体中的地位和作用便不明显了,但仍然有基督徒活跃期间。

在兴中会和同盟会时期,孙中山领导了许多次反清武装斗争,基督徒以各种方式参加或支持这些斗争。大致可分为:1. 直接参加武装起义。据笔者统计,参与惠州起义的基督徒,仅有姓名可查的达 22 人<sup>⑥</sup>以上,其他还有格致、培英两书院的学生,也多为基督徒。当时参加广州方面活动的崔通约估计,惠州起义的参加者,百分之三十属教徒,百分之七十属会党<sup>⑦</sup>。参加辛亥三月二十九日之役的革命志士中,也有一部分是基督徒。在已知的 86 名烈士中,有 6 名是基督徒<sup>⑧</sup>。2. 开展鼓吹革命的舆论宣传。大致可归纳为演讲鼓吹革命,出版报纸,印刷散发宣传品等方面。3. 为革命活动提供大量资金。以大量捐款支持孙中山革命的基督徒商人有许多,冯自由曾总结道:“通观四十年来一部商人的革命救国史,关于个人募款最多者,乙未广州一役为黄咏商,庚子惠州及壬寅广州二役为李纪堂,丁未镇南关一役为曾锡周、马培生,庚戌广州新军一役为李云海……”而李煜堂则是具有“持久性的救国成绩者”<sup>⑨</sup>。

从历史事实看,一部分中外基督徒、牧师、传教士对于孙中山领导的辛亥革命抱着竭力支持的态度,甚至积极投身武装斗争。为孙中山施洗的传教士喜嘉理曾记述道:“当是时,先生始昌言中国之亟

④ 主要根据冯自由 Feng Ziyou “兴中会会员人名事迹考” Xingzhonghui huiyuan renming shiji kao [A Research on the Names and Events of Xingzhonghui Members] (同上引书 tongshang yinshu [Ibid] 第 4 集 [Volume 4])、“兴中会初期孙总理之友好及同志” Xingzhonghui chuqi Sun Zongli zhi youhao ji tongzhi [Premier Sun's Friends and Comrades in the Early Days of Xingzhonghui]、“兴中会时期之革命同志” Xingzhonghui shiqi zhi geming tongzhi [The Revolutionary Comrades in the Period of Xingzhonghui] (同上引书 tongshang yinshu [Ibid] 第 3 集 [Volume 3]);黄大汉 Huang Dahan “兴中会各同志革命工作史略” Xingzhonghui ge tongzhi geming gongzuo shilue [The Brief Revolutionary History of Every Comrade in Xingzhonghui] (《革命文献》 Geming wenxian [The Revolutionary Document] 第 64 辑,台北 Taipei)。

⑤ 冯自由 Feng Ziyou, “革命闲话记事” Geming xianhua jishi [Additional Information about Revolution], 同上引书 tongshang yinshu [Ibid] 第 6 集 [Volume 6], (1981), 61。

⑥ 这 22 人是:孙中山、郑士良、陈少白、李纪堂、邓荫南、左斗山、苏复生、练达成、李植生、吴羲如、苏焯南、宋少东、黄福、刘锦洲、黄守南、梁慕光、宋玉臣、毛文明、崔通约、钟荣光、胡心澄、胡心泉。资料来源:冯自由 Feng Ziyou,《兴中会初期孙总理之友好及同志》 Xingzhong chuqi Sun Zongli zhi youhao ji tongzhi [Premier Sun's Friends and Comrades in the Early Days of Xingzhonghui] (同上引书 tongshang yinshu [Ibid] 第 3 集);王治心 Wang Zhixin,《中国基督教史纲》 Zhongguo jidujiao shigang [The Historical Outline of Chinese Christianity] 第 19 章 [Chapter 19];廖平子 Liao Pingzi, “史坚如案拾遗” Shi Jianru an shiyi [Additional Information concerning the Case of Shi Jianru],《辛亥革命》 Xinhai geming [The Xinhai Revolution], 第 1 册 [Volume 1];崔通约 Cui Tongyue, “沧海生平” Canghai shengping [My memoirs],《革命人物志》 Geming renwu zhi [Biography of Revolutionary People], 第 10 集 [Volume 10], (台湾 Taiwan, 1972)。

⑦ 崔通约 Cui Tongyue,《沧海生平》 Canghai shengping [My memoirs], 国民党党史史料编委会 Guomingdang dangshi weiyuanhui [The Committee of Guomingdang History] 编: Geming renwu zhi [Biography of Revolutionary People], 第 10 集 [Volume 10], (台湾 Taiwan, 1972), 416。

⑧ 这 6 名教徒是 The six Christians were: 劳培 Lao Pei、李炳辉 Li Binghui、韦统铃 Wei Tongling、韦统准 Wei Tongzhun、韦树模 Wei Shumo、韦荣初 Wei Rongchu。邹鲁 Zhou Lu 编:《广州三月二十九革命史》 Guangzhou sanyue ershijiu gemingshi [The History of Guangzhou Revolution in March 29th], (上海 Shanghai: 商务印书馆 Shangwu yinshuguan, 1947), 88、90、91、154。

⑨ 冯自由 Feng Ziyou, “李煜堂事略” Li Yutang shilue [Some Events about Li Yutang], 同上引书 tongshang yinshu [Ibid] 初集, (1981), 198。

宜革新，而密筹实行革新之计划，中国牧师及其同道，闻其绪论，皆秘密与之结合，共谋进行。”<sup>⑩</sup>

孙中山在辛亥革命成功后，多次发表演讲赞扬教会和信徒在支持革命方面所做的贡献。1912年9月他在对教会的演讲中说：“兄弟数年前，提倡革命，奔走呼号，始终如一，而知革命之真理者，大半由教会所得来。今日中华民国成立，非兄弟之力，乃教会之功。”<sup>⑪</sup>同年，他在另一次演讲中指出：“吾人排万难冒万死而行革命，今日幸得光复祖国。推其远因，皆由有外国之观感，渐染欧美文明，输入世界新理，以至风气日开，民智日辟，遂以推倒恶劣异族之政府，盖无不由此观感而来也。而此观感得力于教会及西教士传教者多……”<sup>⑫</sup>直到晚年，他仍然表示：“予深信予之革命精神，得力于基督徒者实多。”<sup>⑬</sup>

## 二

在孙中山的革命活动中，始终可以看到一些基督徒与他并肩战斗或在后方鼎力相助。之所以出现基督徒活动明显的情况，这首先与他本人是一名基督徒分不开的。

1883年11月，孙中山进入香港英基督教圣公会所办的拔萃书室读书，课余拜广州有名的基督教伦敦传道会会长区凤墀为师学习经史之学。就在这年底，孙中山由美国喜嘉理牧师施洗，正式成为基督教徒。早在孙中山“革命言论之时代”（1885-1892年），他就在檀香山、广州、澳门和香港等地结交了许多爱国朋友，其中许多人是基督教徒或与教会有联系的人士。孙中山时常和他们一道探讨救国救民的真理，倡言反清革命。他从13岁至26岁，绝大部分时间都在教会学校中读书，在接受西方教育的同时，也与许多基督徒结下了亲密的友谊。据笔者统计，孙中山在1892年7月毕业于西医书院前，就读的学校有7所（包括私塾），其中教会学校有5所；结识的教友有28人，其中传教士、牧师、传道人5人（见下表）。孙中山通过参加各种宗教活动，经常与教友探讨教义和西方文化，产生了学习西方，改良祖国的愿望。学生时代的经历对于孙中山革命思想的孕育起了重要作用。1912年5月，孙中山曾发表演说回忆道：“至檀香山，就傅西校，见其教法之善，远胜吾乡。故每课暇，辄与同国同学诸人，相谈衷曲，而改良祖国，拯救同群之愿，于是乎生。当时所怀，一若必使我国人人皆免苦难，皆享福乐而后快者。”<sup>⑭</sup>

<sup>⑩</sup> 冯自由 Feng Ziyou, “美国喜嘉理牧师关于孙总理信教之追述” Meiguo Xi Jiali mushi gunayu Sun Zongli xinjiao zhi zhuishu [The Recollections of the American Pastor Charters Robert Hager concerning the Christian Faith of Premier Sun], 同上引书 tongshang yinshu [Ibid] 第2集 [Volume 2], (1981), 14-15。

<sup>⑪</sup> 孙中山 Sun Zhongshan, “在北京基督教等六教会欢迎会的演说” Zai Beijing jidujiao deng liu jiaohui huanyinghui shang de yanshuo [The Speech in Welcome Party Held by Six Churches such as Beijing Christian Church and Others], 《孙中山全集》Sun Zhongshan quanji [The Whole Collection of Sun Yat-sen] 第2卷 [Volume 2], (北京 Beijing: 中华书局 Zhonghua shuju, 1982), 446-447。

<sup>⑫</sup> 孙中山 Sun Zhongshan, “在法教堂欢迎会的演说” Zai Fa jiaotang huanyinghui de yanshuo [The Speech in Welcome Party Held by French Church], 同上引书 tongshang yinshu [Ibid], 568。引文中个别字据余齐昭 Yu Qizhao, 《孙中山文史图片考释》Sun Zhongshan wenshi tupian kaoshi [A Research on Sun Yat-sen's cultural and historical pictures] 更正, (广州 Guangzhou: 广东省地图出版社 Guangdong-sheng ditu chubanshe, 1999), 457。

<sup>⑬</sup> 陆丹林 Lu Danlin, “革命史谭” Geming shitan [Random Talking about History of Revolution], 《近代稗海》Jindai baihai [Series of Historical Materials in Modern China], 第1辑 [Volume 1], (成都 Chengdu: 四川人民出版社 Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1985), 569-570。

<sup>⑭</sup> 孙中山 Sun Zhongshan, “在广州岭南学堂的演说” Zai Guangzhou Lingnan xuetang de yanshuo [The Speech in Canton Christian College], 同上引书 tongshang yinshu [Ibid], 359。

孙中山学生时代结识的基督教教友(1892年7月以前)

姓名	国籍/籍贯	职业	与孙中山的关系
威利士	英国	主教	檀香山意奥兰尼书院院长,孙中山信教即受其影响
芙兰谛文	美国	传教士	檀香山奥阿厚书院教师,对孙中山信教颇有影响
喜嘉理	美国	传教士	美国公理会传教士,在香港为孙中山施洗
杜南	广东顺德	传译	任职于檀香山教会,辅导过孙中山的中文,对其学习医学颇有影响
康德黎	英国	医生	香港西医学院教师,曾任教务长,与孙中山关系密切,在伦敦营救孙中山
孟生	英国	医生	香港西医学院教师,曾任教务长,在伦敦营救孙中山
嘉约翰	美国	医生	广州博济医院院长,喜嘉理介绍孙中山在其医校读书
区凤墀	广东南海	传道人	孙中山的国文老师,常与孙中山谈论反清革命
陆皓东	广东香山	电报生	1883年秋与孙中山在家乡捣毁神像,年底与孙一同受洗
宋居仁	广东香山	小店主	孙中山在檀香山当店员时,结识宋居仁,讨论改造中国政治的方法
郑士良	广东归善	学生	广州博济医院同学,与孙中山密谋革命
何启	广东南海	教师	香港西医学院创办人,改良主义者,其思想对孙有影响
陈少白	广东新会	学生	香港西医学院同学,与孙交谊甚深,为“四大寇”之一
杨襄甫	广东新会	教师	广州博济医院助教,博通中外史籍,孙中山甚敬仰之
王煜初	广东东莞	牧师	香港道济会堂牧师,孙中山常听其宣讲教理
何瞭然	?	教师	广州博济医院化学教员,孙中山尝从之学习化学
尤裕堂	广东顺德	医生	广州博济医院毕业生,介绍族人尤列与孙中山认识
尹文楷	广东南海	医生	区凤墀女婿,与孙中山交往密切
廖翼鹏	广东惠州	学生	广州博济医院同学。
关心焉	广东南海	学生	香港西医学院同学,与孙中山关系较好
郑汉淇	福建	学生	香港西医学院同学
江英华	檀香山	学生	香港西医学院同学,且与孙同班毕业
唐雄	广东香山	学生	檀香山同学,后与孙中山在香港一起受洗
廖德山	广东开平	学生	广州博济医院同学
梁乾初	广东开平	学生	广州博济医院同学
吴杰模	福建	学生	香港西医学院同学
黄康衢	广东	学生	香港西医学院同学
谢纘泰	广东开平	公务员	辅仁文社创建人之一,孙中山在西医学院时与之结识

说明:①职业,指列名者与孙中山初结识时的职业,兼有两种以上职业者酌选一种。②资料来源:《兴中会会员人

名事迹考》，冯自由，《革命逸史》第4集，（北京：中华书局，1981）；《兴中会初期孙总理之友好及同志》、《兴中会时期之革命同志》，冯自由，《革命逸史》第3集，（北京：中华书局，1981）；黄大汉，《兴中会同同志革命工作史略》，杜元载主编，《兴中会革命史料》，《革命文献》第64辑（台北，1973）；谢瓚泰著，江煦棠、马颂明译，《中华民国革命秘史》，政协广东省文史资料研究委员会，《孙中山与辛亥革命史料专辑》（广州：广东人民出版社，1981）；陆丹林，《革命史谭》，《近代稗海》第1辑，（成都：四川人民出版社，1985）。

1892年7月，孙中山以优异的成绩毕业于西医书院，从此结束了学生生活，一面行医，一面和同志们密谋反清革命。结束学校生活后，他在革命活动中亦随时与中外教友保持各种联系。不过他忙于国事，几乎不去教堂做礼拜，如果去教堂也是为了宣讲革命。1912年5、6月间，孙中山在香港基督教会欢迎会上说：“回溯弟初信教于本港，亦在本教会领洗。别后二十余年，为国事奔走，甚少聚集于教会……”<sup>⑮</sup>孙中山的亲信好友徐谦曾回忆和孙中山的一次谈话道：“当民六（1917年）护法之役，我任广东政府之秘书长。与先生闲谈时，先生亦云：彼是基督教徒。当时我问：‘为何不到礼拜堂去做礼拜？’他说：‘我是革命党，恐行动上与基督教以不便，故只中心崇拜。’”<sup>⑯</sup>这说明，孙中山忙于革命后，尽管不去教堂做礼拜，也不大爱谈论宗教，但他对基督教的感情是深厚的，仍然承认自己的基督教信仰。

冯自由曾这样评论道：“考总理之信教，完全出于基督救世之宗旨，然其所信奉之教义，为进步的及革新的，与世俗之墨守旧章思想陈腐者迥然不同。”<sup>⑰</sup>他曾经对人说过：“我不属于教堂的基督教徒，而属于耶稣的基督教徒，耶稣是革命者。”<sup>⑱</sup>孙中山作为政治领袖和基督徒的双重身份对于富有同情心的外国基督徒和有爱国心的中国基督徒具有很大的号召力，因此，他虽然很难得去教堂做礼拜，仍然得到了教会的支持和爱国基督徒的拥戴。

同时，还应看到孙中山虽然是基督徒，但他主要是以政治家、革命家的身份著称于世。孙中山一生既受到了基督教的熏陶，更受到了众多学说的影响；他既崇尚西方资本主义文化，但也不排斥传统文化的精华。西方基督教对他的影响仅仅是诸多影响之一。1923年1月，孙中山曾撰文谈到自己革命思想的来源，他说：“余之谋中国革命，其所持主义，有因袭吾国固有之思想者，有规抚欧洲之学说事迹者，有吾所独见而创获者”<sup>⑲</sup>

### 三

人们也许会问：《圣经》不是教导人们“不要与恶人作对。有人打你的右脸，连左脸也转过来由他打”，“要爱你们的仇敌”（《太》5:39,44）吗？基督徒为何能支持武装斗争，反清革命呢？其实，教会和基督徒也不是铁板一块，在孙中山发动革命的岁月中，也有一些传教士和教会领袖要教徒们心甘情

<sup>⑮</sup> 孙中山 Sun Zhongshan, “在香港基督教会欢迎会上的演说” Zai Xianggang jidu jiaohui huanyinghui shang de yanshuo [The Speech in the Welcome Party Held by Hong Kong Christian Churches], 《孙中山文史图片考释》 Sun Zhongshan wenshi tupian kaoshi [A Research on Sun Yat-sen's cultural and historical pictures], (广州 Guangzhou: 广东省地图出版社 Guangdongsheng ditu chubanshe, 1999), 460。

<sup>⑯</sup> 三民编译部 Sanmin bianyibu 编，《孙中山评论集》 Sun Zhongshan pinglunji [Collection of Reviews on Sun Yat-sen], (上海 Shanghai: 三民出版部 Sanmin chubanshu, 1925), 101。

<sup>⑰</sup> 冯自由 Feng Ziyou, “孙总理信奉耶稣教之经过” Sun Zongli xinfeng Yesujiao zhi jingguo [The Process concerning How Premier Sun Believes in Jesus], 同上引书 tongshang yinshu [Ibid] 第2集 [Volume 2], (1981), 12。

<sup>⑱</sup> Lyon Sharman, *Sun Yat-sen, His Life and Its Meaning: a critical biography*, (New York: The John Day Company, 1934), 310。

<sup>⑲</sup> 孙中山 Sun Zhongshan, “中国革命史” Zhongguo geming shi [History of Chinese Revolution], 同上引书 tongshang yinshu [Ibid], 第7卷 [Volume 7], (1985), 60。

愿地忍受压迫,默默承受现实世界的一切苦难,甚至千方百计阻止教徒参加爱国运动,违者加以处罚。这导致许多中国教徒也未能公开地有力地支持革命。因此,笔者认为有必要分析为何一部分中外基督徒能够挺身而出,支持孙中山领导的辛亥革命。

(一)基督教教义中具有反抗压迫奴役的精神

早期形成的基督教教义中包含着革命的因素。恩格斯在《论早期基督教的历史》一文中指出:基督教在其产生时是一种“被压迫者的运动”,“他最初是奴隶和被释放的奴隶、穷人和无权者、被罗马征服或驱散的人们的宗教。”<sup>②</sup>在当时历史条件下,早期基督教运动所代表的思想潮流,充满着被压迫阶级和被压迫民族反抗罗马奴隶主统治的革命意识,反映了社会下层人民要求摆脱现实苦难的愿望。早期形成的基督教教义有:反对私有制,要求实行财产公有;斥责社会贫富不均,主张人人平等;鄙视富人,同情和支持穷人;宣传上帝将奖赏善人,惩罚恶人,“叫有权柄的人失位,叫卑贱的人高升”等等。

《圣经》里既有教人甘受屈辱,不要反抗统治者的话语,但也有让人民反抗侵略和奴役的教导。如《创世纪》中说:“流你们血害你们命的,无论是兽,是人,我必讨他的罪,就是向各人的弟兄也是如此。凡流人血的,他的血也必被人所流……”(创9:5-6)在这种精神鼓舞下,即使是爱好和平的基督徒,当他们的国家遭到蹂躏,自己的生存受到威胁时,也会勇敢地起来向邪恶势力进行抗争。从宗教心理来分析,在大革命和重大的社会变革时期,宗教信仰者为了民族和自己的利益,便会随着革命的风暴,违反原有的宗教思想体系,同情甚至投身于革命的风暴<sup>③</sup>。

中国主张革命的基督徒把耶稣看作牺牲个人生命,为大众谋利益的伟人。孙中山在香港西医书院读书时经常与王煜初牧师、教友陈少白“互相研讨耶稣与革命之理想”。他们认为“耶稣之理想为舍己救人,革命之理想为舍己救国,其牺牲小我,求谋大众福利之精神,原属一致”<sup>④</sup>。在他们看来,革命与信教不但不矛盾,而且有相通之处,因此愿意投身革命活动。

孙中山自幼生长在农村,亲身感受到清政府的黑暗腐败和劳动人民的深重苦难,因而很容易接受基督教教义中有利于革命的精神。据记载,孙中山年青时,“读《旧约》至摩西导引以色列族出埃及到迦南乐土记,眉飞色舞,拍案大叫,我孙逸仙岂不能令我汉族脱离鞑虏而建新国乎?”<sup>⑤</sup>他在晚年还引用圣经中的这段故事去激励教友。1924年他在《勉中国基督教青年》一文中说:“夫教会之入中国,既开辟中国之风气,启发人民之感觉,使吾人卒能脱异族专制之羁厄,如摩西之解放以色列人于埃及者然。以色列人出埃及而后,犹流离困苦于荒凉沙漠间四十年,而必待约西亚以领之,而至加南之地。”

<sup>②</sup> 恩格斯 Engels [Engels],“论早期基督教的历史” Lun zaoqi jidujiao de lishi [On Early Christian History],《马克思恩格斯全集》*Makesi Engesi quanji* [The Whole Collection of Marx and Engels],第22卷 [Volume 22],(北京 Beijing:人民出版社 Renmin chubanshe,1965),525。

<sup>③</sup> 陈麟书 Chen Linshu,《宗教学原理》*Zongjiaoxue yuanli* [A Theory of Religions' Study],(成都 Chengdu:四川大学出版社 Sichuan daxue chubanshe,1986),220。

<sup>④</sup> 王宠惠 Wang Chonghui,《追怀国父述略》*Zhuihuai Guofu shulue* [A Recollection on the State Father],中华民国各界纪念国父百年诞辰筹委会学术论著编委会 Zhonghua minguo gejie jinian guofu bainian danchen chouweihui xueshu lunzhu bianweihui [Academic Committee of the Society for Celebrating the 100th Birthday of the State Father Sun Yat-sen in Republic of China]:《革命先烈先进阐扬国父思想论文集》*Geming xianlie xianjin chanyang guofu sixiang lunwenji* [A Collection of Articles by Martyrs and Old Generations of the Revolution on the State Father's Thought],第1册 [Volume 1],(台北 Taipei:编者出版 Bianzhe chuban [Published by the Academic Committee],1965),18。

<sup>⑤</sup> 崔沧海 Cui Canghai,“史烈士与基督教信徒合作革命之信史” Shi lieshi yu jidujiao xintu hezuo geming zhi xinshi [The Authentic History of the Cooperation between Martyr Shi Jianru and Christian Believers],《真光》*Zhengguang* [The True Light]二十五周年纪念特刊号 Ershiwu zhounian jinian tekanhao [A Special Volume on the 25th Anniversary],1927。



他希望基督教青年会“担负约西亚之责任，以救此四万万人民出水火之中而登之衽席之上”<sup>②④</sup>。

## (二) 中国基督徒具有强烈的爱国主义情怀

中国基督教信徒中绝大多数人是热爱祖国的。在近代中国，基督徒同广大人民一样，身受帝国主义和封建势力的双重压迫。在民族危机和阶级矛盾尖锐的情况下，他们感到痛苦不安，关心国家和民族的命运。他们中的先进分子对西方资本主义思想文化和政治制度了解较多，对腐朽没落的清王朝非常失望，因而同情甚至参加社会改良或革命运动。下面略举几例来说明这个观点。

香港议政局议员何启，出生于牧师家庭，曾留学英国学习法律和医学，是一位精通西学，极力主张改革中国政治制度的资产阶级维新人士。他关于主权在民的论说，对于孙中山民主革命思想的形成，起了一定的启蒙作用。兴中会成立后，他积极支持孙中山的革命斗争，“实为一有宗教热诚与学术素养及革新思想之先进”<sup>②⑤</sup>。

陆皓东是与孙中山一道受洗的教友，他在上海电报局充译员，有时回到广东与孙中山谈论时局，总是慷慨激昂。他在一篇自述中说：“与同乡孙文同愤异族政府之腐败专制，官吏之贪污庸懦，外人之阴谋窥伺，凭吊中原，荆榛满目，每一念及，真不知涕泪之何从也。”<sup>②⑥</sup>

革命党人曹亚伯在一篇自叙中说道：大冶县福音堂教士张长善“示予一书，名曰《格物探源》，乃上海广学会所译。予生长于极闭塞之兴国州崇山中，见此新书，极其快意，欲借一读，张故靳而不与，予强借。顿悟守旧之非，即入大冶县福音堂为信徒。于是家庭革命、社会革命之思想，日往复于胸中，不顾自身之一切，时与旧习惯相抗矣。”<sup>②⑦</sup>

由于清政府腐败无能，华侨在国外深受歧视。基督徒宋居仁是檀香山仁记西餐店老板，他感到“西人对我华人非常苛待，故革命之心日炽，遂朝夕与中山谈论道理之外，即讨论进行革命方法。”<sup>②⑧</sup>新加坡华侨黄乃裳“以信教故，恒与西籍教士往还，习知彼邦所以致富强之原，以为我国欲振积弱而挽颓风，必取以为法。”他先是投入康梁领导的维新变法运动，失败后，“始悟满清政府之顽聩，非彻底革命不足以图存”<sup>②⑨</sup>

## (三) 外国基督徒中有许多人同情和支持中国的社会进步事业

西方传教士在帝国主义势力的武力保护下才得以大量进入中国城市和乡村传教。他们中有少数人或在某些时候参与了干涉中国内政的活动，但大多数人以传播福音为目的，眼见清政府的腐朽没落和中国人民的贫苦生活，因而反对掠夺和压迫，关心中国的社会进步事业，有的甚至直接参与中国的政治改良或革命。在欧美各国，许多民众都信奉基督教，传教士的宣传可以影响政府和民间对中国的看法。美国学者米泰洛(Michael V. Mettalo)指出：“传教士对美国舆论之形成和对华政策的影响，虽

<sup>②④</sup> 孙中山 Sun Zhongshan, “勉中国基督教青年” Mian Zhongguo jidujiao qingnian [Encouraging Chinese Christian Youth], 同上引书 tongshang yinshu [Ibid], 第11卷 [Volume 11], (1986), 537-538。

<sup>②⑤</sup> 罗香林 Luo Xianglin, 《国父之大学时代》 Guofu zhi daxue shidai [The College Years of the State Father], (重庆 Chongqing: 独立出版社 Duli chubanshe, 1945), 12-13。

<sup>②⑥</sup> 邹鲁 Zhou Lu, 《中国国民党史稿》 Zhongguo guomindang shigao [The History of Chinese Guomindang], 第3册 [Volume 3], (台北 Taipei: 台湾商务印书馆 Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1976), 658-659。

<sup>②⑦</sup> 曹亚伯 Cao Yabo, 《武昌革命真史》 Wuchang geming zhenshi [The True History of Wuchang Revolution], (上海 Shanghai: 上海书店 Shanghai shudian, 1982), 自序 Zixu [Self-Preface], 1。

<sup>②⑧</sup> 邱权政 Qiu Quanzheng、杜春和 Du Chunhe 选编, 《辛亥革命史料选辑》 Xinhai geming shiliao xuanji [A Selection of Historical Documents on Xinhai Revolution] 上册 Shangce [The First Volume], (长沙 Changsha: 湖南人民出版社 Hu'nan Renmin chubanshe, 1981), 50。

<sup>②⑨</sup> 黄世广 Huang Shiguang, “黄公乃棠传略” Huangong Naitang zhuanlue [A Brief Biography of Mr. Huang Naishang], 刘子政 Liu Zizheng 编著: 《黄乃裳与新福州》 Huang Naishang yu xin Fuzhou [Huang Naishang and New Fuzhou], (新加坡南洋学会 Xinjiapo Nanyang xuehui [Southern Association of Singapore], 1979), 252。

然很难确切估量,但无疑是巨大的。在中国工作的成千的美国传教士,经常通过广为流传的报告、书信影响着广大的美国群众……这样就扩大了美国人对中国事态的了解,引起了他们对中国的关注。”<sup>⑩</sup>

孙中山曾结交了好几位对中国革命抱同情和支持态度的外国传教士。他的老师康德黎是一位英国传教医生。康德黎曾希望为中国培养出一批高质量的具有新思想的医生去改变中国现状。1892年7月康德黎在香港西医书院第一届毕业生典礼大会上发表演说道:“只要再过几年以后,造就一批经过适当训练的医生,即可使目前中华帝国的混乱与黑暗,进为医术的和现代科学的。”<sup>⑪</sup>当孙中山弃医革命后,康德黎虽为其医学才能得不到施展而惋惜,但他始终支持中国革命,并在危急关头解救了孙中山。

日本菅原传牧师“表同情于孙公及其理想”,为革命党在日本的活动提供了有力的帮助。他仰慕孙中山,“信其乃一高尚、诚实及恳切之人,甚赞赏其有为民众大领袖之志向,及其爱国之心”。菅原还谈到日本基督徒对孙中山“甚仰佩之,因教徒等信公为民请命,反对压迫残暴之满洲政府也”<sup>⑫</sup>

丁义华是一位在华多年的美国传教士,担任万国改良会东方部书记,与孙中山有所交往,1900—1908年返回美国任夏威夷中国事务监督官。辛亥革命爆发后,丁义华在上海积极呼吁美国社会承认新生的共和国。1912年12月15日他给孙中山写信说:“在这个对您和新的共和国而言的欢庆日子里,我刚刚给美国和我们在北京的部长发了电报,告诉他们我们对新中国能够建成一个强大的共和国所持的信心。”<sup>⑬</sup>在上海的传教士李佳白、柏锡福也持这样的态度。

其他如美国的喜嘉理牧师、芙兰谛文牧师和香忭文牧师也曾同情和支持中国进步事业。

#### (四)孙中山的基督徒身份和革命主张对教友富有吸引力

孙中山在发动辛亥革命期间比较注重利用自己的教徒身份吸引教友同情或参加革命。新加坡华侨黄乃裳是在孙中山直接影响下走上革命道路的基督教徒之一。1900年,孙中山在新加坡进行革命活动,黄乃裳多次拜访孙中山。他对孙的印象是:见其人谦冲镇静,学问渊博,满怀悲悯,流露于言动举止之外。且于基督教有深造之力,有坚卓之信。“孙中山”临行之前夕,酒阑,肃然为余言:“凡人欲为社会国家谋幸福喜乐者,须自愿自始至终,贯彻负悲哀痛苦之责,观路德马丁与华氏(华盛顿—引者注)诸人,可为榜样。“余闻其言,释然有感曰:‘先生之心志,毋亦基督救世之宗旨乎?’孙垂首曰:‘得罪得罪!’竟似为奖借逾分也者。”<sup>⑭</sup>他的这段回忆,再现了孙中山是如何吸引基督徒参加革命组织的。

由于欧美各国的宗教信仰以基督教为主,孙中山便利用一切机会向西方国家表明自己的教徒身份,宣传中国人民对传教士的友好态度,以争取国外政府和人民对中国革命的同情。孙中山在伦敦蒙难获释后,为了取得英国公众的同情,他不论作什么都尽可能着眼于影响舆论。他当着许多英国人的

<sup>⑩</sup> 米泰洛 Mitailuo [Michael V. Metallo] 著,沈云鸥 Sheng Yun'ou 译,《美国传教士、孙逸仙和中国革命》Meiguó chuánjiào shì, Sun Yixian he Zhongguó geming [American Missionaries, Sun Yat-sen and Chinese Revolution],《辛亥革命史丛刊》Xinhai geming shi congkan [The Series of Xinhai Revolutionary History], 第3辑 [Volume 3], (北京 Beijing: 中华书局 Zhonghua shuju, 1981), 99-100。

<sup>⑪</sup> 罗香林,同上引书 tongshang yinshu [Ibid], 11-12。

<sup>⑫</sup> 陆灿 Lu Can,《孙中山公事略》Sun Zhongshan gong shilue [Some Events about Mr. Sun Yat-sen],广东省孙中山研究会 Guangdongsheng Sun Zhongshan yanjiuhui [Society of Sun Yat-sen Study of Guangdong Province]:《孙中山研究》Sun Zhongshan yanjiu [The Study of Sun Yat-sen], 第1辑 [Volume 1], (广州 Guangzhou: 广东人民出版社 Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1986), 356。

<sup>⑬</sup> 广东中山翠亨孙中山故居纪念馆藏件 Collections in the Sun Yat-sen Living Place Museum of Guangdong Zhongshan Cuiheng. 转引自邓丽兰 Deng Lilan 编著:《临时大总统和他的支持者——孙中山英文藏档透视》Linshi Dazongtong he ta de zhichizhe ——Sun Zhongshan yingwen cangdang toushi [The Temporary President and his Supporters], (北京 Beijing: 中国文史出版社 Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 1996), 109。

<sup>⑭</sup> 黄乃裳 Huang Naishang,《绂丞七十自叙》Qishi zixu [A Self Biography in the Age of Seventy], 刘子改 Liu Zigai 编著:同上引书 tongshang yinshu [Ibid], 189。

面去教堂做礼拜。他去拜访了正在英国休假的著名华传教士李提摩太。他还对参与拯救他的孟生博士说,他是一个天生的基督教而不是一个皈依者<sup>⑤</sup>。1904年春孙中山赴美国向华侨宣传反清革命。他在旧金山向美国公众发表演说道:“我们夺取广州的计划是失败了,但我们仍然满怀希望。我们最大的希望是,把圣经和基督教教育(正如我们在美国所认识的)作为一种传递手段,向我们的同胞转送通过正义的法律所可能得到的幸福。”<sup>⑥</sup>8月,在留学生教友王宠惠(王煜初牧师之子)的帮助下,孙中山写成英文著作《中国问题的真解决》,于9月底10月初发表。文中针对美国公众的宗教热情和通商愿望,举出种种事例证明,在清朝以前,中国人对于外国商人与传教士从没有丝毫恶意歧视。文章最后特别向美国人民呼吁:因为你们是“基督教的民族”和“自由与民主的战士”,应该对中国革命“在道义上与物质上给以同情和支援”<sup>⑦</sup>。孙中山的宣传取得了一定的效果,争取到爱好和平正义人士对中国革命的同情支持。

孙中山在发动辛亥革命时注意争取教会和基督徒的支持,中外基督徒对革命也做出了积极回应。但应该指出的是,辛亥革命是中国资产阶级民主革命,而不是宗教革命或战争。基督徒支持孙中山革命并非因为孙中山是基督徒,而是当时民族矛盾社会矛盾激化的结果,是受到基督教普世价值观影响的结果。

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<sup>⑤</sup> 史扶邻 Harold Z. Schiffrin,《孙中山与中国革命的起源》*Sun Zhongshan Yu Zhongguo Geming de Qiyuan* [Sun Yat - sen and the Origins of the Chinese Revolution], 丘权政 Qiu Quanzheng、符致兴 Fu Zhixing 译,(北京 Beijing: 中国社会科学出版社 Zhongguo Shehuikexue Chubanshe [China Social Sciences Publishing House], 1981), 112、102。

<sup>⑥</sup> 孙中山 Sun Zhongshan,“在旧金山的演说”*Zai Jiujinshan de yanshu* [The Speech in St. Francisco], 同上引书 *tongshang yinshu* [Ibid], 第1卷 [Volume 1], (1981), 240。

<sup>⑦</sup> 孙中山 Sun Zhongshan,“中国问题的真解决”*Zhongguo wenti de zhen jie jue* [The True Solution of Chinese Problems], 同上引书 *tongshang yinshu* [Ibid], 第1卷 [Volume 1], (1981), 250 - 251, 255。

**English Title:**

**On the Reasons that Christians Supported the Revolutionary of 1911 led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen**

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**Abstract:** Between 1892 and Revolution of 1911 Christians afforded a great support to the revolutionary activities of Dr. Sun Yat – sen. The reasons Christians helped Dr. Sun are as follows: The teaching of Christianity contains the spirit against pressure and enslavement; Chinese Christians possessed the strong patriotism; many foreign Christians sympathized and supported the progressive enterprises in Chinese society; Dr. Sun’s Christian identity and revolutionary opinions were attractive to conversus.

**Keyword:** the revolutionary of 1911, Dr. Sun Yat – sen, Christians

# 英国传教士对晚清鸦片贸易的态度与行动

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**摘要:**19 世纪初,英国传教士来到中国。因为各种缘故,大多数英国传教士最初都对当时英国商人猖獗的鸦片走私活动保持沉默。及至第二次鸦片战争爆发,英国传教士才更清晰地看到鸦片对中华帝国及其人民所造成的严重灾难,更清醒地认识到英国政府乃是鸦片贸易的罪魁祸首。于是,他们纷纷揭露鸦片对人身与灵魂的摧残,公开谴责鸦片贸易的不道德性,积极投入大量人力与财力在中国广泛展开鸦片戒治活动,在英国国会大力推动终止对华鸦片贸易的动议,并最终促成英国取消对华鸦片贸易。

**关键词:**英国传教士、晚清、鸦片贸易、鸦片戒治

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1807 年,英国第一个、同时也是 19 世纪最早来华的基督新教传教机构英国伦敦传教会(London Missionary Society, 俗称“伦敦会”)传教士马礼逊(Robert Morrison)抵达广州,打开中国的传教大门。然而,当英国传教士们来到中国时,他们不得不接受一个非常残酷的现实,那就是走私鸦片的英国商人与他们如影随形。其后,英国政府更是以武力逼迫晚清政府签订保护鸦片贸易“合法化”的条约。发生在中国的鸦片贸易,有悖于人类的基本道德,更为基督宗教伦理所禁止,并严重阻碍福音的在华传布。早期来华的英国传教士因为各种缘故,除个别人外,大多数都在很长一段时间内对鸦片走私活动保持着沉默。及至第二次鸦片战争爆发,英国传教士才更清晰地看到鸦片对中华帝国及其人民所造成的严重灾难,更清醒地认识到英国政府乃是鸦片贸易的罪魁祸首。于是,他们纷纷揭露鸦片对人身与灵魂的摧残,谴责鸦片贸易的不道德性,并投入大量人力与财力在中国广泛开展鸦片戒治活动,在英国国会大力推动终止对华鸦片贸易的动议,并最终促成英国对华鸦片贸易之终结。

## 一、英国传教士对晚清鸦片贸易的态度

18 世纪后期,英国对中国生丝、茶叶等商品的需求量日趋增加,而其工业产品在以自然经济占为主导的中国却乏人问津。为扭转必须以现银抵消贸易逆差之劣势,英国商人便大量向中国倾销败坏中国财政、荼毒民人肌体之鸦片。1757 年,英国占领印度鸦片产地孟加拉;1773 年,英国东印度公司取得鸦片专卖权;1797 年,该公司又垄断印度罂粟种植和鸦片制造权。在东印度公司的操纵下,英国对华鸦片贩售数量激增。1834 年,英国政府收回东印度公司对华贸易的专营权,东印度公司没有了可能影响其在华其他贸易之顾忌,越发肆无忌惮地走私鸦片。1839 年,英国政府无视鸦片贩售违反中国禁令,更以武力支持和保护鸦片商人的不法活动,并发动侵略中国的鸦片战争。1858 年,英国政府接管东印度公司,直接控制印度的罂粟种植和鸦片制造,并再次借助武力强迫满清政府签订《天津条约》。中英《天津条约》及通商章程规定:鸦片作为“洋药”“准其进口”,“遵行纳税贸易”,可以在各开放口岸销售。<sup>①</sup>这样,英国高人的对华鸦片走私活动便得到条约保护而成为“合法”贸易。自英国商人

<sup>①</sup> 参见王铁崖 Wang Tiejia:《中外旧约章汇编》Zhongwai jiu yuezhang huibian [A Collection of Old Treaties and between China and Foreign Countries], 第一册,(北京 Beijing:生活·读书·新知三联书店,1957),116-117。

对华输入鸦片之日起,英国国界人士自身对鸦片的性质和走私鸦片的道德问题,便存在激烈的争议。最早也最具代表性的争议,出现于传教士在华创办的英文月刊 *Chinese Repository* (《中国丛报》) 上。1836年,一位名叫 J. C. 斯图尔特(J. C. Steward)的基督徒在该报发表文章,指出鸦片贩售的非道德性。作者认为,鸦片伤害人的智力与消化力,甚至败坏道德。鸦片使人上瘾,吸食鸦片有违《圣经》的教导;卖鸦片给人,如同助人做不道德的事情,实在违背《圣经》爱人如己的立场。文章呼吁福音传播者和牧师,不可对事件保持缄默,而是要站出来指责国家的罪恶。作者强调指出,“我们正在积蓄罪恶。这种鼓励鸦片贸易的行为,事实上,是最惹神将愤怒倾倒在人身上的黑暗罪恶。福音的传道人在哪里?共同的人性灵魂溜到哪里?这种罪恶到此刻还没有受到谴责?噢!什么样的不幸才会唤醒你的懊悔和同情?那个垂死的、可怜的鸦片受害者能否触动你的灵魂?想想那千万个因此要灭亡的人,然后问问你自己,这样的罪恶到底要持续多久,何以基督教国家里没有一个人关心此事?到底还要多久,英国政府才不再同流合污地干这种卑劣又侮谩的错事?到底还要多久,英国商人才赚够这血腥的利润而满足,才不怕因为如果他们不干,有人会取而代之?”<sup>②</sup>

J. C. 斯图尔特的文章很快便遭到一些侨居广东的、自称“基督徒”的英国商人们的反对。有位既向中国人派发福音小册子、又走私鸦片的“基督徒”詹姆斯·英尼斯(James Innes),便为自己贩卖鸦片的行予以辩护。他说:“鸦片贸易可以给印度政府提供税收,带来强大的经济利益以造福人群,这已经是合乎道德了。而且鸦片并未被人滥用,鸦片不过如酒一样作药用,既安全又普遍。合法买卖鸦片才能防止滥用鸦片。以资本雄厚、技术高超的政府销售鸦片,总比把鸦片交到地痞恶棍手中买卖要好。”<sup>③</sup>詹姆斯·英尼斯在其文章中还特别强调,英国的教会均对鸦片贸易保持沉默的态度。<sup>④</sup>

然而,詹姆斯·英尼斯为鸦片贸易辩护的文章很快便引起其他在华基督徒的反驳。A. S. 基廷(Arthur S. Keating)即是其中的代表。他批评道:“以雄厚资本和高超技术的政府贩卖鸦片,和以暴徒恶棍贩卖鸦片,本质是一样的。批发和零售毒品,本质也是一样的。另外,外国人只看到中国政府不履行国际法和国家互惠原则,却没有看到自己经营不法的事业,这样的说法是站不住脚的。”<sup>⑤</sup>

伦敦会是英国第一个、同时也是19世纪最早来华的基督新教传教机构,但研究者在相关史料中,却难以觅见该机构对鸦片走私活动所作出的回应。自1807年伦敦会第一位新教传教士马礼逊来华至1858年《天津条约》签订,英国来华传教士虽目睹鸦片走私活动及鸦片泛滥成灾对中国所造成的巨大祸患,但大都保持沉默,甚少发表评论。<sup>⑥</sup>当然,也有极少例外者。1835年来华的伦敦会传教士麦都思(Walter Henry Medhurst)即是其中的“另类”。麦氏早在其1838年出版的 *China: Its State and Prospects* (《中国:现状与展望》)一书中,便揭露鸦片之害以及鸦片贩售的不道德性。麦都思目睹鸦片于人之害,看到其不仅损害人的体力,耗尽吸食者的钱财,更让那些瘾君子良心麻木,意志丧失。所以,他认为,一切与鸦片贸易的瓜葛都是不道德的。“那些种植、售卖和运送鸦片的人,都应该受到谴责,因为他们给那些清白无辜的、信奉异教的人们提供鸦片作为吸食之用。”<sup>⑦</sup>麦都思还明确指出,传教士若与鸦片售卖活动牵连在一起,必然种下恶果:首先,中国人会控诉基督徒贩卖鸦片,如此中国人很难不轻视传教士的品格和他们所传的教义。其次,传教士若乘坐鸦片船只,他就很难在这有关鸦片贸易的事情上置身事外,因为中国人常会问船上是否有鸦片,还会问价钱。其三,若鸦片船的船长与船员

② J. C. Steward, "Remarks on Opium Trade," *Chinese Repository*, Vol. V, (November 1836), 305.

③ James Innes, "Remarks on Opium Trade," *Chinese Repository*, Vol. V, (December 1836), 368.

④ Ibid.

⑤ Arthur S. Keating, "Remarks on the Opium Trade," *Chinese Repository*, Vol. V, (January 1837), pp. 413 - 418.

⑥ 有关早期英国来华传教士对鸦片走私和鸦片战争保持沉默的原因,参见黄智奇 Huang Zhiqi:《亦有仁义——基督教传教士与鸦片贸易的斗争》*Yi you renyi: Jidujiao chuanjiaoshi yu yapiannaooyi de douzheng* [Having Kindheartedness and Justice also: Protestant missionaries and the Struggling against the Opium Trade], (香港 Hong Kong: 宣道出版社 Xuandao chubanshe [Missionary Press], 2004), 11 - 15.

⑦ Walter Henry Medhurst, *China: Its State and Prospects*, (London: John Snow, 1838), 360.

为传教士提供了方便,传教士就有欠于他们。于是,他反对鸦片贸易的立场就难以坚持。其四,每一桩传教士与鸦片贸易混在一起的事件,都会成为给那些从事鸦片贸易的人撑腰、削弱反对鸦片贸易的力量。<sup>⑧</sup> 1855年,麦都思又在 *North China Herald* (《北华捷报》) 上发表文章,公开谴责鸦片走私活动。<sup>⑨</sup>

然而,在英国商人向中国走私贩卖鸦片的很长一段时间,英国国内的教会和传教机构却一直保持着沉默。英国的福音派教会大都支持政府的行动,并未反思英国的行为对中国所造成的伤害。<sup>⑩</sup> 对于英国政府为保护鸦片商人而出兵征讨中国,以及迫使中国签订保护鸦片贩卖的《天津条约》,除了极少数人之外,绝大多数均未持异议。相反,当英国元首提出要对付使英国荣誉受损的中国政府时,却迅即得到教会的支持。<sup>⑪</sup> 即便在英国侵略中国的第一次鸦片战争爆发之后,英国各教会亦对鸦片贩售视若无睹,置若罔闻。<sup>⑫</sup>

英国教会对发生在中国的鸦片走私活动的谴责,至1857年——也就是《天津条约》签订前一年,才公开出现。这一年,离中英两国因为鸦片售卖发生战争已有17年之久。<sup>⑬</sup> 是年,面对英国发动第二次鸦片战争,英国圣公会差会(*Church Missionary Society*, 亦译“英行教会”)领袖约瑟夫·里奇韦(*Joseph Ridgeway*)在该会出版的 *Church Missionary Intelligencer* (《教会传教情报员》)刊物上,公开谴责英国政府强迫推行鸦片贸易的不道德行为。<sup>⑭</sup> 也就是从这个时期开始,英国国内的教会、传教机构以及在华的传教士才逐渐打破沉默,公开揭露鸦片的危害,明确反对鸦片贸易。

## 二、英国传教士与晚清鸦片戒治活动

1858年《天津条约》将鸦片贸易“合法化”以前,便有少数传教士在中国开展鸦片戒治活动。美国海外传道委员会(*American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions*, 俗称“美部会”)医学传教士伯驾(*Peter Parker*),更是此项活动的开拓者。<sup>⑮</sup> 1839年来华的伦敦会医学传教士雒魏林(*William Lockhart*),则是英国最早在华从事鸦片戒治活动者。他先后在澳门、定海、上海、北京等地开设医院,治疗不少鸦片瘾患者。雒魏林根据临床实践,撰写治疗鸦片瘾患者的医疗报告。他在医疗报告中所记载的染上鸦片瘾的人数,与伯驾所记载人数的大致相同。至1850年,要求戒治鸦片瘾的人数和求治其

<sup>⑧</sup> Ibid, 361 - 365.

<sup>⑨</sup> 参见黄智奇 *Huang Zhiqi*:《亦有仁义——基督教传教士与鸦片贸易的斗争》*Yi you renyi: Jidujiao chuanjiaoshi yu yapianmaoyi de douzheng* [Having Kindheartedness and Justice also: Protestant missionaries and the Struggling against the Opium Trade], (香港 Hong Kong: 宣道出版社 *Xuandao chubanshe* [Missionary Press], 2004), 20.

<sup>⑩</sup> Ibid, 9.

<sup>⑪</sup> Eugene Stock, *The History of the Church Missionary Society: Its Environment, Its Men, and Its Work*, Vol. II, (London: Church Missionary Society), 1899, 301.

<sup>⑫</sup> A. J. Broomhall, *Hudson Taylor and China's Open Century: Survivors' Pact*, (London: Hodder and Stoughton and the Overseas Missionary Fellowship, 1984), 219.

<sup>⑬</sup> 参见黄智奇 *Huang Zhiqi*:《亦有仁义——基督教传教士与鸦片贸易的斗争》*Yi you renyi: Jidujiao chuanjiaoshi yu yapianmaoyi de douzheng* [Having Kindheartedness and Justice also: Protestant missionaries and the Struggling against the Opium Trade], (香港 Hong Kong: 宣道出版社 *Xuandao chubanshe* [Missionary Press], 2004), 9.

<sup>⑭</sup> See Eugene Stock, *The History of the Church Missionary Society: Its Environment, Its Men, and Its Work*, Vol. II, (London: Church Missionary Society, 1899), 469 - 470.

<sup>⑮</sup> 参见陈才俊 *Chen Caijun*,《基督新教传教士在华鸦片戒治活动研究》*Jiduxinjiao chuanjiaoshi zaihua yapian jiezhi huodong yanjiu* [A Study on Protestant Missionaries' Activities on Abandoning Opium Habits in China], 载李灵 *Li Ling*、曾庆豹 *Zeng Qingbao* 主编:《中国现代化视野下的教会与社会》*Zhongguo xiandaihua shiye xia de jiaohui yu shehui* [Churches and Societies under the Perspective of China's Modernization], (上海 Shanghai: 上海人民出版社 *Shanghai people's Publishing House*, 2011), 221 - 222.

他病症的人数相对增加。在上海的教会医院,一年内有 9 352 位求诊者,其中约 400 位是求治鸦片瘾的。惟魏林和伯驾都没有把鸦片瘾患者和其他病患者分开治疗。<sup>①⑥</sup>

早期来华新教传教士治疗鸦片瘾患者的方法,没有前例可循,惟靠临床经验。应该说,由于诸方面条件所限,1858 年前传教士在华的鸦片戒治活动尚属起步阶段,不仅戒治环境尚不成熟,而且戒治方法有待摸索。至于其戒治效果,我们也就可想而知了。

1858 年 6 月 26 日,清钦差大臣大学士桂良、吏部尚书花沙纳与英国全权代表额尔金 (James Bruce) 在天津签订的中英《天津条约》第八款规定:“耶稣圣教暨天主教原系为善之道,待人如己。自后凡有传授习学者,一体保护,其安分无过,中国官毫不得刻待禁阻。”第十二款规定:“英国国民人,在各口并和地方意欲租地盖屋,设立栈房、礼拜堂、医院、坟墓,均按民价照给,公平定义,不得互相勒措。”<sup>①⑦</sup>嗣后,两国于 11 月 8 日在上海签订的《通商章程善后条约:海关税则》第五款规定:“向来洋药……例皆不准通商,现定稍宽其禁,听商遵行纳税贸易”;“洋药准其进口,议定每百斤纳税银三十两,惟该商止准在口销卖”。<sup>①⑧</sup>至此,英国实现了利用武力迫使中国“福音传播自由化”、“鸦片贸易合法化”的目标。

然而,西方传教士在华半个世纪的亲历,使他们深谙鸦片祸患给中华帝国及其百姓带来的深重灾难以及对福音传播造成的巨大阻遏,所以,他们很快便发起大规模的反鸦片贸易运动。特别是 1877 年 5 月 10 日至 24 日于上海召开的第一次在华新教传教士大会 (General Conference of the Protestant Missionaries of China), 将反对鸦片贸易作为一个重要议题予以讨论。会议最终形成决议:“第一,吸食鸦片是严重伤害身体、道德和社会的恶行。第二,虽然现在不再禁止鸦片贸易,但它依然严重伤害中国,也伤害印度、大不列颠和其他沾染此贸易的国家。它过去的历史和目前的猖獗情况,尤其在中国人的心中造成怀疑和厌恶,妨碍基督宗教的传播。本大会深愿鸦片贸易尽快受到压制,鸦片只会作为必要的医药用途。第三,本大会充分理解废除此贸易所要带来的商业和经济困难,也不愿意冒昧地提出任何废止这一贸易的意见和方法,只坚持一如既往的信念:“有道德上的错,就不可能有政治上的对。”第四,本大会相信,那些在大不列颠反对鸦片贸易的工作者的努力,是目前传播反对鸦片贸易信息的最实际和最有效途径。他们所做的确实有助切断印度政府与种植、生产和售卖鸦片的直接关系,以及粉碎任何想要阻挠中国政府以合法途径去规限、压制吸食和售卖鸦片的意图。第五,最后,本大会迫切呼吁基督宗教国家所有教会热切向神祷告,求神使用各种方法,使这大恶得以尽快止息,又使呼吁进入人的耳中,好唤醒英国人以及政府和所有基督徒百姓的良心。”<sup>①⑨</sup>

1858 年以前,来自英国的中国传教会 (Chinese Evangelization Society) 医学传教士巴格尔 (William Parker) 已经在宁波开办医院,展开治疗鸦片瘾患者的活动,但是,1858 年之后,才有更多传教士参与协助中国人戒治鸦片瘾的工作。1859 年,巴格尔离开中国,将其在宁波开办的医院交由原中国传教会传教士、中华内地会 (China Inland Mission) 创始人戴德生 (James Hudson Taylor) 管理。当时,该医院一半的病床——约 30 张,是专门为鸦片瘾患者戒除毒瘾而设立的。<sup>②⑩</sup> 戴德生在治疗鸦片瘾患者方面所做的工作,赢得了当地人的信任。根据中国内地会传教士海恒博 (Alfred James Broomhall) 的报告,在

<sup>①⑥</sup> 参见黄智奇 Huang Zhiqi:《亦有仁义——基督教传教士与鸦片贸易的斗争》*Yi you renyi: Jidujiao chuanjiaoshi yu yapianmaoyi de douzheng* [Having Kindheartedness and Justice also: Protestant missionaries and the Struggling against the Opium Trade], (香港 Hong Kong: 宣道出版社 Xuandao chubanshe [Missionary Press], 2004), 25-26。

<sup>①⑦</sup> 王铁崖 Wang Tieya:《中外旧约章汇编》*Zhongwai jiu yuezhang huibian* [A Collection of Old Treaties and between China and Foreign Countries], 第一册, (北京 Beijing: 生活·读书·新知三联书店, 1957), 97-98。

<sup>①⑧</sup> Ibid., 116-117。

<sup>①⑨</sup> M. T. Yates & others eds., *Records of the General Conference of the Protestant Missionaries of China held at Shanghai, May 10-24, 1877*, (Shanghai: Presbyterian Mission Press, 1878), 472-473。

<sup>②⑩</sup> See J. Hudson Taylor, *A Retrospect*, (London: China Inland Mission), 1910, 92-93。



1860年1月底之前,戴德生曾经帮助13名鸦片瘾患者戒除毒瘾。继而,又有133人在随后的3个月前来要求协助戒瘾。<sup>②①</sup>戴德生在该医院工作9个月后,就前往上海,便把助人戒瘾的工作交给高富(Frederick Foster Gough,亦称岳腓烈,宁波人称其为岳牧师)。<sup>②②</sup>

在1877年,全中国共有16家由传教士开办的医院,另有24家医疗站(dispensary)。这些医院和医疗站大多为鸦片瘾患者戒除毒瘾,但戒治的成效似乎并不显著。16家医院中,以伦敦会创办的最多,收纳的病人也最多。<sup>②③</sup>根据英国医学传教士德贞(John Dudgeon,亦译杜德珍)在1867年的报告,他所属的伦敦会设在北京的医院,全年就有5722名病人住院,当中只有124名是要戒除鸦片瘾的。<sup>②④</sup>1869年德贞的报告再次指出,在1869年前后4年间,共有1.8万名病人住院,其中只有634名是求治鸦片瘾的。<sup>②⑤</sup>另据一份报告称,一所在汉口设立的医院,1870年之前的14个月内,所收纳的7037名病人中,仅有96名是求治鸦片瘾的。<sup>②⑥</sup>相对于传教士所报告的中国人吸食鸦片的高比率,要戒除鸦片瘾的人数就显得很稀少了。<sup>②⑦</sup>至于专门为戒治鸦片瘾而创办的医院,就只有英国圣公会差会在杭州开办的一家。另外,1877年之前,北京也有一家由伦敦会和长老会合办、由华人信徒负责管理的戒烟所。<sup>②⑧</sup>

当时,凡来治疗鸦片瘾的患者均需住院,只有服务于杭州的伦敦会医学传教士W. E. 希勒(W. E. Shearer)不赞成患者离家进院治疗。<sup>②⑨</sup>每名住院的病人,一般都要缴付一至两元按金,食宿费用从中扣除。<sup>③⑩</sup>进院者均需马上停止使用鸦片枪,医疗处方是将鸦片溶在水里,混合其他刺激剂给瘾患者服用,继而再逐渐递减用量。有些医生则仍以金鸡纳霜和樟脑作为处方。当时有少数传教士医生表示,治疗鸦片瘾并没有什么特效药,乃是在乎吸食者的节制和决心,但多数人都很重视戒瘾的药方。华人信徒尤其看重戒烟药的功效。<sup>③⑪</sup>1873-1877年间,《万国公报》所载关于鸦片的文章,其内容多是讨论各种戒瘾处方。有些人还吹捧自己的处方已令“千万余人戒脱,无有一人戒不脱者,……还可以治百病”<sup>③⑫</sup>。有些人还借用西医的名字和权威,去推销宣传自己所售卖的戒烟药。<sup>③⑬</sup>

接触中国的鸦片瘾患者愈久,传教士便愈感其医疗效果不理想。英国圣公会差会传教士慕稼谷(G. E. Moule,亦称穆尔)1876年写信给Chinese Recorder(《教务杂志》),补充其之前发表的一篇有关

<sup>②①</sup> See Alfred James Broomhall, *Hudson Taylor & China's Open Century: If I Had a Thousand Lives*, Hodder and Stoughton and Overseas Missionary Fellowship, 1990, 195-196.

<sup>②②</sup> 参见黄智奇 Huang Zhiqi:《亦有仁义——基督教传教士与鸦片贸易的斗争》*Yi you renyi: Jidujiao chuanjiaoshi yu yapianmaoyi de douzheng* [Having Kindheartedness and Justice also: Protestant missionaries and the Struggling against the Opium Trade], (香港 Hong Kong: 宣道出版社 Xuandao chubanshe [Missionary Press], 2004), 67。

<sup>②③</sup> See M. T. Yates & others eds., *Records of the General Conference of the Protestant Missionaries of China held at Shanghai, May 10-24, 1877*, (Shanghai: Presbyterian Mission Press, 1878), 486.

<sup>②④</sup> See *Chinese Recorder*, (July 1868), 51-52.

<sup>②⑤</sup> See *Chinese Recorder*, (January 1869), 181-182.

<sup>②⑥</sup> See *Chinese Recorder*, (April 1870), 319.

<sup>②⑦</sup> 参见黄智奇 Huang Zhiqi:《亦有仁义——基督教传教士与鸦片贸易的斗争》*Yi you renyi: Jidujiao chuanjiaoshi yu yapianmaoyi de douzheng* [Having Kindheartedness and Justice also: Protestant missionaries and the Struggling against the Opium Trade], (香港 Hong Kong: 宣道出版社 Xuandao chubanshe [Missionary Press], 2004), 68。

<sup>②⑧</sup> 参见《万国公报》第10卷,1878年2月16日,第357页。

<sup>②⑨</sup> See *Chinese Recorder*, (April 1870), 318-319.

<sup>③⑩</sup> See *Chinese Recorder*, (April 1869), 263.

<sup>③⑪</sup> 参见黄智奇 Huang Zhiqi:《亦有仁义——基督教传教士与鸦片贸易的斗争》*Yi you renyi: Jidujiao chuanjiaoshi yu yapianmaoyi de douzheng* [Having Kindheartedness and Justice also: Protestant missionaries and the Struggling against the Opium Trade], (香港 Hong Kong: 宣道出版社 Xuandao chubanshe [Missionary Press], 2004), 69。

<sup>③⑫</sup> 《万国公报》*Wanguo Gongbao* [Global Magazine]第10卷,(1877年11月24日),207。

<sup>③⑬</sup> 参见《万国公报》*Wanguo Gongbao* [Global Magazine]第8卷,(1876年2月5日),420。

助人戒除鸦片瘾工作的报道时,引述一位经验丰富的医学传教士的话:“不要把医疗效果说得那么没有保留,……须知道,在这特别的治疗期间,大家会无可避免地有许多莫名其妙的困惑。”<sup>④</sup>

德贞是一个医术非常高明的传教士,其在此期的戒烟工作中亦十分出色,仅 1876 年,在他行医的医院就收纳超过 1 万名病人,其中有许多鸦片瘾患者。当时有华人制造戒瘾药物,更以德贞的名字作为药名。<sup>⑤</sup>

自《天津条约》签订至 1877 年第一次在华新教传教士大会召开,传教士在华的医疗戒治鸦片活动已初具规模,无论是戒烟所的数量与地域分布,还是接纳的病患人数,均有较大的突破。但是,其戒治效果依然不是很理想。

1888 年 6 月 9 日至 19 日,世界新教传教百年大会(Centenary Conference of Protestant Missions of the World)在伦敦举行。应传教士的强烈要求,会议延期 1 天专门讨论鸦片问题,并最后通过由内地会创始人戴德生提出的议案:“第一,要将贻害中国的鸦片贸易大患记录下来。第二,谴责英国政府借印度去制造和推销鸦片这种贻害人间的毒物。第三,确认只要政府肯禁绝此贸易,此贸易定能禁绝。第四,呼吁所有英国、爱尔兰等地的信徒齐心合意敬仰上帝。第五,向首相和印度总督转呈此议案。”<sup>⑥</sup>1890 年 5 月 10 日至 20 日,上海举办第二次在华新教传教士大会。由于一些大的差会均以教育、医疗、文字、救济等作为传教工作的重心,所以鸦片问题远没有像 1877 年大会那样受到重视,仅有内地会提出将拯救鸦片瘾患者作为传教工作的重点。1907 年 4 月 25 日至 5 月 8 日,在华传教士百年大会(China Centenary Missionary Conference)在上海举行。传教士们预感到中、英两国有意禁止鸦片贸易,估计会有大量的鸦片瘾患者寻求断瘾治疗,所以,他们呼吁所有在华传教士加强鸦片戒治工作,并通过两项决议:“第一,促请所有在华传教士,尽可能以各种方法打击鸦片这一大恶,同时加强戒烟所的工作;在任何情况下,都要竭尽所能将基督的能力突显成为脱离此败坏的大恶、求得永远救恩的惟一肯定和希望。第二,敦促所有住在中国人中的基督徒齐心协力,唤起公众一同反对售卖和反对使用鸦片。”<sup>⑦</sup>

传教士在反对鸦片贸易的运动中,最令千万中国鸦片瘾患者受益的,要算是其创办的戒烟所所提供的戒烟服务。其中又以戴德生及其内地会所做的工作最早和最有效果,有些后来的传教机构也效法他们的工作。<sup>⑧</sup>

在 1890 年之前,传教士在华的反对鸦片贸易工作,只有在治疗鸦片瘾患者方面有点成绩。传教士发现,帮助中国人戒治鸦片瘾,是其接触和传播福音给中国人的最佳方法。所以设立戒烟所便成为传教士的一项重点工作。特别是对于内地会的传教士,其戒烟所大都设在山西太原一带。而戒烟所的涌现则与社会的迫切需求有关。那些设于内地城市的戒烟所,跟附设于沿岸大城市大医院的戒烟所,无论在规模还是设备上,都有很大的差别。<sup>⑨</sup> 根据美部会传教士 H. T. 惠特尼(H. T. Whitney)在

<sup>④</sup> *Chinese Recorder*, (October 1876), 136.

<sup>⑤</sup> 参见黄智奇 Huang Zhiqi:《亦有仁义——基督教传教士与鸦片贸易的斗争》*Yi you renyi: Jidujiao chuanjiaoshi yu yapianmaoyi de douzheng* [Having Kindheartedness and Justice also: Protestant missionaries and the Struggling against the Opium Trade], (香港 Hong Kong: 宣道出版社 Xuandao chubanshe [Missionary Press], 2004), 46.

<sup>⑥</sup> Johnston James, ed., *Report of the Centenary Conference of Protestant Missions of the World, held in Exeter Hall (9 - 19 June)*, London, 1888, Vol. I, (New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1888), 471.

<sup>⑦</sup> *Records: China Centenary Missionary Conference, 1907*, (Shanghai: Centenary Conference Committee, 1907), 658.

<sup>⑧</sup> 参见黄智奇 Huang Zhiqi:《亦有仁义——基督教传教士与鸦片贸易的斗争》*Yi you renyi: Jidujiao chuanjiaoshi yu yapianmaoyi de douzheng* [Having Kindheartedness and Justice also: Protestant missionaries and the Struggling against the Opium Trade], (香港 Hong Kong: 宣道出版社 Xuandao chubanshe [Missionary Press], 2004), 100.

<sup>⑨</sup> 参见黄智奇 Huang Zhiqi:《亦有仁义——基督教传教士与鸦片贸易的斗争》*Yi you renyi: Jidujiao chuanjiaoshi yu yapianmaoyi de douzheng* [Having Kindheartedness and Justice also: Protestant missionaries and the Struggling against the Opium Trade], (香港 Hong Kong: 宣道出版社 Xuandao chubanshe [Missionary Press], 2004), 100 - 101.

1890年传教士大会上的报告,理想的戒烟所除了要有好看的中式或西式外观外,里面则要设置各样的书刊,还要开设心理辅导服务等等。H. T. 惠特尼这些理想,恐怕只有像伦敦会、英国圣公会差会及美国长老会等几个大宗派的传教差会可以达到,而且亦仅限于沿岸大城市大规模综合性医院内附设的戒烟所。然而,对于大型的教会医院而言,给人戒烟只是其医疗工作的一部分,像伦敦会在全国9家医院的79 365名病人中,就只有209人是治疗鸦片瘾的。英国圣公会差会医院的情况亦大致如此,在36 760名病人中,只有118人是治疗鸦片瘾的。英国圣公会差会还在杭州建立了一所专门治疗麻风和鸦片瘾患者的医院。<sup>④</sup>这两大传教差会都没有在内地设立戒烟所,他们的着重点,是在大城市里发展全面的医疗和教育工作。

当时在华设立最多戒烟所的传教组织是戴德生领导的内地会,且其戒烟所大都设于内陆。戴德生刚到中国不久,就开始医治鸦片瘾患者,并因此赢得声名。他每次回英国述职,都在各大教会之间奔走,宣传反对鸦片贸易的信息。他在创立内地会之后,于1878年开始出版内地会刊物*China's Millions*(《中国亿兆》),把对付中国的鸦片之害视为重要问题之一。该刊极少发表议政文章向中、英两国政府诉求反对鸦片贸易,而是常常登载传教士在中国内陆地区所见种植罂粟和吸食鸦片的情形,着重助人戒烟和传扬福音。<sup>⑤</sup>1876年,内地会只有两家戒烟所;后来逐渐增多,1885年有8家,1886年有13家,<sup>⑥</sup>1893年有28家。<sup>⑦</sup>内地会的戒烟所和传教士的数目,增幅乃众传教组织之冠。<sup>⑧</sup>及至1905年,该会共设立101家戒烟所。<sup>⑨</sup>内地会戒烟所发展迅速、远胜其他差会的主要原因,可归纳为如下几点:首先,该会领导人发现开办医院和戒烟所是当时社会最需要的服务,又是接触中国人的最佳途径。戴德生在1880年代内地会的发展计划里,将戒烟所和医院列为重点工作。他计划在每个传教站开办一个戒烟所,并设立售药站以销售戒治鸦片的药物。他以医院作为训练中国同工的基地,其他内地会的传教士同样抱有这种工作理念和热诚,而且对救助中国人脱离鸦片灾害都有很强烈的意愿。其次,内地会的发展策略是发散式的。传教差会大都集中在沿岸大城市发展大型医院,内地会则将传教站、戒烟所分散扩展到内陆的城市乡镇。从医疗技术和设备看,内地会分散在各地的传教站和戒烟所,当然比不上大城市的大型医院;但从传播福音的效果看,它们却因深入内陆乡镇而能广泛地和百姓接触。最后,内地会的传教士很愿意放手,将管理戒烟所的任务交由中国信徒领袖负责,自己退居顾问的角色,保持合作的关系。这都是内地会的戒烟所之所以能够在山西太原一带发展迅速的原因。<sup>⑩</sup>

传教士为中国人治疗疾病和戒除鸦片瘾的成效,开始得到一些官员的肯定,特别是那些曾经被传教士医治过的,或是因为办理洋务而对传教士工作有所了解的人。山西有位将领因为在传教士的戒烟所戒除了鸦片瘾,就推荐其他鸦片瘾患者去找传教士帮忙戒治。<sup>⑪</sup>李鸿章和三位道台亦曾出席天津伦敦会医院的开幕典礼,该医院还是李鸿章出钱建造的,以表达对马根济(John Kenneth Mackenzie)救

<sup>④</sup> See Donald MacGillivray, *A Century of Protestant Missions in China, 1807 - 1907*, (Shanghai: American Presbyterian Mission Press), 1907, 27.

<sup>⑤</sup> 参见黄智奇 Huang Zhiqi:《亦有仁义——基督教传教士与鸦片贸易的斗争》*Yi you renyi: Jidujiao chuanjiaoshi yu yapianmaoyi de douzheng* [Having Kindheartedness and Justice also: Protestant missionaries and the Struggling against the Opium Trade], (香港 Hong Kong: 宣道出版社 Xuandao chubanshe [Missionary Press], 2004), 101 - 102。

<sup>⑥</sup> See *China Millions*, (China Inland Mission, 1886 - 1887), 80, 84.

<sup>⑦</sup> See *China Mission Handbook*, (Shanghai: American Presbyterian Mission Press, 1896), 150.

<sup>⑧</sup> 1875年,内地会只有32位传教士。而1885年,传教士人数增加到225位,传教站则由52个增加到106个。

<sup>⑨</sup> See Donald MacGillivray, *A Century of Protestant Missions in China, 1807 - 1907*, (Shanghai: American Presbyterian Mission Press, 1907), 147.

<sup>⑩</sup> 参见黄智奇 Huang Zhiqi:《亦有仁义——基督教传教士与鸦片贸易的斗争》*Yi you renyi: Jidujiao chuanjiaoshi yu yapianmaoyi de douzheng* [Having Kindheartedness and Justice also: Protestant missionaries and the Struggling against the Opium Trade], (香港 Hong Kong: 宣道出版社 Xuandao chubanshe [Missionary Press], 2004), 102 - 103。

<sup>⑪</sup> See Mrs. H. Taylor, *Pastor His: Confucian Scholar and Christian*, (London: Morgan & Scott, 1923), 219 - 220.

活其妻子的感激。<sup>48</sup> 此外,在南京有 13 位官员支持兴建教会医院,并在院内附设戒烟所。<sup>49</sup> 可见,传教士设立戒烟所的做法,开始获得一些中国官员的肯定。中国政府随后也开办戒烟所,而第一家官办的戒烟所开设于 1880 年冬。<sup>50</sup>

1890 年前后,戒烟所的发展最切合当时中国社会的需要。当地方政府雷厉执行禁种禁吸鸦片,或者鸦片瘾患者到了一穷二白的时候,戒烟所便成为吸食鸦片者最有可能选择的地方。中国政府和民间自办的戒烟所不多,成果也不显著;因为缺乏跟进的善后工作,所有很多人戒了又复吸。<sup>51</sup> 由于中国政府和民间自办的戒烟所难以应付社会的需求,传教士所创办的戒烟所则正好能满足之。传教士们确信,戒烟所的设立,正是一个抗议鸦片贸易的具体行动。英国圣公会差会的医学传教士梅登垦(Duncan Main)就绝对肯定戒烟所的存在价值,他还进一步解释说:“戒烟所可以让中国人亲眼看到我们的好意。盼望我们可以做些好事,把那些被鸦片捆绑的、被生命中的不幸缠住的……拯救出来。”<sup>52</sup>

英国浸礼会(British Baptist Missionary Society)的华新(G. B. Farthing)牧师 1891 年抵达山西。他也仿效内地会的做法,开设一家戒烟所;因为反映良好,且有中国人因此皈依基督,<sup>53</sup>所以随后几年,他又开设 3 家戒烟所,交由华人基督徒管理。至 1895 年,有超过 600 名鸦片瘾患者在其戒烟所戒毒,<sup>54</sup>甚至有鸦片瘾患者愿意自己出钱到戒烟所戒毒。<sup>55</sup> 其他 1890 年之后建立戒烟所的差会,分别有联合长老传教会(United Presbyterian Mission):在辽宁和沈阳;美国浸信传教会(American Baptist Mission):在四川;英国卫斯理传教会(English Wesleyan Mission):在湖北(他们早于 1880 年代已在广东佛山设立了一家戒烟所);<sup>56</sup>美国长老传教会(American Presbyterian Mission):在山东济南;美国循道传教会(American Methodist Episcopal Mission)<sup>57</sup>和美国归正宗传教会(American Reformed Church):在福建;礼贤传道会(Rhenish Missionary Society):在广东东莞;<sup>58</sup>加拿大长老传教会(Canadian Presbyterian Mission):在湖南;<sup>59</sup>瑞典美国人差会(Swedish American Mission):在湖北的樊城;<sup>60</sup>瑞典差会(Swedish Mission):在山西解州。<sup>61</sup> 除了以上的传教差会之外,还有英国圣公会差会、伦敦会、美部会这些历史悠久又具规模的传教差会,分别在各大城市的医院里开设专门治疗鸦片瘾患者的病房。<sup>62</sup> 以上提到的各个传教差会,设立最多戒烟所的也不过 5 家,最少的只有 1 家。然而由内地会设立的戒烟所,1905 年已

<sup>48</sup> See Donald MacGillivray, *A Century of Protestant Missions in China, 1807 - 1907*, (Shanghai: American Presbyterian Mission Press, 1907), 10.

<sup>49</sup> See James Johnston, ed., *Report of the Centenary Conference of Protestant Missions of the World, held in Exeter Hall (9 - 19 June)*, London, 1888, Vol. I, (New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1888), 134.

<sup>50</sup> 参见《申报》*Shen Bao* [Shun Pao], (1882 年 7 月 11 日), 3301。

<sup>51</sup> 参见《申报》*Shen Bao* [Shun Pao], 1882 年 12 月 5 日, 3448。

<sup>52</sup> *Chinese Recorder*, April 1893, 192.

<sup>53</sup> See Donald MacGillivray, *A Century of Protestant Missions in China, 1807 - 1907*, (Shanghai: American Presbyterian Mission Press, 1907), 80.

<sup>54</sup> See *China Mission Handbook*, (Shanghai: American Presbyterian Mission Press, 1896), 47.

<sup>55</sup> See Donald MacGillivray, *A Century of Protestant Missions in China, 1807 - 1907*, (Shanghai: American Presbyterian Mission Press, 1907), 85.

<sup>56</sup> See *China Mission Handbook*, (Shanghai: American Presbyterian Mission Press, 1896), 96.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid*, 220.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid*, 276.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid*, 291.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid*, 295.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid*, 522.

<sup>62</sup> 参见黄智奇 Huang Zhiqi: 《亦有仁义——基督教传教士与鸦片贸易的斗争》*Yi you renyi: Jidujiao chuanjiaoshi yu yapiannaoyi de douzheng* [Having Kindheartedness and Justice also: Protestant missionaries and the Struggling against the Opium Trade], (香港 Hong Kong: 宣道出版社 Xuandao chubanshe [Missionary Press], 2004), 138 - 139.

增加到 101 所,其中 71 所在山西。<sup>63</sup> 以治疗鸦片瘾著称的医生,有在杭州的梅登垦,在天津的马根济,在厦门的郁约翰(John Abraham Otte),在北京的 M. D. 普理查德(M. D. Pritchard)和 B. C. 阿特伯里(B. C. Atterbury),在华山的 S. A. 达文波特(S. A. Davenport),以及在烟台的窦伟德(Arthur Douthwaite)。<sup>64</sup>

19 世纪末 20 世纪初,传教士在华设立的戒烟所虽为很多中国人戒毒,但成功地使戒瘾者完全脱离鸦片瘾的比率却很低。根据 1896 年的统计,在传教差会开办的戒烟所里接受戒毒的有 1 088 人,其中只有 170 人在一年内不再重吸鸦片。<sup>65</sup> 传教士把这样低的戒断率,归咎于两个原因:一是因为戒瘾者的心不诚恳。二是因为缺乏教牧同工去跟进那些没有真正信心的戒瘾者。对于拥有较多传教士的宗派,跟进工作比较容易,也更见成效。内地会有最多传教士,在 1906 年有 849 位。虽然如此,其发展蓬勃的戒烟所却缺乏高素质的领导同工。内地会传教士 W. G. 皮特(W. G. Peat)就曾在 Chinese Recorder 上发表公开信,反对让一些连基督教信仰都未弄清楚的人负责管理传教士的戒烟所,主张戒烟所应由传教士管理。他的呼吁说明,当时兴旺的戒烟所可能因人手不足而趋向于让信仰根基尚浅的华人信徒担当领导重任。W. G. 皮特还认为,戒烟所的工作虽然重要,但传教士不应以此作为全部的工作。<sup>66</sup> 这反映出传教士当中可能有同工因只顾帮人戒毒,而忽略其最为根本之传教目的。<sup>67</sup>

及至 1907 年,传教士设立的戒烟所一直是鸦片瘾患者主要求助的地方,因为当时中国政府和民间的戒烟所仍未普遍。Chinese Recorder 的编辑曾经设计问卷,向在华传教士调查各地的禁烟情况。按照传教士的报告,只有福州、天津和广州才有官办的戒烟所,但办得并不成功。<sup>68</sup> 而满清政府在 1907 年之后,才容许百姓自办戒烟所和禁烟的组织,又只许他们办理有关戒烟的事务,不准议论政治和其他与戒烟无关的事情。<sup>69</sup> 传教士办理的戒烟所之所以如此吸引中国人,主要是因为他们的医疗技术逐步得到中国官方的肯定,也开始赢得中国人的信任。在助人戒烟的事情上,传教士们所做的确实切合当时社会的需要。<sup>70</sup>

1878 - 1907 年间,英国传教士在华的医疗戒治鸦片瘾活动更趋全面、深入,戒治方法亦更为科学、理性。其最重要的成效在于,促进了大量中国政府和民间的戒烟机构的诞生。

### 三、英东禁止鸦片贸易会与晚清鸦片贸易的终结

1858 年中英《天津条约》规定在华鸦片贸易“合法化”之后,越来越多的英国传教士极力反对这种罪恶的贸易,并形成共识:鸦片贸易的罪魁祸首并非那些贩卖鸦片的英国商人,而是力主鸦片贸易的

<sup>63</sup> See Donald MacGillivray, *A Century of Protestant Missions in China, 1807 - 1907*, (Shanghai: American Presbyterian Mission Press, 1907), 147.

<sup>64</sup> See James. S. Dennis, *Christian Missions and Social Progress*, (New York, Chicago and Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1899), 129.

<sup>65</sup> See *China Mission Handbook*, (Shanghai: American Presbyterian Mission Press, 1896), 327.

<sup>66</sup> See *Chinese Recorder*, April 1893, p. 184.

<sup>67</sup> 参见黄智奇著 Huang Zhiqi:《亦有仁义——基督教传教士与鸦片贸易的斗争》*Yi you renyi: Jidujiao chuanjiaoshi yu yapi-anmaoyi de douzheng* [Having Kindheartedness and Justice also: Protestant missionaries and the Struggling against the Opium Trade], (香港 Hong Kong: 宣道出版社 Xuandao chubanshe [Missionary Press], 2004), 140。

<sup>68</sup> See *Chinese Recorder*, (March 1908), 119.

<sup>69</sup> 《十二朝东华录之光绪朝》*Shierchao donghualu zhi guangxu chao* [Twelve Dynasties' Guangxu Dynasty] 第十册, (台北 Taipei: 文海出版社 Wenhai chubanshe [Wenhai Press], 1963), 5575 - 5577。

<sup>70</sup> 参见黄智奇 Huang Zhiqi:《亦有仁义——基督教传教士与鸦片贸易的斗争》*Yi you renyi: Jidujiao chuanjiaoshi yu yapi-anmaoyi de douzheng* [Having Kindheartedness and Justice also: Protestant missionaries and the Struggling against the Opium Trade], (香港 Hong Kong: 宣道出版社 Xuandao chubanshe [Missionary Press], 2004), 140 - 141。

英国政府。所以,传教士反对鸦片贸易的方式不再只是呼吁商人顾及商业道德,而是重在争取英国国会修改法律。与此同时,传教士一致认为,福音工作在中国难以开展,是因为鸦片贸易的缘故;这个观点持续到以后的几十年。他们认为中国人之所以反对传教士,是因为传教士是洋人。中国人向来就憎恶洋人,加上被洋人打败,还被强制输入鸦片,所以,当他们看到那些所谓的基督宗教国家道德水平不过如此,就对洋人传教士所传的道理更加反感。在传教士的心目中,鸦片贸易一日不除,福音工作一日不会同见到光明。特别刺激英国传教士的,是他们以自己的国家参与这种贸易为耻辱。他们的言论大都表达了这方面的想法,他们都想除去自己民族的羞耻。<sup>①</sup>

伦敦会差派到香港和广东带传教的丹拿(F. Storrs Turner)牧师,对自己国家的行为深以为耻。为了除去自己国家的羞耻,并唤醒英国政府和己同胞的良心,他不惜辞去在香港的传教职务,回到英国,专心推动反对鸦片贸易的运动。丹拿1859年到中国(香港和广东)传教,1870年后返回英国。回国的目的,就是要将中国人吸食鸦片的真实惨状告诉英国人。1874年,丹拿出版*British Opium Policy and Its Results to India and China*(《英国的鸦片政策及其对印度、中国的后果》)一书。他在书中有条不紊地分析英国东印度公司、英国政府和中国政府在鸦片贸易问题上所应承担的责任,最后陈明英国鸦片贸易政策所带来的祸害。该书还收录许多不同身份的人所撰写的有关鸦片致害于人的见证,这些论据是当代文献里对鸦片贸易的前因后果描写得最详细的。丹拿撰写此书的一个重要目的,就是要在英国成立一个反对鸦片贸易的机构。<sup>②</sup>于是,在丹拿的四出奔走下,由曾经来华的传教士发起、旨在推动大规模禁烟运动的组织——英东禁止鸦片贸易会(Anglo-Oriental Society for the Suppression of the Opium Trade,以下简称“英东禁烟会”)于1874年11月14日在伦敦(London)成立。

英东禁烟会虽然不是一个传教组织,但其成员则以教会人士为主。创始人丹拿任执行秘书,实际负责该会的全面工作,且为全时受薪的职员;执行秘书的任务是联系教会和传教士,筹办各地的禁止鸦片贸易会议,处理英东禁烟会的日常会务,包括出版反对鸦片贸易的报刊、书籍和小册子,策动全英国的教会、反对鸦片贸易的人士及组织,联名上书英国国会和外交部。执行董事包括曾经在华传教20多年的锥魏林和理雅各(James Legge);副会长是英国国教会(Church of England)的里彭主教(Right Rev. the Lord Bishop of Ripon);董事会顾问包括在华传教士戴德生、斯蒂文森(John Stevenson)、德贞等及13位来自英国不同宗派的教会领袖,如司布真(Charles Haddon Spurgeon)、G. S. 巴雷特(G. S. Barrett)、J. W. 皮斯(J. W. Pease)等。<sup>③</sup>

英东禁烟会将英国国内零星的反对鸦片贸易的力量整合起来,形成合力,并发展成为一种声势浩大的反对鸦片贸易运动。1874年之前,英国已经有两个较小的禁烟会,分别是保护原住民会(Aborigines Protection Society)和压制鸦片走私会(Society for the Suppression of Opium Smuggling)。英东禁烟会就是在这两个禁烟会的基础上成立的。<sup>④</sup>此后,英东禁烟会更在英国不同的区域成立分支会社,如1882年在曼彻斯特(Manchester)成立分会,1880年代末又在格拉斯哥(Glasgow)和利物浦(Liverpool)

<sup>①</sup> *Ibid.*, 38, 32-33.

<sup>②</sup> See F. S. Turner, *British Opium Policy and Its Results to India and China*, (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington, 1876), III.

<sup>③</sup> See Alfred James Broomhall, *Hudson Taylor & China's Open Century: If I Had a Thousand Lives*, (Hodder and Stoughton and Overseas Missionary Fellowship, 1990), 139-140; H. J. Beattie, "Protestant Missions and Opium in China," *Harvard Paper on China*, Vol. 22, (December 1964), 122, 129.

<sup>④</sup> J. B. Brown, "Politics of the Poppy: The Society for the Suppression of the Opium Trade, 1874-1916," *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 8, 2, (1 April 1973), 101.

成立分会。<sup>⑥</sup>

英东禁烟会成立之后,创办旨在推进禁烟运动的月刊 *The Friend of China* (《中国之友》)。此刊于 1875 年 3 月创刊,直至 1916 年英国立法废止鸦片贸易才停刊,其口号是“公义使邦国高举,罪恶是人民的羞辱”。该刊大量登载反映中国鸦片祸患及谴责鸦片罪恶的文章,向英国政府与民众传达鸦片贸易的祸害以及中国人民的诉求,其中有相当篇幅的文章是由在华传教士撰写的。<sup>⑦</sup> 1882 年之前,英东禁烟会已出版发行 14 本书籍和 9 种小册子,论述鸦片贸易及其邪恶性,其中最具影响力的书籍是海恩波(Benjamin Broomhall)的撰写的 *The Truth about Opium Smoking* (《鸦片吸食的真象》)。该书详载传教士和中英两国官员就鸦片问题所作的见证。<sup>⑧</sup> 英国传教士还在出版于中国的 *Chinese Recorder* (《教务杂志》)、《万国公报》(其前身为《教会新报》)上发表大量谴责鸦片危害和反对鸦片贸易的文章。

作为英东禁烟会的创始人和执行秘书,丹拿还联络中国的华人基督徒领袖,鼓励他们在中国成立禁烟会,以传递鸦片害人的反鸦片信息。由于他和广东的信徒稔熟,因此,他的提议一呼百应。时于 1875 年,广州便成立了第一家华人劝戒鸦片社——由广东羊城教会主办的“羊城劝戒鸦片社”。其后,宁波、北京、福州等许多地方,亦陆续成立一些华人劝戒鸦片社。华人劝戒鸦片社成立的目标有两个:其一,向百姓宣传鸦片之害。具体方法是:印发单张,遍贴康衢,分派民户;或著成书,藉以颁行。其二,呼吁各省各会的牧师、教师和有名望的官绅兴办禁烟会,并一同联名上书政府,请求立法禁种鸦片,或连同英国禁烟会劝止鸦片贸易,以及请送戒烟的药方药物。<sup>⑨</sup>

1881 年 10 月 21 日,英东禁烟会在伦敦满信楼(Mansion House)举行全英国反对鸦片贸易的大会,有一千多人参加。领导此次大会的负责人有:英国国教会的坎特伯雷大主教(The Archbishop of Canterbury)和贝德福德主教(Bishop of Bedford)、新教的 E. E. 詹金斯(E. E. Jenkins)牧师和 R. J. 辛普森(R. J. Simpson)牧师。全英国有共 11 个教会团体参加此次大会,显示反对鸦片贸易的运动得到大多数英国主流教会的支持。不少教会领袖得到大会的邀请,在华传教士则有顾维廉(William H. Collins)和海恩波出席大会。英东禁烟会的负责人和大多数执行委员都是新教徒,有具政治背景的,也有属于自由党的,他们都为团结反对鸦片贸易的力量而不分教义和党派。此次会议的主要议题是谴责英国政府对华贩卖鸦片的政策不道德。会议通过四项决议:第一,鸦片贸易违反基督徒和国际的道德,也违反英国国家的商业利益。第二,英国不仅有责任停止鸦片贸易,而且除了医疗用途,不再鼓励印度种植罂粟。第三,英国有责任援助印度减轻其因停种罂粟和停售鸦片所带来的经济困难。第四,大会委派代表进见首相,呈递议案,请予执行。<sup>⑩</sup> 1882 年 3 月 5 日,英东禁烟会再次举行反对鸦片贸易在全国大会。会议邀请 9 位在中国工作超过 8 年的传教士,让他们现身说法,见证鸦片在中国所造成的灾害。<sup>⑪</sup>

在英东禁烟会的发动和宣传下,英国绝大多数教会对发生在中国的鸦片贸易问题予以极大的关注。大多数教会领袖都曾致函英国国会和外交部,促请停止鸦片贸易。从 1877 到 1882 年,他们写了

<sup>⑥</sup> 参见黄智奇 Huang Zhiqi:《亦有仁义——基督教传教士与鸦片贸易的斗争》*Yi you renyi: Jidujiao chuanjiaoshi yu yapianmaoyi de douzheng* [Having Kindheartedness and Justice also: Protestant missionaries and the Struggling against the Opium Trade], (香港 Hong Kong: 宣道出版社 Xuandao chubanshe [Missionary Press], 2004), 38, 84。

<sup>⑦</sup> *Ibid.*, 42。

<sup>⑧</sup> See Benjamin Broomhall, *The Truth about Opium Smoking*, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1882), 1-4.

<sup>⑨</sup> 参见黄智奇 Huang Zhiqi:《亦有仁义——基督教传教士与鸦片贸易的斗争》*Yi you renyi: Jidujiao chuanjiaoshi yu yapianmaoyi de douzheng* [Having Kindheartedness and Justice also: Protestant missionaries and the Struggling against the Opium Trade], (香港 Hong Kong: 宣道出版社 Xuandao chubanshe [Missionary Press], 2004), 42-43。

<sup>⑩</sup> See W. H. Brereton, *The Truth about Opium*, (W. H. Allen, 1883), 80.

<sup>⑪</sup> See Benjamin Broomhall, *The Truth about Opium Smoking*, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1882), 17-63.

超过 770 封请愿信,收集了超过 57 000 个签名,并将之递交国会和外交部。<sup>①</sup> 他们呼吁英国政府停止生产和销售鸦片,以及不要干预中国政府为了抑制鸦片泛滥而高征鸦片税的自由。

英东禁烟会除了联系英国国内教会团体,推动发表反对鸦片贸易的言论之外,同时也积极联络支持反对鸦片贸易的中国官员。该会曾经联系的中国官员,除有先后担任驻英大使的郭嵩焘和曾纪泽外,还有时任总督和北洋大臣的李鸿章。郭嵩焘更被邀请担任英东禁烟会的名誉顾问。李鸿章虽然没有参与英东禁烟会,但曾致函该会,表示对该会所付出努力的欣赏,还勉励他们继续致力协助中国脱离鸦片的奴役。<sup>②</sup>

英东禁烟会成立的最终目的是终结英国的对华鸦片贸易。在声势浩大的反对鸦片贸易的声浪下,身兼英东禁烟会副会长和国会议员的皮斯,连续不断地在国会提出反对鸦片贸易的动议。1880 年 6 月 4 日,他首次向国会发起动议,未被通过;1881 年 4 月 21 日,他再次向国会发起动议,又未被通过;1883 年 4 月 3 日,他第三次向国会发起动议,国会终于通过了动议。然后进行议决,结果 126 票反对、66 票赞同,议案未获通过。1889 年 5 月 3 日,英东禁烟会的另一位国会议员塞缪尔·史密斯(Samuel Smith)再度动议国会议决禁止鸦片贸易的议案,结果以 165 票赞成、88 票反对而获通过。虽然英国政府并未因为此次国会有大多数人反对鸦片贸易而修改其对华鸦片政策,但是,它却激起了英东禁烟会更高的反对鸦片贸易的士气。1891 年 4 月 10 日,英东禁烟会会长兼国会议员皮斯,更进一步提出新的动议,要求国会认定鸦片贸易是违反道德的。辩论结果是 130 人赞成,160 人反对。1906 年 5 月 30 日,在英东禁烟会的不懈努力下,国会议员西奥多·泰勒(Theodore Taylor,亦有学者译为戴得道)再次在国会发起动议,要求国会确认鸦片贸易是违反道德的。结果,动议在没有反对的情况下获得一致通过。1906 年 9 月 20 日,光绪皇帝颁布谕旨,限 10 年内完全废止吸食鸦片,并同时颁布限制吸食鸦片的新规条。1907 年 12 月和 1908 年 1 月间,英国政府开始与满清政府协议,以 3 年为试验期,逐步减少印度鸦片向中国的输入。1911 年 5 月 8 日,两国政府正式签订《中英禁烟条件》。<sup>③</sup> 正是因为英东禁烟会及广大英国在华传教士的不懈努力,才最终导致 1906 年英国国会正式确认鸦片贸易的不道德性,以及中英两国政府协定逐步禁绝鸦片种植与贸易。

#### 四、余 论

19 世纪初至 20 世纪初,英国在华基督新教传教士逐渐认识到鸦片对中华帝国的严重危害,纷纷揭露鸦片对人身体与灵魂的摧残,谴责鸦片贸易的不道德性,并投入大量人力与财力在中国广泛开展鸦片戒治活动,在英国国会大力推动终止对华鸦片贸易的动议。发生在中国的鸦片贸易,有悖于人类的基本道德,更为基督宗教伦理所禁止。所以,鸦片在中国的出现,无疑引起中国人对西方人的普遍反感和愤怒,并严重阻碍福音的在华传布。英国在华传教士竭力反对鸦片贸易,积极展开禁烟活动,主要有三个方面的原因:一是因为鸦片贸易大都由所谓“基督宗教国家”的人民经营,以致阻碍华人接受基督宗教信仰;二是因为鸦片危害中国人民的身心健康以及中华帝国的财政经济,最终危机英中政治与商贸关系;三是因为英国使用武力将鸦片毒害强加于中国,侵犯中国的主权,使传教士深感愧疚。

<sup>①</sup> 参见黄智奇 Huang Zhiqi:《亦有仁义——基督教传教士与鸦片贸易的斗争》*Yi you renyi: Jidujiao chuanjiaoshi yu yapianmaoyi de douzheng* [Having Kindheartedness and Justice also: Protestant missionaries and the Struggling against the Opium Trade], (香港 Hong Kong: 宣道出版社 Xuandao chubanshe [Missionary Press], 2004), 82。

<sup>②</sup> *Ibid.*, 44, 76 - 77, 126 - 127。

<sup>③</sup> *Ibid.*, 85, 93 - 94, 121, 134 - 134, 136 - 137。



**English Title:**

**The British Missionaries' Attitudes and Actions to the Opium Trade in Late Qing Dynasty**

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**Abstract:** The British missionaries came to China at the beginning of the 19th century. At first, most of the British missionaries, for various reasons, kept silence to the rampant opium smuggling by the British merchants then. Until up to the outbreak of the Second Opium War, the British missionaries just saw more clearly the serious disaster to the Empire of China and her people caused by opium, and realized more soberly that the British government was the real culprit of the opium trade. So they revealed the destruction of opium to human body and soul one after another, condemned the immorality of the opium trade in public, and put a great deal of manpower and financial resources into the activities of abstaining from opium poppy in China actively, promoted with utmost strength to the motion of ending the opium trade to China in the British Parliament, and contributed the United Kingdom to canceled the opium trade in China finally.

**Key words:** British missionaries, Late Qing Dynasty, the opium trade, abstaining from opium poppy



比较宗教文化研究  
**Comparative Religious and Cultural Studies**



# 金规则：拉平基督宗教与儒家

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**提要:**在对金规则的探讨中,中国大陆的一些研究者尤其关注儒耶之间的差异。本文将其称之为“差异论者”。差异论者的主要观点是:儒耶金规则在起源和抽象层次上不相同,这导致金规则效力的普遍性不同;儒耶金规则在表述形式上不同,这导致或反映出深层的文化心态不同。本文认为,差异论者所指出的不同,并不存在,就算可能存在,差异论者也没有足够的证据表明它们是存在的;就算有足够的证据表明它们存在,这些不同也不带来或不反映更进一步的差异。

**关键词:**金规则、儒家、基督宗教

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全球化促进全球文化融合,但文化融合的另一面恰是全球性的文化冲突。从20世纪90年代以来,对全球伦理的关注俨然成为一个热点。在文化冲突的时代,思考全球伦理的可能性或者现实性,无疑有助于人们提升对文化融合乌托邦的热情。1993年,芝加哥世界宗教大会发表了孔汉思(Hans Kung)起草的《走向全球伦理宣言》。这份宣言认为,全球伦理在某种意义上是一个事实,因为通过检索人类主要的文明形态,我们可以发现,它们都认为,“每一个人都应当得到符合人性的对待”<sup>①</sup>,这是“世界诸宗教在伦理方面现在已有的最低限度的共同之处。”<sup>②</sup>我们在各个主要文明中找到的对这一原则的具体表述,被称之为“金规则”。<sup>③</sup>金规则有两种表述形式,一种是消极的,一种是积极的。如在儒家经典《论语》中,相应被表述为,“己所不欲,勿施于人”(论语·颜渊,论语·卫灵公),此为恕道;“己欲立而立人,己欲达而达人”(论语·雍也),此为忠道。基督宗教对应消极表述<sup>④</sup>是“你厌恶的事

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① 孔汉思 Kong Hansi [Hans Kung]、库舍尔 Kusheer [Karl - Josef Kuschel] (编):《全球伦理——世界宗教议会宣言》*Quanguo lunli——shijie zongjiao yihui xuanyan* [A Global Ethic: the Declaration of the Parliament of the World's Religions], 何光沪 He Guanghu 译, (成都 Chengdu: 四川人民出版社 Sichuan renmin chubanshe [Sichuan people's publishing house], 1997), 55。

② 同上书,2。

③ 值得注意的是,汉语世界对“金规则”的使用极其混乱。一些人认为,金规则的肯定表述才是金规则,如基督宗教研究方面的泰斗何光沪引用罗秉祥 Luo Bingxiang(《繁星与道德》*Fanxing yu daode* [Stars and Ethics], 香港 Hongkong: 三联书店 Sanlian shudian [Joint Publishing], 1993)的研究表明,一些来华传教士就持这种看法。赵敦华也持这一看法,他将金规则的肯定表述看成是金规则,而将否定表述看成是银规则。于此可参见赵敦华 Zhao Dunhua,《只是“金规则”吗?》*Zhishi “jinguize” ma* [Is It Merely “Golden Rule”?], (《社会科学战线》*Shehuike xue zhanxian* [Social Science Front]), 2008年第2期,32。更流行的意见认为,唯有否定式的表述才是金规则。何光沪本人赞同斯威德勒(L. Swidler)的说法,持第三种观点,认为对肯定否定两种表述的区分只有形式意义,而无实质内容,因此是没有必要的。于此可参见何光沪 He Guanghu,《从“米规则”到“盐规则”》*Cong “miguize” dao “yanguize”* [From “Rule of Rice” to “Rule of Salt”], 《世界宗教文化》*Shijie zongjiao wenhua* [the religious Cultures in the World], 1997年第4期。本文认同第三种看法。

④ 下引《多俾亚传》(Tobit)和《德训篇》(Sirach),为基督宗教中天主教、东正教和非卡尔西顿教会(the Non - Chalcedonian Churches)所接受。

不可对别人做”(Do to no one what you yourself dislike)<sup>⑤</sup>,或,“你要以己度人,在一切事上要压制自己”(Recognize that your neighbor feels as you do, and keep in mind your own dislikes),<sup>⑥</sup>或者“爱是不加害于人的,所以爱就完全了律法”(Love does no wrong to a neighbor; therefore, love is the fulfilling of the law)(罗 13:10)。对应的积极表述是“所以,无论何事,你们愿意人怎样待你们,你们也要怎样待人”(In everything do to others as you would have them to do to you)(太 7:12),或“你们愿意人怎样待你们,你们也要怎样待人”(Do to others as you would have them do to you)(路 6:31)。人们愿意相信,“这些在历史中各自独立地自发生成并且以不同方式表述出来的金规则在含义上“都惊人地相似”,几乎可以说其逻辑语义是完全一致的。”<sup>⑦</sup>

大异其趣的是,在中国大陆,一些学者却更热衷于讨论金规则表述与内涵上的差异,似乎他们不关心共识。如新批判主义的代表人物邓晓芒就认为,“人们通常关注的是它(指金规则——引者注)在各个不同民族文化中所体现的伦理思想的共性,而不太注意其中的差异,尤其是在表达方式上所透露出来的理解上的差异。”<sup>⑧</sup>指出或强调差异的学者还包括王晓朝<sup>⑨</sup>、周玄毅<sup>⑩</sup>、蒋重跃<sup>⑪</sup>等。由于这些学者都处在儒家文化圈中,这一文化圈面临的主要外来文化压力来自基督宗教,所以,他们指出或强调的差异主要存在于儒家与基督宗教之间。<sup>⑫</sup>为了行文的方便,我把他们称作金规则方面的“差异论者”。差异论者热衷于指出儒耶在金规则表述方面的种种不同,并从这种种不同推演出更多或更大的不同来。他们这样做,具有不同的目的。大多数差异论者,他们的思想跟西方更接近,指出差异来是要矮化儒家,比如邓晓芒和王晓朝;有少数差异论者,至少表面上持公允的立场,如周玄毅和蒋重跃,试图论证各有利弊。至于从儒家出发的差异论者,则少之又少。一个例外是汤一介<sup>⑬</sup>,他正确地指出,儒家、基督宗教和佛教虽然都有等同或类似于金规则的表述,但是,各自的理论根据却并不相同:金规则在儒家那里,和“仁学”相联系,在基督宗教那里,和“博爱”相联系,在印度佛教那里,则和“慈悲”相联系。然而,接着他却笔锋一转,“这三种不同的文化传统的伦理观念虽然不同,但并不是互相排斥

⑤ 《旧约·多俾亚传》*Jiuyue duobiyazhuan* [Old Testament, Tobit] 思高本 *Sigao Shengjing* [Studium Biblicum O. F. M.], 4 章 15 节。

⑥ 《旧约·德训篇》*Jiuyue dexunbian* [Old Testament, Sirach] 思高本 *Sigao Shengjing* [Studium Biblicum O. F. M.], 31 章 18 节。

⑦ 赵汀阳 Zhao Tingyang,《论道德金规则的最佳可能方案》*Lun daode jinguize de zuijia keneng fang'an* [On the Best Possible Solution of the Golden Rule],《中国社会科学》*Zhongguo shehuihexue* [Social Science in China], 2005 年第 3 期, 71。

⑧ 邓晓芒 Deng Xiaomang,《全球伦理的可能性:“金规则”的三种模式》*Quanqiu lunli de kenengxing: “jinguize” de sange moshi* [The Possibility of Global Ethics: Three Models of Golden Rules],《江苏社会科学》*Jiangsu Shehuihexue* [Jiangsu Social Sciences], 2002 年第 4 期, 1。

⑨ 参见王晓朝 Wang Xiaochao,《从信仰的角度理解金规则》*Cong xiyang de jiaodu lijie jinguize* [The Understanding to the Golden Rule in the Dimension of Faith],《江苏社会科学》*Jiangsu Shehuihexue* [Jiangsu Social Sciences], 2003 年第 1 期。

⑩ 参见周玄毅 Zhou Xuanyi,《儒耶“金规则”差异辨析:跨文化伦理研究的一个“元问题”》*Ruyue “Jinguize” chayi bianxi: kua-wenhua lunli yanjiu de yige “yuanwenti”* [On Differentiation of the Golden Rules of Confucian and Christianity: One of the Primary Question of the Multi-culture Ethics],《武汉大学学报》(人文科学版) *Wuhandaxue xuebao (renwen kexue ban)* [Wuhan University Journal (Humanity Sciences)], 2011 年第 2 期。

⑪ 参见蒋重跃 Jiang Chongyue,《〈新约〉金规则与〈论语〉忠恕思想之比较》*Xinyue jinguize yu “lunyu” zhongshu sixiang zhi bijiao* [A Comparison between the Golden Rule in the New Testament and the Theory of Zhongshu in the Analects of Confucius],《河北学刊》*Hebei xuekan* [Hebei Academic Journal], 2008 年第 2 期。

⑫ 当然,由于各位学者各自的学术兴趣,他们指出的差异并不仅仅限于儒耶之间。以邓晓芒为例,他更愿意从康德的角度,或者说从普遍人性的角度,重构金规则的表述,这被他称为金规则的第三种模式,这也是他愿意推荐的模式。参见邓晓芒前引文。

⑬ 汤一介 Tang Yijie,《孔子思想与“全球伦理”问题》*Kongzi sixiang yu quanqiu lunli wenti* [The Doctrine of Confucius and the Global Ethics],《中国哲学史》*Zhongguo Zhexueshi* [History of Chinese Philosophy], 2000 年第 4 期, 46。

的”，甚至，他认为，这三种不同的伦理观念，其实“存在着某种深刻的互相‘认同’的方面”，即，“都以不同的方式表达人的‘爱心’”。可以想见，差异论者一定会认为，汤一介将差异辩识为实现同一目的的方式不同，是一种严重的低估。<sup>⑭</sup>

跟以上差异论相反，本文试图指出，差异论所列举的在金规则方面儒耶的主要不同，其实并无不同；或者其不同虽然存在，却并不带来实质性的差异；或者，他们缺乏可信的理据去支持他们将儒耶差异化的论调。

## 一、差异论：在金规则方面，儒耶有哪些重要不同？

差异论者在细节论述方面各不相同，侧重点也迥异。但他们之间还是有共同之处的。其中比较重要的共同之处是，大体上，他们都认为，儒耶在金规则方面有不同：一是起源不同，儒家金规则起源于自然本性，基督宗教金规则起源于上帝的诫命。二是抽象层次不同，儒家更为具体，基督宗教更为抽象。三是表述形式不同，儒家的表述是否定的，基督宗教的表述是肯定的。起源与抽象层次的不同，使得相应金规则在效力的普遍性方面，有所差异，儒家只对部分人有效，而基督宗教则对所有人有效。表述形式的不同，则带来或折射出其效力表现方式上的温和与激进之差异以及相应文化心态上的深层差异。

### 1. 儒耶金规则的起源不同。

这几乎是一个常识。儒家与基督宗教是两种完全不同的文化形态，起源当然有不同。对各自起源的确认，则有待于学者的澄清。一般认为，儒家以自然本性为根，而基督宗教则以上帝的诫命为基，“一个是自然本性，一个是先知律法；一个是人之为本质的属性，一个是上帝的明确指令。”<sup>⑮</sup>基督宗教方面的确认很简单，因为《马太福音》7章12节已经明示：“这是律法和先知的道理”；而我们知道，律法和先知的权威来自于上帝。在儒家方面，倪梁康通过现象学分析后指出，“对‘忠、恕’思想或‘己所不欲，勿施于人’律令的认可实际上包含着一个隐含的或被默认的前提：人所具有的同情心，或者用道德中性的概念来表述：人的同感能力”，换句话说，孔子的忠恕之道，“必须以孟子所说的‘人皆有不忍人之心’为最终的自然美德依据”。<sup>⑯</sup>这一说法在其他学者那里得到了印证。如杨适也同样认为，“伦理道德中的仁爱 and 忠恕，归根到底是以两人关系中为一体性联系和一体感为根据的。孔子儒家讲仁爱和忠恕，总要从父子关系和孝慈情感讲起，从唐尧虞舜开始人伦伦理的“五教”起，到孟子提出“五伦”，都以氏族和家族人伦中的各种两人关系为根本来立论。”<sup>⑰</sup>墨哲兰则直接归结为“同欲”、“同感”<sup>⑱</sup>。而所有这些同欲同感，按王晓朝所引用的“一些研究中国文化的专家”的说法，则源自“原始社

<sup>⑭</sup> 另有一些学者，比如邹昌林，也低估其中的差异。他认为，“中西文化从本质上应该是相通的，只是各自的发展路线不同”。于此可参见邹昌林 Zou Changlin, 《从“金规则”看儒家伦理“仁”的思想体系的本质特征及其与基督教伦理的异同》*Cong “jinguize” kan rujia lunli “ren” de sixiangtixi de benzhitizheng* [Looking at the Innate Character of Confucius Ethics Ren and Its Similarities and Differences from the Christian Ethics form the Golden Rule], 《世界宗教研究》*Shijie zongjiao yanjiu* [Studies in World Religions], 2010年第3期, 177。

<sup>⑮</sup> 同周玄毅 Zhou Xuanyi 前引文, 第15页。又可参见蒋重跃前引文, 102。

<sup>⑯</sup> 倪梁康 Ni Liangkang, 《“全球伦理”的基础——儒家文化传统问题与“金规则”》*Rujia wenhua chuantong wenti yu “Jinguize”*: *Quanguo lunli de jichu* [The foundation of “Global ethics” ——The Confucian Culture Tradition and “Golden Rules”], 《江苏社会科学》*Jiangsu Shehuikexue* [Jiangsu Social Sciences], 2002年第1期, 15。

<sup>⑰</sup> 杨适 Yangshi, 《关于全球伦理对话的方法问题》*Guanyu quanguo lunli duihua de fangfa wenti* [On Problems of Global Moral Dialogue Method], 《浙江学刊》*Zhejiang xuekan* [Zhejiang Academic Journal], 2001年第2期, 22。

<sup>⑱</sup> 墨哲兰 Mo Zhelan, 《“金规则”之“罪己诏”》*“Jinguize” zhi “zuijizhao”* [Dangers Coming from the Golden Rule], 《读书》*Dushu* [Reading], 78。

会氏族血亲之爱的自然情感的遗留”。<sup>①⑨</sup>

关于起源的不同,我们不妨归结如下:基督宗教方面,金规则来自律法和先知,最终来自上帝;在儒家方面,金规则来自于同欲同感,而同欲同感最终来自于自然的血亲关系。

## 2. 抽象层次和普遍性不同。

一些差异论者,如邓晓芒、王晓朝和蒋重跃等,进一步从儒耶金规则的起源不同推论出了金规则的抽象层次及其效力的普遍性不同。

儒家的努力方向是要将从自然血亲之爱推广为“泛爱众”(论语·学而)的普遍之爱,在孟子那里,发展为“老吾老,以及人之老;幼吾幼,以及人之幼”的“推恩”(孟子·梁惠王上)。然而,王晓朝断言,儒家“这个‘众’是否指所有人是大有问题的”,“做为孔子金规则之基础的仁爱没有,也决不可能推广于全民”<sup>②⑩</sup>。

跟王晓朝一样,邓晓芒也认为,儒家的“泛爱众”不可能是众人。他给出了一种解释:儒家太重视内容,从而不具有形式上的普遍性。我们知道,儒家金规则的忠恕之道都以“己”为标准,邓晓芒敏锐地察觉到,问题就出在这里:一方面,儒家之“所欲”或“所不欲”,都是指“东西”,是“事情本身,而不是贯通的形式”,即,没有考虑自己所欲或所不欲者,是否人家也会“欲”或“不欲”,这就造成“欲”并非“单纯的自由意志”这一事实;另一方面,所谓的“己”,也是一个事实性的概念,跟“身分、地位(名分)、等级、家族”等偶然境况纠缠在一起,这就表明了,儒家的“己”并非抽象的普遍“人格”。<sup>②⑪</sup>这就导致儒家之爱,只能是狭隘之爱。著名的“父为子隐,子为父隐”(论语·子路)公案,成为邓晓芒的有力佐证。孔子主张父亲偷了别人的羊时,当儿子的要隐瞒不报,这就“与金规则直接冲突”,因为“偷羊的一家所做的恰好就是‘己所不欲施之于人’的事”。<sup>②⑫</sup>

反观基督宗教,情况却有所不同。对于王晓朝而言,这是一个事实陈述。因为,“基督教的创始人耶稣做到了这一点,他没有给这条道德律令的适用范围作任何限制”,在这位创始人的观点中,人“显然包括所有人,一切人,而且最小的、最末的人最先进天国。”<sup>②⑬</sup>蒋重跃印证道:“上帝对世人的爱是无差别的,所以,人的爱人同样也是无差别的”<sup>②⑭</sup>,爱亲人,也要爱邻人甚至敌人。

邓晓芒也看到了这个事实,他特别指出,基督宗教强调的对敌人和邻人的爱具有特别的意义。在对儒家的分析中,父偷羊子隐瞒的例子表明,儒家的爱是狭隘的,“只限于与自己有共同所‘欲’即共同利害关系的人”;但基督宗教对敌人的爱却超越了一切,因为,敌人可以说是“与自己没有任何共同之处”的。<sup>②⑮</sup>这样,在对“己”或“人”的理解上,基督宗教已经理解了“一个赤裸裸的纯粹的‘人’的概念”。<sup>②⑯</sup>这一理解是斯多亚学派最早建立起来的。在这一理解之下,“人的身分、等级、贫富、血缘等选择外在的区分全都变得不值一提”。<sup>②⑰</sup>这样一来,在爱的问题上,所有人就都成了“邻人”,“爱(你的邻)人如爱己”(Love your neighbor as yourself)(太19:19)。邻人不是亲人,甚至可能是敌人,但我们还要爱他,这就反过来表明,这种爱绝不来自于自然的情感,“而是来自上帝本身(‘圣爱’)”。<sup>②⑱</sup>

<sup>①⑨</sup> 同王晓朝 Wang Xiaochao 前引文,20。

<sup>②⑩</sup> *Ibid*,20。

<sup>②⑪</sup> 同邓晓芒 Deng Xiaomang 前引文,2。

<sup>②⑫</sup> *Ibid*,2。

<sup>②⑬</sup> 同王晓朝 Wang Xiaochao 前引文,20。

<sup>②⑭</sup> 同蒋重跃 Jiang Chongyue 前引文,103。

<sup>②⑮</sup> 同邓晓芒 Deng Xiaomang 前引文,3。

<sup>②⑯</sup> *Ibid*,3。

<sup>②⑰</sup> *Ibid*,3。

<sup>②⑱</sup> *Ibid*,3。



除此之外,邓晓芒还看到,基督宗教金规则的表述不是指向具体东西或事情的“所欲”或“所不欲”,而是指向行为方式的“如何”,“更着重待人的方式,而不在于内容”。<sup>29</sup> 邓晓芒引为例证的是“有人打你的右脸,连左脸也转过来由他打;……有人……要拿你的里衣,连外衣也由他拿去”(太5:39-40)。在邓晓芒看来,这正好表明,如果对方的所欲与自己的不同,在跟金规则不矛盾的情况下,“不妨听之任之”。<sup>30</sup>

### 3. 表述形式不同以及由此折射出的文化心态的不同。

在这方面,差异论者认为,儒家表述的金规则是消极的恕道:“己所不欲,勿施于人”,基督教表述的金规则是积极的:“无论何事、你们愿意人怎样待你们、你们也要怎样待人。”这方面的代表是周玄毅和蒋重跃。应当承认,这是一个很奇怪的说法。我们已经知道,儒家有积极的忠道;在基督宗教那里,也有消极的表述。<sup>31</sup> 周玄毅显然看到了这一点。不过,我们可以暂且把这些疑问放在一边,假设他这么处理是正确的,在此前提下,他就接着指出了消极表述与积极表述反映出两个深刻的差异:一是施欲先后关系不同;二是人已关系不同。

对于第一点,周玄毅是这样论述的:“儒家是从‘不欲’的意愿推导出‘勿施’,应然层面上讲也可以从‘施’的行为反推出‘欲’的意愿;而基督教则是从‘欲’的意愿推导出‘施’的行为,却不能从‘施’的行为反推出‘欲’的前提”<sup>32</sup>。他在这里做了一个否定后件的推理。

前提一:己所不欲,勿施于人(儒家金规则)

前提二:施于人(否定前提一的后件)

结论:己所欲(得到前提一的前件的否定)

这就表明,“己所不欲,勿施于人”跟“己施于人,是己所欲”是逻辑等价的。儒家主张前者,也就同时主张了后者。但后者一方面显示出施欲的鸿沟:受施者与所欲者不同一,这样“就容易由于主体间的沟通障碍而导致一种双输的结局,既没有照顾到别人的真实所欲,又牺牲了自己利益所在。”<sup>33</sup>另一方面,又会带来“诛心之论”,甚至为了表明自己是道德的而去杀人。因为,当施于人施出问题,必定是己之欲出了问题。为了表明自己的清白,不得不用行动来证明自己。这样,当耶稣要求只有那些没有罪的人才可以去处死淫妇时,“很难保证”<sup>34</sup>儒家的信徒不会投石头以彰显自己的清白。因此,儒家的消极表述虽然可以“尊重他者的独立价值”,强调“无伤害原则”,但最大的危险就在于普遍而言的“道德虚伪化”<sup>35</sup>

而对基督教来说,却有“漠视他者意愿的真实存在,容易演变成一种道德上的霸权主义”的危险<sup>36</sup>。由于欲蕴含着施,虽然欲以“希望别人怎样对待自己出发”,但由于“‘别人’只是一种构想出来

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid*, 3。

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid*, 3。

<sup>31</sup> 值得注意的是,蒋重跃正确地指出,跟儒家有消极积极两种表述不同,新约只有一种表述,那就是积极的表述。根据他的解释,“《新约全书》的金规[则]只有肯定式表达,因为基督教的博爱来自上帝,上帝是无限的,上帝的爱也要无限地向外推出去;《论语》忠恕思想则既有肯定式,也有否定式表达,由于儒家的博爱来自人自身,人是有限的,故人类之爱既要向外推出来,又要向内加以限制。”于此可参见蒋重跃前引文,第103页。虽然他正确地看到了,在《新约》这里,“从根本上说”,人不应从“己之所欲”或“己所不欲”出发来行事,而儒家则需要从己欲或不欲出发。但是,他未能注意到,《新约》中也有许多否定性的表述。肯定与否定的存在,恰恰表明,世人执行上帝的诫命,需要诉诸跟人的欲望的关系来完成:凡人需要区分,哪些欲望是自己的,哪些欲望是上帝给的。在这个问题上,儒耶并无二致。关于这个问题下文将只讨论周玄毅的版本。

<sup>32</sup> 同周玄毅 Zhou Xuanyi 前引文,17。

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid*, 17。

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid*, 17-18。

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid*, 18。

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid*, 18。

的存在”，所以这不过是一种“他者意识名存实亡的思想方式”<sup>⑤7</sup>。我不想兄弟让我在地狱承受火刑，所以，我也就不想让兄弟在地狱承受火刑，因此，我就把兄弟放到火刑架上烧死以免除他们在地狱里的痛苦。在此思想方式之下，宗教迫害难以避免。

对于第二点，周玄毅认为，儒家金规则下的人己关系，是一种互生关系，而基督教金规则下的人己关系，是一种平行关系。

就儒家来看，“恕道”的起点是孟子所强调的“恻隐之心”，方法则是朱熹所说的“推己”，首先当然是推己及人。<sup>⑤8</sup>但金规则下的推己，强调的是“勿施”，不要将己所不欲者推之于人。实质上，这就是一个“克己”的过程。正是在这一过程之中，“人”对“己”的限制造就了“己”：虽然“为仁由己”，但“克己复礼为仁”（论语·颜渊）。以此观之，在儒家这里，人己是相互生成的关系。

就基督教而言，人与人的道德关爱，则源自于“自己与他人同样平等于接受了上帝关于爱的律令”<sup>⑤9</sup>。这种道德关爱的终级道德性，并不是内在的，而是外在的，必须“共同指向上帝之爱，人与人的道德关系才是基础牢固的”，这就说明，人与人是平行的。站在周玄毅的立场上，平行关系，在某种意义上，就是没有关系，是可以被取消的关系，所以，跟儒家“忠告而善道之，不可则止”（论语·颜渊）这种尊重他人意愿的做法不同，基督教的做法会更积极以至出现宗教迫害。

下面，我们来逐一检查差异论者的论点。

## 二、起源真的不同吗？

差异论者认为，儒耶金规则的起源是不同的，前者起源于血亲基础上的自然本性，而基督宗教则起源于超越者上帝。换句话说，一个的起源在我们自己身上，是内在的。另一个的起源则是外在的。

注意，我在这里并不想挑战一个常识：儒家跟基督宗教是不相同的两种文化，它们历史源头并不相同，它们各自的逻辑源头也不相同。我只想指出，金规则在儒耶两家的起源差异，并非像差异论者所讲的那么明显。

首先，我们要看到，“人的同感能力”是所有金规则的一个必要条件，而不只是儒家金规则的一个必要条件。无论是儒家的“己所不欲，勿施于人”，“己欲立而立人，己欲达而达人”，还是基督宗教的“你厌恶的事不可对别人做”，“无论何事，你们愿意人怎样待你们，你们也要怎样待人”，都要以人己双方同欲同感为必要条件。如果人己双方所欲可以有所不同，金规则只会带来混乱。这对儒家与基督宗教是平等的。以基督宗教为例，我所恶，非人所厌，我所厌，非人所恶，那么，按照金规则的积极表述，我愿意人用我喜欢的方式待我，所以，我也就用我喜欢的方式去待人。结果就成了，别人让我快乐，我让别人痛苦。这显然不是金规则所愿意看到的。

如果人的同感能力对于儒耶两家来说同样必要，那么，差异论者就不能简单地把同感能力说成是人的自然本性，以此来区分儒家与基督宗教。就算同感能力可以被原为自然本性，在基督宗教那里，这种自然本性也是必要的。我们可以反证如下：假设基督宗教并不预设人的自然本性带来人的同感能力，那么，自然本性要么带来异感能力（人与人的所欲所感不同），要么跟同感异感能力无关。由于自然本性必定跟人的感觉能力相关，所以，自然本性只能带来异感能力。也就是说，在自然本性之下，人与人的感觉与欲望全然不同。这显然是一个跟事实不相符合的理论；而且，如果基督宗教坚持这个

<sup>⑤7</sup> *Ibid*, 18。

<sup>⑤8</sup> *Ibid*, 19。

<sup>⑤9</sup> *Ibid*, 20。

理论的话,将会带来一个荒谬的结论:它的金规则号召我们用折磨别人的方式去对待别人(给别人带来痛苦),或者,号召我们用折磨自己的方式去对待别人(给别人带来快乐)。

就此而言,差异论者最多只能说,儒家的金规则停留在自然本性之上,而基督宗教则超越了自然本性,将最终权威交给上帝。但是,当差异论者这么讲的时候,他们又错了。因为,儒家如果仅仅停留在自然本性之上,他们根本就提不出类似金规则的表述来。虽然血缘亲情这种自然本性让我们感受到爱,但是,它们并没有迫使我们去推广这种爱。老吾老,就够了,为什么要把“老吾老”的这种做法“及人之老”呢?要是爱源于自然本性或本能,禽兽显然也有这样的爱,禽兽却没有推广这种爱的意愿。而且,儒家指责主张兼爱的墨家因“无父”而是“禽兽”(孟子·滕文公下),这恰恰表明,禽兽是无父的,所以,儒家理论下的血缘亲情,根本不可能源于跟禽兽同一的自然本能。这样,我们就得到了两个要点:一,儒家的血缘亲情并不等同于自然本性,二,儒家推广血缘之爱的“推恩”更不是自然本性所能解释得了的。

于是,一个比较可信的解释是,我们不妨承认儒家跟基督宗教都是超越性的,至少在超越自然本性这一点上,并没有什么差别。接下来的问题是,儒耶的超越者是同一的吗?儒家文化“敬鬼神而远之”(论语·雍也),关于超越者的描述少之又少。但儒家敬天,崇尚天人合一的境界。孔子将“畏天命”列为“君子三畏”之首。(论语·季氏)汉儒董仲舒认为天是生天,“父者,子之天也;天者,父之天也。无天而生,未之有也。天者,万物之祖,万物非天不生。”<sup>④</sup>;天是天主,“天者,百神之大君也”<sup>⑤</sup>;不仅如此,人跟天还处处相似,因为“人副天数”,“天地之符,阴阳之副,常设于身。身犹天也,数与之相参。”<sup>⑥</sup>著名儒学家郭齐勇径直将其解释为“人之所以类似于天,从根本上讲,是因为天正是按照自己的形象来创造人类的。”<sup>⑦</sup>如果我们足够理智,对儒耶超越者是否同一的问题根本无法做出回答。儒耶关于超越者的表述,有相似处,也有不同处,也许如希克所言,“有可能各种宗教都在以错误的方式去经验,将种种幻相投射到宇宙之上”;也有可能全都是对的,“各种宗教都跟一个无限的神圣实在对应,这个神圣实在超越了人的概念能力,人只能以这些千奇百怪的方式去思考它、经验它。”<sup>⑧</sup>

因此,关于儒耶在金规则起源问题上的不同,如果差异论者认为是自然本性与上帝诫命的不同,他们就只是犯了一个简单的错误;如果他们认为是两个超越者之间的不同,他们就缺乏证据。

### 三、抽象程度和普遍性真的不同吗?

前面谈到,邓晓芒所谓的抽象程度不同是指,儒家金规则的“欲”是“所欲”,是具体的东西,受到具体情景的制约;儒家的“己”是具体情形下的“己”,受到身分、地位等的限制;儒家的“人”是指具有共同利害关系之人。相对应地,基督宗教金规则的“欲”专指“如何”或“怎样”,侧重于对待人的方式;基督宗教的“己”与“人”是邻人,甚至是敌人,毫无共同利益。于“欲”于“人”,基督宗教的理解都更为抽象。

当邓晓芒主张儒耶在“欲”上有抽象程度之别时,他正确地注意到了儒耶金规则在表述形式上的某些不同。从汉语来说,儒家是名词结构:“所欲”或“所不欲”,而基督宗教则采取了从句的说法:“你们

<sup>④</sup> 董仲舒 Dong Zhongshu,《春秋繁露》*Chunqiu fanlu*, (北京 Beijing: 中华书局 Zonghua shuju [Zhonghua Book Company], 2011) 194。

<sup>⑤</sup> 同上,185。

<sup>⑥</sup> 同上,164。

<sup>⑦</sup> 郭齐勇 Guo Qiyong,《中国哲学史》*Zhongguo zhexueshi* [A History of Chinese Philosophy], (北京 Beijing: 高等教育出版社 Gaodeng jiaoyu chubanshe [China Higher Education Press], 2006年), 139。

<sup>⑧</sup> J. Hick, *Problems of Religious Pluralism*, (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1985), 26。

愿意人怎样待你们,你们也要怎样待人”。然而,这一表面的差别<sup>⑤</sup>,不足以推论出它们在抽象程度上有所不同。所字结构固然是名词结构,但名词结构并不只是指向一个具体的东西,它也可以指某个抽象的方式。例如,儒家完全可以说,他们的“所欲”就是“你们愿意人怎样待你们,你们也要怎样待人”。要是我们因此推论说,儒家对金规则的表述更为普遍,因为所字结构包括了具体的事物与抽象的方式,它几乎涵盖了一切;而基督教的表述则只包括了抽象的方式,未能涵盖具体的事物,这不过是犯了跟邓晓芒同样的错误。因为,基督宗教的金规则表述也可以涵盖儒家的内容。例如,我不想吃甜食,所以,我不给你吃甜食——我们假设这是正确的。在儒家表述之下,当然可以得到这个正确的结果。在基督宗教表述之下,同样也可以:我不希望你拿甜食给我吃,所以,我也不拿甜食给你吃。

当邓晓芒主张在“人”的抽象程度上儒耶有别,从而两者在金规则的普遍性上有别时,他跟王晓朝等就有了交集。他们都主张,儒家泛爱众,不可能是所有人。他们并没有意识到,基督宗教理解之下的众人,也不可能是所有人。如果儒家有问题,基督宗教在这里同样有问题。

从儒家来看,不管血亲是不是一个纯粹自然属性,但对爱的推广,必定会因为爱的根基在陌生人那里的消减和消失(陌生人不是我的至亲,甚至未必是我的血亲!)而造成爱的消减甚至消失。关于这一点,儒家自己也心知肚明,他们只能提倡“差等之爱”:血亲关系越远,爱的情感强度愈低。诚所谓“亲疏有别”是也。孟子就曾说:“事,孰为大? 事亲为大。”(孟子·离娄上)又云:“仁之实,事亲是也;义之实,从兄是也;智之实,知斯二者弗去是也;礼之实,节文斯二者是也;乐之实,乐斯二者……”(孟子·离娄上)仁、义、礼、智、乐之实都被归结为事亲从兄。

当我们这样论述的时候,并没有替儒家设想一位超越者。如果前面的论证没有错误,儒家的理论中,是有超越者的位置的。<sup>⑥</sup> 根据前面引用过的汉儒董仲舒“天副人数”的思想,我们都是天的子民,所以,我们可以做如下理解,正是在同为上天所生的意义上,我们拥有自然血亲之爱,并且愿意将这种爱加以推广。这种观点在宋儒张载那里,得到了进一步的发挥:“乾称父,坤称母,予兹藐焉,乃混然中处。故天地之塞,吾其体;天地之帅,吾其性;民吾同胞,物吾与也。”<sup>⑦</sup>事实上,早在《论语》中,就已经有了“四海之内,皆兄弟也”(论语·颜渊)的说法。在儒家这一理论之下,泛爱众的众人为所有人,是无疑的了。就此而言,儒家之爱,要遍及天地之子,跟基督宗教之爱,要遍及非敌人与敌人,在普遍性上并无实质不同。对于儒家来说,我们爱所有人,是因为我们爱天爱地,赞天地之化育。对于基督宗教而言,我们爱所有人,则是因为我们爱天主,爱上帝,“我们若爱上帝,又遵守他的诫命,从此就知道我们爱上帝的儿女。”(约一5:2)

差异论者也许会说,就算儒家的爱可以推广到所有人,爱有差等的问题还没有解决。爱父母必然胜过爱陌生人。而在基督宗教那里,爱却是平等的。实则不然。爱有差等的难题,又叫推恩难题,其根源在于,离爱的本源越远,爱的强度越弱。亲亲互隐的案例之所以会存在,恰好显示出“推恩”中“推”与“恩”之间的张力:父子亲情是恩之本,如无“恩”之本,便无恩可推;正因为如此,父子相隐。但是,另一方面,如果有恩而不去“推”恩,儒家也就不是儒家,而类于“为我”(孟子·滕文公下)之杨朱。所以,孔子对这种行为也只是说:“直在其中矣”(论语·子路)。这并不是儒家希望看到的理想情况,而是一种极端情况。

基督宗教也许可以从容化解儒家的这一困境,但是,它有类似的困境存在。基督教的爱源自上

<sup>⑤</sup> 其实,在儒家的忠道表述上,也暗含有从句结构:“己欲立而立人,己欲达而达人”。

<sup>⑥</sup> 何光沪早已表达过类似意见。他将金规则的消极或积极表述称作“米规则”,是维系人类社会的必要条件;而将“爱人如己”之类的表述称作“盐规则”。他认为,盐规则让人超离人的生存,而升华到人的圣化。而对这一圣化人的盐规则或最高伦理或伦理目标加以解释与论证的时候,各大宗教与文化“从事实上和逻辑上看都带有宗教性质。”于此可参见何光沪 He Guanghu 前引文,4。

<sup>⑦</sup> 张载 Zhang Zai,《张载集》Zhang Zai ji [the Anthology of Zhang Zai],(北京 Beijing: 中华书局 Zonghua shuju [Zhonghua Book Company],1978),62。

帝,所以,离上帝越远,得到的爱将会越少。在极端情况下,离上帝更远者会受到有违于金规则的对等。如,我们可以不接待客人,甚至连问候都省掉:“若有人到你们那里,不是传这教训,不要接他到家里,也不要问他的安;因为问他安的,就在他的恶行上有份”(约贰 1:10-11);可以诅咒别人,“若有人不爱主,这人可诅可咒”(林前 16:22);甚至旁观他人遭沉沦:“不敬虔之人受审判遭沉沦”(彼后 3:7);暴力的顶点是“把那些不信的灭绝了”(犹 1:5);抑或让他们求生不得,求死不能:“惟独要伤害额上没有上帝印记的人。但不许蝗虫害死他们,只叫他们受痛苦五个月。这痛苦就像蝎子蜇人的痛苦一样。在那些日子,人要求死,决不得死;愿意死,死却远避他们”(启 9:4-6)。

#### 四、表述形式以及文化心态真有不同吗?

很难解释以周玄毅为代表的某些差异论者为什么会执着于消极与积极表述方式上的差异,并以此差异来言说儒耶差异。严格说来,这两种表述方式在两方都存在。周玄毅在知晓这一信息的情况下,问了一个更奇怪的问题:“既然在儒耶各自的思想资源中,对这一原则的表述都是既有肯定形式又有否定形式的,那为什么偏偏基督教采取了肯定形式,而儒家则采取了否定形式作为自己的‘金规则’?”要知道,金规则的说法是相当晚近的事,并不存在基督教和儒家采用什么形式当成自己的金规则这一问题。也许,周玄毅是在某种特定的含义上使用“金规则”这个词,比如“最为核心、最为根本的原则”<sup>④</sup>。但以此验之于儒耶,也都不恰当。我们知道,儒家的根本原则与其说是恕道,不如说是“仁爱”。基督宗教的核心原则与其说是“无论何事、你们愿意人怎样待你们、你们也要怎样待人”,不如说是“爱上帝”。因为这是“这是诫命中的第一,且是最大的”(太 22:38);如果只涉及到人,不如说是“爱人如己”,因为“像那‘不可奸淫’,‘不可杀人’,‘不可偷盗’,‘不可贪婪’,或有别的诫命,都包在‘爱人如己’这一句话之内了。”(罗 13:9)

由于不能确认周玄毅是否在这里犯了一个错误,我们姑且接受他的前提,承认儒耶金规则在表述形式上有消极与积极之别。下面我将表明,这两种表述形式是等价的。<sup>⑤</sup>为了论述的方便,我约定,金规则的积极表述是:己所欲,施于人。鉴于上面针对邓晓芒关于抽象层次不同的反驳,我对金规则的积极表述跟基督宗教的积极表述是等值的,因为我们只需要让“所欲”和“怎样”之类的词的指代范围不受金规则之外的任何限制就可以了。

第一步,我们可以得到“不欲 p 等值于欲非 p”。从形式逻辑上看,这当然不成立。例如,我不想打球,当然推不出“我想不打球”。因为,有可能我什么都不想,什么都没想。但是,就我们考虑的语境——金规则来说,却是成立的。己所不欲,勿施于人。其中的“不欲”,一定不是“未欲”,而是“欲不欲”。也就是说,己所不欲 p, p 是己所不欲的。但是,“不欲 p”却是己所欲的。依旧以“我不想打球”为例,实则是,“我想不想打球”(“不想打球”是我想的内容),而这正好等价于“我想不打球”。

第二步,同理,我们可以得到“勿施 p 等值于施非 p”。例如,“不去实施打人的行为”等值于“要去实施不打人的行为”。类似的关键点在于“勿施 p”实则是“施勿施 p”。

第三步,非 p 等值于 r。意即,任何否定性的简单表达式(在这里,主要指不是句子的表达式)都可以为一个等值的肯定表达式替换。例如,“不死”可以用“活”来替代,“不好”可以用“坏或者中性”来替代。如果现实中的表达式没有丰富到足够完成这一转换的地步,我们通过引入新词的方式来达到目的,直接用否定表达式“非 p”来定义 r。

<sup>④</sup> 同周玄毅 Zhou Xuanyi 前引文,15。在其他学者那里,可以看到对金规则的含义进行的类似约定,如赵汀阳也认为金规则“被当作是一个伦理体系的基石”,但跟周玄毅不同,赵认为儒耶双方均有消极与积极的表述。于此可参见赵汀阳 Zhao Tingyang 前引文,71 和 73。

<sup>⑤</sup> 蒋重跃通过简单的换质换位推理给出了一个不同的证明。参见蒋重跃 Jiang Chongyue 前引文,102。

经过这样三步,我们就可以证明:金规则的消极表达与其积极表达之间,是等值的。“己所不欲 p,勿施 p 于人”这一消极表达,可以先被改写成:“己欲所不欲 p,施勿施 p 于人”,然后改写成“己所欲非 p,施非 p 于人”,接着用肯定词项替换否定词项,得到金规则的积极表达:“己所欲 r,施 r 于人”。同理,我们可得到从积极表达达到消极表达的改写过程。

这一改写过程表明,金规则消极形式与积极形式的差别,并不是一个逻辑差别,而只不过是一个经验心理方面的差别,从而不是一个实质性的差别。这样,当周玄毅利用否定后件的推理去得到儒耶在施欲先后关系上的不同时,这一不同会因为金规则两种表达形式的等值而被抹消。其它建基于此的结论,如儒家强调无伤害却导致道德虚伪化,基督宗教易演变为道德霸权主义等,也就失去了根据。

到这里,我们还可以后退一步,就算承认这两种表达形式的差别是实质的,也得不到周玄毅想要的结论。就施欲关系而言。周玄毅正确地看到儒家会因为主张金规则的消极表达而承认“己施于人,是己所欲”,这其中暗含施和欲的主体的分裂,所以有可能造成双输。但是,他忽略了,在金规则的积极表达中,施和欲的主体也是分裂的:己所欲,施于人。他关于儒家的表达会带来诛心之论和道德虚伪化的问题的论述,则本来就不够严谨。“己施于人,是己所欲”,我们可以得到,如果“己施于人”为真,则“是己所欲”为真;但是,周玄毅希望得到的是,如果“己施于人”在道德上是正确的,那么“是己所欲”在道德上也是正确的——这样才有所谓的以行动来证明自己清白的说法。他显然混淆了“真”与“善”。就推理来说,前后件的关系跟真值相关,跟前后件的道德属性并不相干。至于他对儒家强调无伤害原则而基督宗教易沦为道德霸权主义的说法,缺乏历史事实的支持。诚然,基督宗教历史上有许多宗教迫害的案例,但是,在儒家那里,也有许多“存天理,灭人欲”的对应案例。这些案例,眼内在者与超越者关系紧张有关,而跟金规则的肯定否定表述无关。

就人己关系是互生还是平行而言,金规则的消极与积极表述所起作用也不大。为了论证儒家那里人己关系是一种互生关系,周玄毅强调了在构建自我的过程中,需要别人的限制,这一限制在主体那里表达为“克己”。他甚至认为,孟子整个“四端之心”“大多跟施之于人的主动行为没有关系”<sup>⑤</sup>。然而,他没有看到,儒家的推己及人是双推,既推正面,又推负面,忠恕并行。如果一味克己,只能是自己推离出人己关系之外。事实上,如前文所述,儒家金规则的起源不能被简单等同于自然本性,而也要有天道的根源。在天道的意义上,在董仲舒“天副人数”或者在张载“民胞物与”的意义上,儒家人与人的关系就是一种跟基督宗教类似的平行关系。反过来,在基督宗教中,如果我们撇开上帝一维,单看人与人之间的关系,那也将是一种与儒家相似的互生关系:唯有在相互的爱中,才能彼此成就。

## 五、结论

要是以上论述没错的话,我已经论证:在金规则的起源方面,差异论者如果认为儒耶差异是自然本性与上帝诫命的差异,那么,他们犯了一个简单的错误;如果他们认为儒耶差异是两个超越者间的差异,那么,他们没有足够的证据。在金规则的抽象程度方面,儒耶金规则是一致的,可以相互蕴含。在金规则效力的普遍性方面,如果我们接受儒家之天为超越者,在理想情况下,儒耶的爱都将推广到所有人;如果我们承认儒家的爱是差等的,我们也必须在同样意义上承认,基督宗教的爱也是有差等的。而在金规则的表述形式方面,要么,儒耶并无消极与积极的差异,要么,这种差异存在,但只是表面的,因为它们可以相互蕴含;就算它们不能相互蕴含,它们也跟施欲先后关系以及人己的平行或互生关系无关。因此,差异论者所举出的儒耶在金规则方面的种种核心不同,都已经被拉平。

<sup>⑤</sup> 同周玄毅 Zhou Xuanyi 前引文,19。

**English Title:**

**The Golden Rule: A Comparison between Christianity and Confucianism**

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**Abstract:** This paper identifies and critiques a widely accepted view defended by some Chinese scholars nowadays that there are many important differences between the Christian version of the Golden rule and its Confucian counterpart. I call this view “differentism”. While details vary from scholar to scholar, certain common elements can be seen in the writings of most differentists. This paper has two aims. The first is to examine some of the relevant formulations applied by leading differentists such as Deng Xiaomang, Wang Xiaochao, Zhou Xuanyi and Jiang Chongyue in order to show that differentists’ strategies do not provide credible arguments to support their differentism. The second is to show that the above-mentioned two versions of the Golden Rule are equal to each other in some core respects.

**Key words:** the Golden Rule, Confucianism, Christianity





# A Personal Vision of China and the West in Broad Historical Context

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**Abstract:** This paper daringly attempts a review of the whole of European and Chinese history and, based upon it, seeks to provide an answer to the perturbing question of what it that has caused the deep, and at times agonizing, revolution of Chinese culture in modern times. The author sees the source of this revolution in a new self-awareness of the individual person that is rooted ultimately in Christianity, though more in its secularized than in its religious form. It argues that China must search for the roots of Christianity in order to find its new identity. The West, in danger of losing its Christian identity, may have to learn from China, to balance its strongly conceptual religious tradition with greater stress on life and personal experience. The author, a Catholic missionary who lived, studied and taught philosophy and culture for forty years in Taiwan, introduces his own spiritual and intellectual development as part of the basis for his interpretation of history.

**Keywords:** China's modern revolution, Western cultural history, Chinese cultural history, Christianity, China and Western culture.

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## Introduction

We live today in a world of change and unrest. We are experiencing a process of evolution which began fifty or more years ago and seems to grow faster and faster. Many different factors influence this process and drive it on. They may be political and economic, social and psychological, spiritual and religious. Never before has mankind reached such numbers in the world, nor felt itself to such an extent as an interconnected unit. Today we not only hear of distant places with different human ideas and beliefs, customs and values; in many places we experience these differences personally. It may be as residents, tourists, workers or students in large cities, or in smaller groups, even living together in villages or among families. This cultural variety makes life colorful and rich, but can also be challenging, especially once you are forced to change some of your own ideas and ways of behaving, or simply to accept the change of your environment. Slowly but surely most things and values appear to be undergoing change, and many areas of life seem to be ruled by what is perceived to be fashionable.

Never before has Man felt so much to be the ruler of the world, but then suddenly news of natural catastrophes of unexpected proportions may frighten him, or environmental questions could create much concern. At other times we may hear of social unrest, or even uprisings, in countries in which tradition or a strong government seemed to be in full control. At yet another moment an economic crisis throws millions of people into panic. We experience how ideologies are shaken or break down, and how religion in many societies increasingly retreats from public life and becomes a private matter.

There is still another dimension which can influence our awareness: The growing knowledge

about the unimaginably large size of the universe. Since our own experience of time and space is in no comparable proportion with the entire universe, in reality this knowledge hardly influences our immediate awareness; yet from time to time the minuteness of our Earth or of the planetary system may still touch our consciousness.

One important factor of our times is the rapid development of the technical communication network, which can cause both amazement and bewilderment. The amount and variety of information can be overwhelming. Every day we hear of new things. Little wonder that the media influence or control the minds of many people.

All these various factors result in people living more than before in their own world. They do not want to be ruled according to traditional patterns. At the same time the distance between people in the public realm is increasing, and mutual trust is weakening. They have not learned how to communicate in this situation. Many families break up; parents, teachers as well as political and religious leaders are increasingly losing authority. People and entire cultures are in danger of losing their identity. In some societies the political system is open to change, but generally lacks consistency and broader, lasting goals; in others the government tries to remain in control by setting narrow goals, to keep the people united and at the same time to protect its own power.

In spite of all these changes human nature has remained the same. The surroundings seem to be in continuous flux, yet Man still has the same basic needs. Many proven things are still valid today, though some forms may have changed.

In this paper I would like, from a certain distance, to describe the situation of two influential cultures and societies, the Western and the Chinese. In regard to the former I limit myself mainly to European culture, since I am convinced that in the long run intellectual and cultural factors are more formative and influential than political, economic or military ones. Out of the same consideration I regard it as important to consider historical developments. This is the reason why, in the first part, I attempt to present my view of European and Chinese history. Only the second part tries to provide an interpretation of our present situation.

The title of this paper speaks of a personal vision. Does this suggest that it is mainly the sharing of a personal opinion, without any scientific basis? The topic is too broad, and the distance from some events too short, to permit a convincing, scientific analysis. Nonetheless the paper aspires to be more than a private opinion. The weight of crucial judgments depends on the amount and the quality of the underlying information, as well as on the dimensionality of the point of view. This is why I choose to begin with a short overview of my personal history, to explain the basis of my assessments.

## **1. Historical background**

### **1.1 Background of the author.**

I was born and grew up in traditional Western settings in a village in the Austrian Alps. Touched by Jesus' love, I wanted to become a priest, and so had to go through classical high school training in Salzburg, a city of music and art. Increasingly I felt a call to help in less developed countries and to participate in mission work. This led me finally to enter the Society of the Divine Word, just when the era of the Second Vatican Council began.

My basic spiritual, philosophical and theological training in our congregation occurred exactly at a time of genuine opening and serious dialogue of the part of the Catholic Church with our modern times and world. I experienced both an atmosphere of hope and of unrest, of loving concern and of being challenged, of gaining new insights and of painful searching and questioning. It was for me

both a time of rocking turmoil in the depths of my heart and finally one of finding peace and new confidence.

My concern as a future missionary had slowly turned from social and economic needs to intellectual and spiritual ones. Sent to Taiwan, a long process of learning and study began for me. I was prepared, slowly, to grow into Chinese culture. Starting with language and trying to understand life, I hoped, step by step, from the present to go back into history, from daily concerns to thoughts of wisdom, from Earth to reach Heaven. I had many helpers, teachers and friends, from simple folk, young and old, to leading intellectuals of the day.

In this process, undoubtedly my meeting with the modern legal scholar John C. H. Wu played an important role. This highly gifted man had grown up in traditional Chinese settings, but soon got also to know Western knowledge and thought. As a young man he experienced his first love for Jesus. While studying law in America and Europe, delving deep into modern intellectual history, he felt a strong call to reform and modernize his own culture and country. Yet at the same time his religious faith was shaken and he landed in agnosticism. Back home he set out to enlighten and to educate, yet soon experienced the frightening force of political struggles and upheavals. From where could he get the strength not to give up? Finally, in the midst of war he unexpectedly came to know the story and writings of the young French nun, Saint Therese of Lisieux, and felt so deeply touched by her that he decided to become a Catholic.

From then on, a thorough study of the intellectual and spiritual journey of John C. H. Wu deepened my own intellectual dialogue with Chinese culture. Not only did my faith in the mission of Christianity for China become strengthened; in recent times even my understanding of the development of modern Western culture and the complex relationship of China with the West took on increasingly clearer features. Some results of this I wish to share in this paper.

## 1.2 My understanding of European culture and its history.

Western culture during the last 2000 years has mainly been shaped and nourished by three forces. One is the Roman, practical, down-to-earth and legal attitude, the second is the Greek, speculative, artistic, conceptual mind with its strong humanistic tendency. Both include a clear transcendental dimension. For the Romans it was the simple religiosity of the farmer, full of respect for the ancestors and gods; for the Greeks it was at first faith in the widely humanized world of the Olympic gods, but increasingly it took the form of abstract, metaphysical speculation and contemplation or of participation in mystical experience.

The third form of inspiration and motivation of Western culture is Christianity. It seems to have started as a force to unite people of different nations, tribes, classes and languages into a new community, rooted in the love of Christ. The power of this love found its deepest expression in the death and resurrection of Jesus, celebrated in the sacrament of unity, the Eucharist. In spite of repeated persecutions and repressions Christianity increasingly spread within the Roman Empire. Once it was legally recognized and soon thereafter become the official religion, the Greek mind demanded clear answers to some challenging questions: Who, after all, was Jesus, the Christ? How did his early followers experience him? Was he only of human nature like all other people? How could he, in the Greek context, soon be described as “being in the form of God” (Phil. 2,6) and even as the “Word become flesh” (John 1,14)? In spite of considerable opposition, visible in the wide spread of Arianism, the early Councils, the authoritative meetings of the leaders of the Church, decided to recognize also the “divine nature” in Jesus. Based on this the Trinitarian dogmas soon followed.

During the next centuries it was not primarily conceptual questions which were the main concern, but rather the effects of the great movements of the Germanic tribes, which lead to the break-

down of the western part of the Roman Empire. The Church now proved to be the only stabilizing force during these challenging years. Her influence steadily grew and spread slowly to the north, to all the Germanic and Slavic peoples. During the High Middle Ages, in the 12th and 13th centuries, almost all of Europe had already become Christian. During this time, on the one hand a rather high degree of integration of the three sources of Western culture had been reached; on the other, structures of authority still played a major role.

In the following centuries this new Christian, European culture, which had reached a certain maturity, encountered many new inner and outer challenges. Wars, but especially the plague, killed millions of people. It was difficult to find meaning in all this. How could God allow so much suffering? In theology the focus turned from reason to God's will. At the same time new contacts with the East Roman and the Arab world, as well as a growing self-awareness of the individual, brought with them an opening up to traditional Greek culture, which ushered in first the humanist movement and finally in the Renaissance. Even the leaders of the Church were in danger of becoming mired in secular interests or esthetics. The cry for reform within the Church finally led to the religious Reformation, protesting on the one hand a too conceptualized and legalized faith, on the other Rome's demonstration of secular power without spiritual strength. Only the tragic split of the Church led also to the renewal of the Roman Catholic Church.

The time of the Renaissance and Reformation was also the time of discovery and scientific development. Already during the Middle Ages questioning and searching minds had been trained, formally shaped by Aristotelian logic and systematic thought, yet more encouraged to see the world as the creation of God which man was to rule. During the 15th and 16th centuries, not only were new continents discovered, but the world as a globe had become an experience. Slowly the universe revealed itself in totally new dimensions. As the conflict of Galilei proved, reason, in the form of natural sciences, though grown within the framework of Christian education and training, became partly a challenge to traditional Church teachings and Church authority.

Slowly a whole movement began to form, attempting to build up a world view by relying only on reason. Initially it was not conceived as opposition against faith and the Church, but rather as an exercise of a strongly self-conscious mind. But a growing awareness of individuality and a high interest in practical matters of life deepened the tension with Church authority and its theological foundation; revelation. The Enlightenment, starting from the late 17th and extending to the early 19th century, saw in reason the "light of the world" and openly refused any higher authority. The French Revolution, a democratic movement, also protested against traditional political structures and authorities. During the 19th and early 20th centuries developments grew even more extreme. Political and social tensions increased. The new class of workers, born from the growth of industry and suffering exploitation, fought for their rights in revolutionary movements. Ideologically they found a strong, supportive voice in Marxism. Culturally, extreme rationalism turned into the Romantic movement, yet philosophically it led to a radical, social materialism as in Marx's teaching, or an atheistic, self-centered existentialism like in Nietzsche's dream of the superman. Positivism became more and more the attitude of science, and in the form of agnosticism or even nihilism it also threw its shadow on general intellectual culture. The Catholic Church, the broadest and most organized international organization, answered these challenges with an even stronger stress on its "divine authority", by declaring the highest, authoritative statements of its leader, the pope, as infallible.

The weakening of cultural unity and stress on economic interests led to a strong increase in nationalism. On the other hand the search for natural resources, in line with industrial developments, provided new strength to colonial policies. Had the age of discovery already brought about a new beginning of Christian missionary work, so the late 19th century saw fresh enthusiasm to spread the

Gospel, this time also shared by the Protestant churches. All these political, economic and ideological tensions finally led to two alarmingly destructive world wars, which cost tens of millions of human lives, and finally to the breakdown of the colonial system. The cold war between the capitalist or liberal-socialist world, with its stress on individual rights and freedom, and the Marxist-communist world, with its focus on collectivism and power of the state or the party, ended only with the fall of the Berlin Wall, a symbol of political and intellectual control and suppression.

Has European culture, after all these struggles in recent centuries, lost its identity? Are we living in a new age? If so, when did it begin? What are its characteristics? In face of modernism the Catholic Church had, at the beginning of the 20th century, once more responded with a stress on reason, discipline and authority, precisely those values which were challenged by this modernism. It is characteristic that during the second half of the 19th century, when the limits of reason had already become obvious, Catholic philosophy took the shape of Neo-Scholasticism, and religious architecture expressed itself in Neo-Gothic and Neo-Romanesque style. Only after World War II did a new breakthrough become obvious.

During the sixties the Church experienced a new spring. This time it was not by stressing authority, but rather, as pointed out earlier, by a willingness to face the modern world and to enter into dialogue with this world. One important feature was a new focus on the role of lay-people within the Church. They were the bridge between the secular and the sacred. Another important feature was a clearly expressed respect for other religions. Possibly Israel's slow growth in the belief in the one God, and therefore the fight of the prophets against all gods which were not really God, not only deeply influenced the early Church but generally the attitude of the Church toward other religions. A deeper understanding of other religions, and a clearer distinction of the concepts and practices involved, was growing only slowly. Of course, by now the world was no longer restricted to Europe with its colonial appendages; rather it was a new, multi-cultural, participatory, global structure.

However, in Europe and other Western countries this spring did not last long. The explosion of information, along with the growing influence of the media, spread the urban, global culture over all of society. Those sectors which earlier were mainly bound by traditional Church authority now experienced a growing process of "de-churching". Traditional Church leadership by clerics had not changed much, but less and less young people felt the call to clerical and life and dared to invest their entire life in the service of the community of faith.

### 1.3 China: the Eastern giant's culture and its history.

In this part I would like to draw a sketch of China's rich cultural heritage, its historical development, and its modern struggles as I envisage it. Reflecting on China's history it appears reasonable to do it in two parts: first, to look at traditional China, and then to see what has happened during the last hundred or hundred and fifty years.

#### 1.3.1 My understanding of traditional Chinese culture and history.

Some of the deepest roots of this culture, clearly visible 4.500 years ago, is the faith in Heaven as the ruler of the universe and the belief in a great variety of gods and spirits, primarily the ancestors, who must be respected as protectors and providers of blessings. To disregard them can lead to calamity. Beside these spiritual beings there are also a whole range of cosmic laws and energies, which need Man's attention if he wants to live in harmony with nature. The human world again has its own laws. Clear structures of authority and ways of disciplined, gentle behavior seem to belong to the oldest tradition, at least of the ruling class.

Three thousand years ago, during the Western Zhou dynasty, a kind of secularist and humanist

movement can slowly be discerned, which reached its peak from the 6th to the 4th century B. C. , more or less parallel to the peak of Greek culture, as well as to the biggest crisis and new integration of Israel's tradition. In India it was the era of the Buddha, whose thoughts later began to influence China deeply. Confucius, living in this time of political division and instability, did not deny the existence of spirits and the influence of cosmic laws, but based on the tradition of the sages he wanted to point out the way of virtue, of sound human relationships and wise government. The one who is called to rule the world in the name of Heaven is the man of virtue whom people will willingly obey. In the family too there will be order and harmony, by rule of authority and virtue. Trust in the way of Heaven, respect for the ancestors, and striving for a virtuous life form the spiritual basis of Confucius' school of thought.

Another branch of philosophy, whose spokesman was Lao-zi, mentioned the spirits, gods and religious rituals even less than Confucius. It even hesitated to stress human rules of behavior. Its followers were touched by the cosmic Tao, or Way, which mysteriously rules the entire world. Man should not take himself too seriously. This world view encourages one to be natural, to act in a self-forgetting, humble, soft manner, without ado. This is the real Way, also the way of Heaven, which is beneficent for man and all beings born of the Way.

For some time Mo Zi's teaching was also attracting many followers. He stressed the kindness and all-embracing love of Heaven, which was to be imitated by people. Everyone should live in this spirit of self-sacrifice, in order to establish peace in the world. Mo Zi saw his ideal in the ascetic spirit of the soldier who sacrificed himself for the good of the people. He somehow distanced himself from the musical, esthetic and formal side of life.

During this time of intellectual plurality and political tensions and conflicts, one group of people thought that the best way to bring peace and order to the world was by enforcing a strict legal system of punishment and reward, binding everyone equally without exception. Qin Shi Huang relied on their theory. This actually resulted in the establishment of the Chinese empire. His dynasty was short because too harsh and unbearable for the people. Yet in a milder form, combined with Confucian ideals of human relationships and moral virtues, it remained the political basis of all future dynasties.

During the first and second century A. D. , the time of the Eastern Han dynasty, a new religion slowly began to spread in China: Buddhism. We can see it in relationship to the "secularizing" tendencies in Confucius', Lao Zi's and the Legalist's teaching. By "secularizing" I mean a certain distance from traditional animistic-shamanistic, popular religiosity and ritual. On the one hand the teaching of the Buddha somehow relieved the burden and suffering of life, providing a possible answer for the fate of the individual; on the other hand, in the figure of the Buddha and the Bodhisattvas, one can feel a deep spirituality, not centering on the ordinary concerns of the human world, even not on nature, but on the inner being. Their way is that of discipline, concentration and virtue, and as fruit of enlightenment a deep compassion for the suffering people and a concern for their spiritual life. In this way the new religion could satisfy many religious needs of the people, broadening and deepening their outlook on life, and provide the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas as spiritual models for life, objects of veneration, and sources of help.

But in one point Buddhism differed essentially from Chinese tradition: in seeing life as a sea of suffering. Chinese tradition always conceived the world as something great and mysterious, in spite of its undeniable challenges, limitations and sufferings, ending in death. This inner conflict became tangible in the appearance of a new Chinese movement, the Taoist religion. Recapturing traditional animist and shamanist traditions with all their gods and spirits, it includes a strong link to the mysterious cosmic law, represented in the spirit of the Yijing, but even more so in the teaching of Lao-

zi, who now himself became one of the leading gods. A common point with Buddhism is to not stress human action so much, but rather, in times of unrest, to retreat from the world. Unlike Buddhism, however, the goal is not to empty oneself and leave the life of this world behind, but rather to already now strive for a fuller life, in this manner somehow entering eternal life already in this world.

Buddhism spread rapidly in China and during the Tang dynasty it seemed to be the leading spiritual force, even among the intellectuals who were most touched by the wisdom, simplicity and beauty of Zen. This school had inherited the deep compassion of Buddhism for all living beings, yet it included, like Taoism, a strong, transcendental sense of the mystery of the world and universe. The enlightened experienced the mystery of life, not only in meditation and in seclusion from the struggles of human life, but instead exactly in the work and dealings of ordinary life or in nature.

Yet it was also at the peak time of Buddhism when its basic conflict with traditional Chinese appreciation of life and the world was strongly brought forward. Triggered by the overwhelming power and influence of monasteries and similar institutions, the reaction was soon directed against fundamental Buddhist concepts and attitudes. Political power, in the form of the Emperor, turned against Buddhism, and hundreds of thousands of monks and nuns were sent home, an affliction from which Buddhism never fully recovered.

In spite of this rejection of Buddhism toward the end of the Tang dynasty in the name of Confucianism, it seems that the establishment of Neo-Confucianism during the Sung dynasty, especially its form of thinking and reasoning, was influenced by highly abstract forms of thinking in some Buddhist schools. In modern times this somehow rigorous, “scholastic” system of Confucian thought was blamed for China’s backwardness, because of the difficulties this system experienced in adapting to new challenges. Actually it existed in two branches, one laying more stress on reason, the other more on will.

### 1.3.2 My understanding of the more recent history of China

During the high period of the Tang dynasty China had its first contact with Christian Nestorianism. Later, together with the suppression of Buddhism all other foreign religions were forbidden as well, so nothing remained of Christianity. During the Mongol Empire the first official contacts with the Pope in Rome were established. With the fall of this foreign dynasty, again hardly any remaining influence could be perceived among the Chinese.

Towards the end of the Ming dynasty the Jesuits came to China, most famous among them was Matteo Ricci. For the West it was the Age of Discovery, the time of development of the natural sciences, but also, after the Protestant Reformation, a time of Catholic renewal and great religious fervor. Ricci and the Jesuits at his side were aware of the inner strength and richness of Chinese culture, expressed in a natural pride and feeling of superiority, and they were willing to study this culture and to grow in it. It is worth mentioning that, as representatives of a religion, they attempted first to be associated with Buddhism. Treated with disrespect by the class of scholars, they turned to Confucianism. Actually Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism coexisted in Chinese society, in spite of certain inner tensions and conflicts, though without direct communication or dialogue.

The Jesuits impressed people at the emperor’s court as scholars of Western learning, especially in the field of natural sciences, particularly in astronomy. At the same time they gained the confidence and trust of people of highest standing through their personal honesty and integrity. Even the change of dynasty from the Ming to the Qing did not affect their position. Some people even accepted Christianity and were baptized. The belief in a personal God, so central to Christianity, must have reminded them of one of the oldest roots of Chinese religiosity. The person of Christ and his

teaching of love certainly also impressed some. Yet it must have appeared more of an invitation to a new personal lifestyle than the blueprint for an entire new social order. Most difficult to accept and to understand must have been the cross, and the theology of salvation.

The court slowly allowed more and more Catholic religious congregations of priests to work among the people and to preach the gospel. These men soon discovered the strong belief of the common people in the influence of the spirits and gods on their life, their own ancestors included. People prayed and sacrificed to receive blessings; at the same time they were much afraid of harmful influences. For the common people religion was primarily an emotional experience, while the scholars had their own intellectual interpretation of veneration of the ancestors and sages, and of the influences of cosmic forces and laws. Out of this tension there grew among the missionaries the painful conflict of rites, which slowly became such a great hindrance for the spreading of the gospel of Christ. Both interpretations of the popular and Confucian rituals were reported to Rome, asking for a clear and binding decision. Yet Rome could only rely on the understanding of the people in the field. When Rome finally sided with the missionaries of the common people and decided against the interpretation of the scholars, by stressing the need of the purification of the faith of the people, the Emperor Kangxi, originally very sympathetic to the cause of Christianity, became so annoyed that he angrily forbade Christianity. For about one hundred years Christianity once again nearly disappeared from society. Only in some places did it survive, though experiencing repeated persecution and suppression.

A totally new situation developed during the middle of the 19th century. China had little interest in Western goods. When the English, buying silk and porcelain, experienced a growing imbalance in trade, they started to sell opium to China, which was produced in India. Soon the harmful results became obvious and the Court forbade the import of the drug. At this England declared war. Soon the western canons and warships proved to be superior to the Chinese ones. China had to accept defeat. But this was not the end. One humiliation followed the other. China was forced to open more and more ports to the Westerners for purposes of trade and banking, and once more had to allow missionaries to spread their religious teaching among the people. Unlike the defeat by the Mongols and Manchus, who even took over the ruling power yet hardly changed the way of government and the life of the people, also unlike the Jesuits who showed great respect for Chinese traditional culture, these new "western barbarians" on the surface appeared to respect the sovereignty of the old empire but in reality regarded its culture and way of life as backward and outdated. Thus began one of the most complex and contradicting processes in known human history, which to this day has really not yet come to an end.

With time young people were invited to study in the West, or they went by themselves. Scholars discovered the great progress of Western knowledge of nature and of technology, but also that life in Western society is in many regards different from life in China. A theory soon developed that China should in the essentials, such as general world view, government, ethics and human relationships, keep its own traditions, but in daily practical matters and in technology it must absorb Western expertise.

Soon another humiliation followed. China was defeated in its first war with Japan. The conflict had begun in Korea but soon extended to China proper. Japan only dared to challenge China because it had opened up earlier to modern Western knowledge. At this time Yan Fu, a scholar who had studied technology in England and was deeply impressed by Western thinking, above all by the Western scientific spirit, took the opportunity to introduce Darwin's theory of evolution and of survival of the fittest. At the same time he applied it to the situation of China by declaring: If China does not open up to modern Western ways of thinking, it cannot survive in the struggle of life.



From then on more and more Western ideas and practices freely began to flow into China. Beside knowledge of natural sciences, technology and medicine, scholars became interested in legal and political ideas, as well as in literature and art, philosophy, sociology and psychology. New schools of higher, modern learning were founded, and soon the traditional Confucian examination system proved to be obsolete and was dropped. Since at the imperial Court traditional powers were too strong and opposed more rapid reform, the Manchu dynasty was finally overthrown. For the May Fourth Movement, occasioned as a result of political interference by Japan after World War I, the main thrust soon became to be cultural. Students and their scholarly supporters proclaimed cultural and political reform through science and democracy as the most urgent need of the country. As a necessary step in this direction they demanded that in scholarly writing the poetic style of classical Chinese be replaced by the more prosaic, down-to-earth, spoken language. This allowed greater accuracy and left less room for personal interpretation. In this way the common people also had easier access to modern ideas.

Soon after the new Western thinking was introduced to China, people began to ask why China had in so many regards fallen behind the West. At the same time awareness was growing of a tension between modern ideas of freedom, equality, and social responsibility, and traditional role models and structures of authority. The culprit was undoubtedly Confucianism, which for thousands of years had been the backbone of Chinese culture but now began to be severely attacked by many an intellectual.

Centers of modern thinking were primarily new-style Western universities, a good number of which were founded by Protestant missionary organizations. In the countryside missionaries had also opened their schools, in this way broadening the base of educated people and at the same time influencing their view of the world and of life.

What about religion? This is certainly one of the most intriguing and controversial topics. As mentioned above, China's intellectual and spiritual elite had already in early times gone through a phase of secularization, in the sense of a decreasing faith in religious or supernatural powers, replacing them on the one hand with a stress upon the cosmic order as the basis for human life, and on the other with a rising awareness of moral responsibility, be it as an individual within the family or as an official in political life. Though educated persons may still have believed in the existence of all manner of gods and spirits, these were kept at a distance, and under Buddhist influence even heaven became more and more a kind of cosmic law.

It was quite different with the common people. Heaven was believed in and respected as the source of life and the ruler of the universe. For them the gods and spirits, and above all the ancestors, influenced all aspects of life. These spiritual forces were much closer to the people than to the political administrators. The moral laws, guiding life in the family clan and in the village, were influenced by Confucian teaching, but the protectors of moral laws were again primarily the gods and, as supreme authority, Heaven. In spite of this there was no binding doctrinal, religious authority with influence throughout the country; instead, different schools, monasteries, temples or individual charismatic leaders had their points of attraction, and in this way influenced their followers. The religion of the people in China was based more on feeling and experience than on doctrine and intellectual thought.

In modern times Western thinking was slowly gaining influence among the intellectuals, and the common people began to revolt against the imperialists and the Western, organized religions' claims of exclusivity. Religion became a highly controversial issue. The new Chinese word for religion, "zongjiao", was actually the translation of a Western term, which had been created in Japan. In Western texts it represented primarily Western organized religion, with its clear doctrine and so-

cial organization; in the context of history of religion, it pointed to a primitive and mythological world view, or to a complex doctrinal, social system like Buddhism or Hinduism. In China, educated people regarded veneration of ancestors or sacrifices to gods as the expression of “li”, a word generally referring to right, polite behavior. Prior to this the people had no common word for religion; rather they spoke of sacrifice, veneration, fortune-telling, Fengshui, etc. Chinese intellectuals were mainly interested in “modern Western thinking”, based on scientific research and tested in practice. Philosophically they were inclined toward enlightened, rational thinking or toward even more radical theories, generally ignoring, if not opposing, religion. This kind of secular Western thought encouraged them to claim that China long ago had already overcome religion. Yet there were others who paid more attention to the life and feeling of the common people and concluded that every aspect of life of the Chinese people was deeply influenced by religious thoughts and feelings. As a response to the new thinking many aspects of traditional popular beliefs and rituals were therefore now declared, in Enlightenment terms, to be superstition.

During the twenties a strong movement against Christianity rose among intellectuals. Even enlightened Buddhist leaders spoke of Christianity as a primitive religion. On the other side they saw for themselves the need to become more involved in society and the secular world if they wanted to survive.

The intellectual and spiritual-moral struggle was soon overshadowed by the pain and suffering of the Chinese-Japanese war. After the war the ideological conflict soon developed into the civil war, resulting in the victory of the Communists.

Yet the victory of the Communist Party did not solve the basic problem; rather it was only a temporal, political-military solution. What was it that China needed most in order to become a strong, healthy and modern nation? However, before it could face the outside world it had to solve its inner conflicts, which could not simply be resolved by one-party rule. Materialist, anti-religious, communist ideology was increasingly controlling public life, dismantling so-called traditional, feudal, economic and political structures, once again disgracing Confucianism and traditional thoughts and customs, and suppressing all religious activities. Equality, comradeship, social community in a certain sense became the highest ideals, politically and economically slowly leading to the establishment of the people’s communes. Aware of the need of industrialization, the “Great Leap Forward” was to prove the strength of the new system, but had disastrous results. Instead of political-economic reform the tensions led to the Cultural Revolution, showing among other things a deep-seated desire of the people for liberation from the traditional rule of the scholars with their attitude of superiority, liberation also from the authoritarian structure of family life. The peasants now became the dignitaries, and idealistic youth the tool and weapon for destruction, wiping out opposition and preparing the ground for the New Society.

In the end the ideologists were defeated by reality and the needs of life. The realists returned to the stage, partly from exile or from prison. Yet a simple return to the traditional past was no longer possible. Slowly new freedom was given to the entrepreneur, and religion too was slowly recognized as a free choice of the individual, though within a very limited framework.

Increasing liberalization brought the recognition of the government by more and more countries and with it a new opening to the outside world. An increasingly liberal economic policy and the low level of salaries brought foreign investments and rapidly growing foreign trade. After the earlier cut-off from Western cultural and political developments, now tens of thousands of young people went abroad to study. China had once again appeared on the international stage. The rapidly growing economy, the impressive modernization of its cities, the speedy build-up of its infrastructure, together with an active foreign policy among less developed countries, soon presented the image of a new,

rising superpower.

## **2. An attempt to interpret the social and cultural processes of change in China and the West**

The growth of a human is a highly complex reality. Can one therefore say that nothing can be more complex than the development of a human society? Economic, social, cultural factors can all play an important role at certain times and in certain areas. In the following part I shall try to point out some observations and intuitions, which seem to be worth further consideration.

### **2.1 The deepest cause of China's modern revolution.**

Without doubt, China is playing an increasingly influential role in the modern, globalized world. But has China really already found its new identity? Was the main change in recent history to catch up in scientific knowledge and technology, and as a result obtain an increasingly industrialized society and modern economy? Did the country essentially return to traditional feudal society structures with the party now as the new ruling class? Finally, what had brought about the radical intellectual and social movements in the early years of the last century? Though the Cultural Revolution remains for many a nightmare, were there not also some ideals behind it, similar to the T'ai-ping Revolution? Is there something which prevents China from going back to traditional ways of living and ruling? What are the deepest changes, and where can one find the roots for these changes?

My personal idea and feeling is that the deepest change during the last 150 years occurred, as contradictory as it may sound, in a new assessment of the value of the individual and consequently in a slowly developing new awareness of the person. The driving force behind this I see in Christianity, though mainly in a secularized and not in a religious form. The missionaries and the Christian communities with their charitable institutions doubtlessly were influential, but the influence was broader through basic ideas of Western society with Christian roots. However, in order to find a strong and healthy basis for this new awareness, it must be brought back to its real roots. Only on this basis China can find its new identity.

Traditional Confucian culture was a humanist one, stressing human relationships, based on cosmic ideas and an understanding of human nature. It not only designated different roles to genders and social groups of people, but added value judgments, building in this way a clearly structured society. On the one hand human relationships stressed the formal or outside behavior aspect; on the other they stressed moral virtues, but above all authority. In reality, when virtues were not fully developed, authority could, seen from a modern point of view, become very authoritarian.

In the teaching of the Gospel, announcing the kingdom of God, Jesus put the relationship between God and Man at the center, but immediately connecting it with the love of one's neighbor. Every human being was called to enter the kingdom of God, which was the family of the children of God, not depending on gender, personal talents or social status. This view of the human person, deeply changing traditional structures and values and even the understanding of law, was founded in Jesus' experience of the transcendent love of God, the Father. It was fortified and fully realized in Jesus' life, treating every human as a child of God. It reached its highest value in the death of Jesus, revealing a love which somehow had to face all aspects of the darkness of Earth; rejection, negation, forsakenness, extreme suffering and death; yet still his love did not collapse, but instead one could say it accomplished its goal. The experience and pronouncement of His resurrection as confirmation of His teaching, living and dying, became the foundation of Christianity. Soon this dynamism entered the Roman Empire and step by step built up a new, egalitarian community, until it

was by imperial authority recognized as the new form of social order.

It still took a long time before this new vision of man and society more deeply affected the entire Western culture. A broader influence first originated from individual charismatic leaders and teachers, then from groups of individuals, monks and nuns, who through their spiritual way of praying, working and living inspired others and became the yeast which slowly changed society. During the High Middle Ages Christianity was clearly the core of Western culture and had in many institutions, structures and laws, prepared the way for future developments. What happened afterward we have, at least initially, reflected upon in the first part of this paper.

What is the meaning of all this, if we try to understand modern developments in China? Can China, after the recent, somewhat chaotic period, return to the traditional feudal form of government and social life? Or are the common people no longer willing to be ruled over without participation and sharing of power? Can we speak of a new awareness of the dignity of each person? The decisive question, however, is then this: What is the basis for the dignity of each person? Is only the government its guarantee? Is it the constitution of the state, or the social contract of society? In recent history we have experienced how governments, seemingly out of care for the majority of people, are able not only to disregard and disrespect, but to mistreat, suppress and annihilate other segments of the population. The government and constitution must protect the dignity of the person, but they are not the basis or a sufficient guarantee for the dignity of each person. Historically, only the life and teaching of Jesus, and based on it the Christian faith, can fulfill this. This does not mean that Confucianism or Taoism or Buddhism do not have deep insights into the world and human nature, in this way preparing the way, but the most striking developments in this regard are based on a Christian inspiration.

## 2.2 The problem of Western society

What then can we say about the modern development of Western culture? What about secularization in general? It seems that Man, in his limitation, always tends to simplify complex situations, especially once he has a position of power, or, on the other hand, when he is under pressure. He has difficulties in broadening his vision and in listening to the other side, and in searching jointly for a solution for the problems.

Western culture, under Greek influence, learned to highly value conceptual truth, in contrast to the more holistic, intuitional, feminine way of thinking. In the light of Platonic philosophy, aware of the difference between the eternal world of the ideas and the concrete, limited, human world, it strives for the knowledge of the eternal, true, and in the deeper sense, real world. This leads to the hard work and struggle of observation, distinction, classification, definition and finally to the rules of correct reasoning and inferring. Brought to this level, something cannot be this and that at the same time and under the same aspect; it cannot be true and false.

It was in the context of this kind of thinking that the Christian community developed its theology, partly pressured by the Emperor, to clarify doctrinal decisions. Theology in the Middle Ages was clearly regarded as the first science, based on its source of revelation – clearly a concept of authority, but also as science of the deepest truths about God, the world and Man. In modern times, as the growth of secular science entered into conflict with traditional Church teaching (although not related to central theological truths), science attempted increasingly to build up its world view, based on observation, or philosophically on pure reason. The result was a continuous shrinking of the realm of certain truth and a growing denial of the authority of the Church, of Revelation, of the Bible, and finally of the existence of God. Pure reason, pragmatism and finally positivism became the standards for truth.

But life does not work like this. Neither the dignity of the human person, nor human relationships, nor the meaning of life and the world, rest on arguments of pure reason, pragmatism or positivism. Modern philosophical voluntarism and existentialism have already proved the dead end of an overstressing of reason; at the same time they showed the miserable state and wretchedness of man when he becomes isolated from the Divine, or at least a cosmic, world.

In this postmodern time of pluralism and relativism, neither traditional authority nor pure reason has great influence or power. The Church may be convinced she owns the fount of Truth, and may appreciate the treasure which belongs to her or which she experiences, but she must learn, in this modern environment, to stand on the side of the doubting listener, and to humbly share her insights and experiences, and not to speak with a claim to traditional authority. The West must regain its identity in Christian faith. Nothing has replaced it, or can replace it. Training in Christian spirituality is the crux of Western society and the Church.

## Conclusion

Generally speaking, Chinese culture stresses life more than abstract thought; it strives for external harmony more than for conceptual truth. It stresses the common or complimentary aspects more than the causes of tensions and points of difference. Therefore conflicting ideas can, to a certain degree, coexist peacefully, but at times the tension can become too strong and lead to a kind of explosion.

Maybe China and the West must learn from each other. Logical, systematic thinking was one of the preconditions of the development of the modern sciences, and China, deeply impressed by Western science and technology, must also continue to encourage this way of thinking. However, it seems that the deepest challenge for China is not science. It appears that science and technology could have been integrated into traditional Confucian structures of society without causing any revolution. What brought about the deepest, lasting changes seems to be related to a new vision of man. To find its new identity, China must return to its own cultural roots, but more so it must find the real basis of the dignity of each human in Christ, seeing in each person a child of God. Only in this way can it also approach its old idea that all people among the four seas are brothers.

In regard to spirituality and religion the West may have much to learn from China: the importance of personal experience and the relation to real life. It is a fuller life of openness and tolerance, of inner dynamic and motivation, of love and understanding, of communication and dialogue, of insight and vision, of honesty and humility, at once critical and not judging, trusting and cooperating, a life of inner peace and of hope; it is such a life which can draw people together and become a new model and source of authority.

In terms of transcendental truth it may be worthwhile to listen to John C. H. Wu, who said: "The East enters too fast into the realm of the unspeakable, where our concepts can no longer satisfy the desire for truth, while the West lingers too long outside, paying, – so could one interpret, – too much importance to human concepts and distinctions".

中文题目:

## 以广阔历史视野看中国与西方关系之个人洞见

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**内容提要:**这篇文章大胆地全程回顾欧洲和中国的历史而在此基础上答复下面令人深感困惑的问题: 第一, 近代中国文化极深刻的、且有时极为惨痛的革命, 其内涵为何? 第二, 是什么导致这革命? 作者看见, 最深的革命发生在个人的一种新的自我尊严意识, 而其最深的原因或激励乃源自基督信仰, 虽然较多是以其俗化形式而非以其宗教形式。因此他认为中国需要探寻基督信仰的根源, 才能找到它的新的自我认同。近代的西方面对着失去与基督信仰认同的危机, 它也许需要向中国学习, 更加着重生活与个人的经验, 以平衡其强具概念性的宗教传统。本文作者是一位曾在台湾四十年生活、研习并教授哲学与文化课程的天主教传教士。文中他也简述了自己的思想与精神的发展, 因为它是作者诠释历史的部份根据。

**关键词:** 中国近代革命、西方文化史、中国文化史、基督信仰、中国与西方文化

**书评与通讯**  
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# **Sino – Christian Theology : A Theological Qua Cultural Movement in Contemporary China**

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Sino – Christian Theology: A Theological Qua Cultural Movement in Contemporary China, edited by Pan – chiu Lai and Jason Lam. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2010. Hard cover, ix + 237 pages, including an appendix.

This extremely valuable collection of essays by eleven distinguished Chinese scholars from Greater China and the United States most helpfully introduces the English reader to the past, present, and potential of Sino – Christian Theology. It builds on the foundation laid in Sino – Christian Studies in China, edited by Yang Huilin and Daniel Yeung in 2006.

An opening chapter by the editors, titled “Retrospect and Prospect of Sino – Christian Theology: An Introduction,” first surveys the contents of the volume and then offers an illuminating description of the rapidly – evolving state of this field, along with some suggestions and forecasts for the future.

## **Basic characteristics of Sino – Christian Theology**

Especially in its early days, and even to a large degree even now, Sino – Christian Theology (SCT) has been distinguished by several characteristics: It (1) “takes hanyu or the Chinese language as the medium of expression”; (2) “takes seriously the contemporary Chinese context” (as distinct from traditional Chinese culture); (3) takes the Chinese academy, especially universities, as its institutional base; (4) emphasizes the “intellectual, cultural and humanistic nature of theology rather than its ecclesiastical function”; (5) “employs the methods shared by some other discipline in [ the ] humanities without excluding the method(s)” particular to Christian theology.

## **Definition**

From the beginning, scholars have struggled to find a precise definition of SCT. The editors clarify the situation by offering two: A “narrow” definition refers to “the theological thinking of some cultural Christians, i. e. , a kind of philosophical expression of personal faith gaining a footing in the academic society of the humanities and social sciences.” It is different both from church – based dogmatics and the “indigenous theology” of the earlier 20th century.

More “broadly,” CST can be viewed as “any theology written in the Chinese language,”

especially that produced within the Chinese academy, and written “ from historical and sociological perspectives rather than from philosophical or theological perspectives,” and potentially including even modern indigenous theology.

### **Recent developments and future prospects**

In recent years, though the core characteristics remain, new developments have significantly altered the original flavor of SCT. Briefly:

1. Though still in the minority, more and more younger SCT writers identify themselves as committed Christians, and are more open to “healthy interactions” with churches.

2. More scholars, especially younger ones, “identify themselves as ‘Christian Scholars’ (jidutu xueren) in order to distinguish themselves from ‘Cultural Christians’ who do not have [a] clear commitment to Christianity.” They also believe that one must employ distinctly theological methods in this task, rather than just the methods of the human sciences.

3. SCT is moving away from dependence upon translated western works to “the creative re-interpretation of western theologies and the articulation of innovative theological discourses with Chinese characteristics.”

4. More studies are employing more the methods of “the social sciences, including sociology, and anthropology,” to reflect the reality that Chinese Christianity is a social phenomenon.

5. The scope of SCT is continually becoming broader, especially since younger scholars are now trained in the biblical languages.

6. As a result, SCT hopes to make a contribution to the international scholarly community by offering a “brand new type of scriptural theologising” with Chinese distinctive.

7. SCT is “moving towards a full-fledged study (or studies) of Christianity,” including theological and non-theological studies, such as Christianity and culture. SCT is becoming “Sino-Christian studies” ranging over “all ... aspects of Christianity.”

Thus, though SCT is still in its infancy stage, there is great hope for the future.

### **Overview of the book**

With that introduction, let us very briefly glance at the contents of each chapter. The following is only a slight sampling; each chapter should be read in its entirety to mine the riches of this volume.

#### **Part I: Historical Review**

“The emergence of Scholars Studying Christianity,” by Jason T. S. Lam, first offers a “description” of the phenomenon of the recent “production of theology” in the universities of China, including the research interests of various scholars and their degree of commitment to Christianity. “A historical and sociological analysis” provides a brilliant and penetrating explanation for the rise of SCT in a communist nation. The “analysis of the nature of theology” coming from this environment concludes that SCT retains the flavor and speaks the language of the social and human sciences. Lam’s “theological reflection on the typology of theology” ends with a powerful challenge for theologians in Asia to produce works that can gain the respect of scholars throughout the secular academy.

LI Qiuling offers “Historical Reflections on Sino-Christian Theology” which trace the rise of

SCT from the original thought of Liu Xiaofeng, in cooperation with Daniel Yeung (Yang Xinan), who became Executive Director of the Institute of Sino – Christian Studies in Hong Kong, and who offered Liu the necessary institutional base and resources to pursue the development of SCT. He notes also the early and formative influence of He Guanghu. Their goals were to (1) “develop Christian theology and its culture by means of the historical philosophical resources and social experiences of Chinese – language culture, in order to form a Christian theological culture imbued with Chinese – language thought and culture”; (2) “develop the subject of theology within the academic field of Chinese language thought,” and to establish dialogue with other Chinese religions; (3) to make it “the shared enterprise of Chinese – language religious studies scholars from all social areas within the Chinese – speaking world.”

They hoped to see the “entry of Christian theology into mainstream Chinese culture” to enrich the resources of Chinese – language thought, and to incorporate Christian theology into “Chinese humanistic scholarship.” This ambitious program raised fundamental questions, of course, which Li skillfully probes. The growth of the movement has come with translation of western Christian classics; publication of journals by the Centre in Hong Kong; sponsorship of scholars; and convening of conferences.

Li also explains how SCT grew out of particular social and political circumstances, meeting the need for Chinese scholars to understand Christianity and explore its potential role in Chinese culture and society, at a time of “ideological adjustment” in China. Finally, he briefly explores certain problems for SCT, namely, its relationships to the “tradition” of Christian theology; to traditional Chinese culture; to “the universality of Christianity”; and to the organized church. In each case, he advocates greater mutuality, so that SCT may draw upon the riches of both the Christian tradition and Chinese linguistic and cultural resources, and may make its unique contributions to worldwide Christianity theology.

Continuing the historical survey, Peter K. H. LEE narrates the early discussion in Hong Kong of “the “Cultural Christians” Phenomenon in China.” Of interest mostly to scholars from Hong Kong, the record of the debate that took place in 1995 and 1996 still sheds light on the origins of the movement as well as the important role that Hong Kong has played, and continues to play, in the maturation of SCT.

Shun – hing CHAN offers reflections on that debate in “Conceptual Differences between Hong Kong and Chinese Theologians: A Study of ‘the Culture Christians.’” He finds that there are differences among theologians in Hong Kong, as well as between them and practitioners of SCT on the Mainland; in addition, there are similarities between Hong Kong theologians and some of those in China. He applauds the debate for its “genuine, conceptual interaction” between these various groups.

Issues involved included: the relationship between church tradition and creative thinking; the relationship between confessional orthodoxy and academic research; the potential relationships between Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese writers of theology. He hopes that in the future all these scholars will engage in mutually – beneficial interaction.

## **Part II: Theoretical Reflection**

The crucial question of the relationship between Chinese and western theology is concisely examined by LAI Pan – chiu in “Theological Translation and Transmission between China and the West.”

He first reviews the two most prolific periods of Chinese theological production: The 1920s/

1930s and 1990s/1990s. In the first period, Chinese Christians began to wrestle with the possible relationships between Christianity and traditional Chinese culture, producing works of “indigenous theology,” and then turned to the urgent question of the relevance of Christianity to China’s social and political crisis in the “contextual theology” movement. They not only translated (mostly liberal theological) books from the west, but wrote creative new theological works. Even their “translations,” however, became works of interpretation and adaptation to the Chinese context. In all this, they reflected the larger situation, in which “modern China has been subject to the influence of more than a few Chinese translations of foreign writings” and ideas, including democracy, Marxism, socialism, scientism, evolutionism and materialism.

In the second period, there arose another “revival” of Chinese theology in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Mainland China, again in response to local conditions. In Hong Kong and Taiwan, indigenous theology gave way to contextual theology (especially in Taiwan), as political conditions seemed to call for Christian response. Starting with the translation projects of Liu Xiaofeng, western theological thought – mostly neo – orthodox and liberal – was re – introduced to China, while in the institutional church Ding Guangxun drew upon western philosophy to propound his theology of the Cosmic Christ.

He concludes his chapter with a call for “bilateral translation and transmission,” urging both Chinese and western theologians to learn from each other and to contribute to each other.

In “The Value of Theology in Humanities: Possible Approaches to Sino – Christian Theology,” YANG Huilin surveys 19th and 20th – century German and French hermeneutics to show how liberal theologians and linguistic philosophers have tried to elucidate a legitimate theory of interpretation. His sophisticated analysis leads to the conclusion that while we cannot fully understand truth and reality, nor can we allow the destruction of all meaning. He believes we can learn from the ways in which German thinkers have tried to balance both the subjective nature of faith commitment and the objective nature of authoritative texts and indeed of all reality.

This is because “theological hermeneutics is the source of activities in textual interpretation” and “the absence of theological hermeneutics leaves the questions of ‘power discourse’, ‘openness of text’, and other basic hermeneutical problems unsettled.” In other words, all the humanities need theology as a fundamental discipline if any meaning is to survive.

“Sino – Christian Theology: The Unfolding of the ‘Dao’ in the Chinese Language Context,” by ZHANG Qingxiong, emphasizes the fundamental role which language plays in human life. Language not only describes our world and experiences, but “is also the frame for our understanding of the world and for organizing our thoughts.”

Analyzing the development of Buddhism in China into three stages: “(1) mission; (2) determination of teachings . . . ; and (3) establishment,” he opines that Christianity in China is still in the mission and determination of teachings stages. Only when Chinese thinkers fully absorb Christianity in the light of their culture and experience will they be able to “establish” it as a truly Chinese faith, not only answering questions common to all people, but especially answering those posed by Chinese. A complex discussion of human and divine Word and the relationship between natural law and experience is followed by the statement that “the attitude toward miracles is a watershed between Church Christians and scholars of Christianity” in China, especially since miracles are central to the biblical narrative.

He concludes his essay with his confidence that Sino – Christianity will someday make a major contribution to world Christianity, expressed in two sentences: “We live in the body of Jesus, and Jesus lives in our hearts. In philosophical language: We live in dao, and dao unfolds in the world and in our hearts.”

In a bold, even stunning chapter, CHIN Ken – Pa presents the program of Liu Xiaofeng as a “Paradigm Shift: From Chinese Theology to Sino – Christian Theology.” He begins and ends with Paul’s characterization of the gospel of the Cross of Christ as “foolishness to the Greeks and a stumbling block to the Jews,” adding, and “savagery to the Chinese” because of their commitment to humanistic moralism. Previous attempts to “domesticate” Christianity, such as indigenous theology and contextual theology, bring it under submission to both traditional Chinese moralism and the pervasive modern drive for national salvation.

Liu believes that all efforts to “sinicize” Christianity in order to make it acceptable to Chinese intellectuals have failed to retain the core of this necessarily “foreign” faith; the doctrine of the Cross, implying as it does the transcendence of God and the need of all mankind for salvation. “Sino – Christian theology” identifies with the “foreigner” and starts from “the truth of the Cross.” Rejecting the inherent assumption of the superiority of Chinese culture, SCT presents a message that challenges all culture. Actually, Christianity seeks to save not cultures, but individuals who are suffering from the existential aporia of modernity. SCT rejects both cultural nationalism and state nationalism, and renounces all aspirations of becoming “acceptable” to Chinese intellectuals as one aspect of Chinese culture or a servant to the state.

Nor does he accept the idea that Christianity is a Western religion; rather, it is a universal faith revealed by God to bring people of all cultures to a knowledge of himself. “Christian theology is the result of the encounter of the divine Word with the individual existential experience, rather than the encounter of the divine Word with national ideology.” The “basic proposition” of SCT is “the forming of the divine Word in Chinese,” that is “the formation of a kind of existentialism – oriented grammar of individual faith.” It thus seeks to break free from “‘the grand national narrative’ as the tool of indigenization.” It “cannot arise out of Chinese context,” but will “impact Chinese culture” by offering the only way to heal the “split” that modernity has caused in the human spirit.

### **Part III: Rereading Tradition**

LAI Pan – chiu addresses the important question of relationships among “Sino – Christian Theology, Bible, and Christian Tradition” in recognition of the challenge from church Christians who cast doubt upon the legitimacy of SCT’s being called “Christian” if it does not take the Bible seriously. Lai agrees that SCT has been weak in biblical studies heretofore and suggests several “legitimate” reasons for this situation. He notes the growing strength of biblical studies as an academic discipline in China and recommends that Chinese academics become aware of the “intellectual” and “academic” nature of solid biblical studies. He also suggests that SCT might make a contribution to biblical studies by bringing Chinese cultural resources, such as Buddhist method of doctrinal criticism, to bear upon their interpretation.

In “Messianic Predestination in Romans 8 and Classical Confucianism,” Yeo Khiok – khng offers a provocative example of drawing up the resources of Chinese culture to enrich our understanding of Christianity with an intertextual reading of Confucius and Paul focusing on the concept of the “messianic” figure who will “save” mankind from violence and injustice. His method, which seems to assume the equal value of both Paul and Confucius, will be considered sub – Christian by some, and quite appropriate by others.

Finally, in “Reflection on Enlightenment: A Proposal of the Focus of Sine – Christian Theology,” LIN Hong – hsin shows that the 18th – century Enlightenment, while claiming to enthrone reason, really produced superstition and tyranny. Blind faith in “reason” inevitably fails to understand

that it is a form of religion. Thus, unless we have a Word from the Creator, we shall not be able to enlighten others. “This should be an important starting point of Sino – Christian theology,” he concludes.

An Appendix presents the results of a “Preliminary Survey on the New Generation of Scholars of Christian Studies in Mainland China.” Many of them are calling for Christian studies in China to broaden its scope to include other points of view.

## Conclusion

In the light of that call for a wider range of sources, may I make a few suggestions?

First, the theological and apologetic works of Zhang Lisheng (章力生, Lit – sen Chang) are worth careful study, for he was a distinguished Chinese academic who was able to communicate Christian thought in language imbued with Chinese language and culture. Furthermore, his English works are being reprinted and two of his shorter books are being translated into English.

Second, there is a growing wealth of excellent biblical and theological studies by Chinese authors, including senior scholars like Choong Chee – pang and younger scholars like Wu Daozong.

Third, the contributors of this book seem largely ignorant of the significant work of American evangelical scholars, including systematic theologian and biblical interpreter Carl F. H. Henry, an abridgment of whose *God, Revelation & Authority* has been translated into Chinese. Henry interacts powerfully with the thinkers who have so influenced ecumenical and liberal theologians in Greater China as well as the main spokesmen for SCT. He deals at length with questions of language, hermeneutics, Scripture, and the relationship between Christianity and philosophy.

I hesitate to make the following criticism, but the overall excellent quality of the book is considerably diluted by the presence of a great many distracting typographical, lexical, grammatical, and stylistic errors, which could have been easily eliminated by a professional, native – English – speaking editor.

Reflecting, analyzing, and summarizing a large and growing literature in Chinese, *Sino – Christian Theology* serves as an essential guide for English readers to this increasingly – important field of study; it deserves widespread and careful reading.

中文题目:

**体现当代神学与文化运动的汉语神学**

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# 弘扬共同体理念,建设中华民族共有精神家园 ——“宗教与中国社会伦理体系的构建”学术研讨会综述

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中国伦理学学会和中国宗教学学会联合举办的“宗教与中国社会伦理体系的建构”学术研讨会暨浙江大学全球化文明研究中心成立仪式于2011年6月3日至6日在杭州梅家坞举行。本次研讨会是继上世纪九十年代末中国的伦理学者和宗教学者合作推动“全球伦理运动”以来,中国伦理学界和宗教学界再次联合的象征,旨在加强学科对话,推进“伦理共同体”和“宗教共同体”的建构,共同应对中国社会转型发展过程中文化思想价值伦理方面出现的各种问题,为中国社会文化思想道德建设献言献策,共建中华民族的精神家园。参加本次研讨会的有来自宗教学界与伦理学界的著名学者和学术新秀共35人,中央统战部干部2人,媒体和学术期刊8家,浙江大学兄弟研究所旁听学者5人。此次会议由浙江大学宗教学研究所承办,浙江大学宗教学研究所所长王晓朝教授主持,浙江大学副校长罗卫东教授为中国宗教学会会长卓新平教授担任浙江大学兼职教授颁发了聘书,宣布了浙江大学全球化文明研究中心的成立,并发表了热情洋溢的致辞。

浙江大学全球化文明研究中心由安伦捐资创办,旨在推进中国社会各界对宗教的正确认知,建构中国宗教共同体,以应对全球化的过程中全人类都将面对的生态危机、社会危机、道德危机、价值危机、信仰危机。该中心的工作重点是汇聚学术界的力量,展开跨学科、多学科的合作,深入研究全球化背景下世界各大文明与各种宗教的关系,阐发、推介、传播共同体的理念,为建构中国宗教共同体提供理论基础;推进世界各文明、各宗教之间的对话,促进宗教间建立多元通和、和而不同、和合共生的良好关系,促进各宗教自身的合理改革,发挥其造福社会的积极功能;推进宗教知识的基础教育,促进社会对宗教的了解,消除偏见,为中国宗教的健康发展创造良好的社会环境;推动政、教、学三界的良性互动,为创建和谐社会贡献力量。

这次会议的研讨范围涵盖较广,涉及伦理与宗教的关系和渊源、宗教社会现存的宗教和道德问题及其相互关系的分析、宗教问题的解决策略和政策制定原则、宗教共同体的基本理论、宗教共同体对于解决精神价值问题的效用和可行性、解决精神问题的传统文化资源等论题。

在宗教与道德、宗教学与伦理学之间关系的问题上,学者们持尖锐对立的观点。伦理学会会长、清华大学哲学系主任万俊人教授在题为《宗教与道德之间》的发言中认为,伦理学是一门“顶天立地的学问”,天就是宗教信仰,地就是政治法律。正常的道德状态需要天清地宁,政治法律不能离开道德,政教分离是不可避免的,但是道德不能跟政治分开,宗教也需要道德,在道德不好的社会,难以设想宗教是健康的。北京大学徐向东教授在《宗教信念的认知地位及伦理-政治含义》主张要批判性地审视宗教信仰与人类生活的其他方面的关系,即使宗教在某种意义上表达了人们在最高的精神层面上的追求,但世俗生活的可能性不得不建立在与人类生活的根本形式更为相关的普遍的道德规范的基础上,人类在其自身的状况中所面临的真正危机归根结底是道德意义上的危机,而不是宗教信仰的

危机,甚至也不是某种意义上的文化危机。安伦的《公民道德建设的公民信仰认同基础》认为,宗教之所以带来许多问题,其原因在于多元、纷争和迷信,如果构建以宗教共同体为基础的公民信仰认同,则所造就的、包含了各宗教之精华的理性化的宗教共同精神不仅有助于化解我国社会价值伦理缺失的危机,而且可能为全球化时代人类普世价值伦理构建的困境提供出路。

浙江大学宗教学研究所王晓朝教授的《伦理“之后”是宗教——伦理共同体与宗教共同体浅议》、清华大学哲学系博士后陈越骅的《伦理共同体何以可能?——试论其理论维度上的演变及其现代困境》、上海社会科学院宗教研究所的晏可佳教授的《宗教共同体——从理性建构到行动的纲领》等论文集中讨论了宗教共同体的概念、产生的背景、实践意义和可行性。全球化的过程是人类在各领域形成共同体并最终形成人类共同体,进入大同世界的过程,在这个过程中伴随着致命的生态危机、资源危机、高科技武器带来的人类自我毁灭的危机,而其中的宗教冲突对人类的威胁可以与高科技武器对人类的自我毁灭的威胁相提并论,而且这两种威胁也是相互重合的。因此解决宗教文明之间的冲突,构建全球化人类共同的核心价值和伦理体系,已经成为全球化时代人类共同生存发展的无法回避的至关重要的任务。因此在精神信仰与思维领域需要一个轴心式的转变,从第一轴心时代获取思想资源,配合现代成熟的物质与教育条件,形成新的精神信仰实践模式,以配合全球化的顺利完成。这一场精神思想运动的根本意识是全球意识、生态意识、宗教对话、全球伦理、全球宗教共同体,其中宗教共同体是人类顺应全球化趋势为了共同生存发展而必将形成的各宗教信众和教派多元通合、和而不同、和合共生的信仰机制。它要求各宗教放弃对立排他的因素,但不要求各宗教放弃各自的特色和身份。与会学者探讨了宗教共同体理论对于振兴和弘扬中华文明,构建中华民族的社会主义核心价值体系,加强民族凝聚力和维持良好的社会秩序;处理宗教间关系,使诸宗教成为协同解决社会精神伦理问题的资源而不是负担;构建中国崛起的软实力,建立中国在国际社会的正面形象和影响力等方面的作用,主张在复兴儒释道共同体的精华的基础上,融合基督教和伊斯兰教等所有世界文明的精华,构造共有精神家园。

中央统战部李平晔博士的总结发言《对我国宗教问题的几点思考》、南昌航空大学马克思主义学院曾广乐的《试论道德信仰与道德变迁》、浙江大学国际政治研究所张新樟的论文探讨了具体的宗教伦理问题策略建议。李博士认为,以前我国宗教工作领域中最大的困惑是理念的困惑,或者说,导致我们对宗教问题困惑的深层根源在于宗教管理系统在理论思考上的严重滞后所带来的认识上及工作中的困惑,从而影响到对于宗教方面新情况新问题的解决和处理。理论上的“剪不断,理还乱”会导致工作上常常出现疲于应付的局面,难于做到未雨绸缪。改革开放三十年后的今天,我们的宗教问题的研究已相当深入,我们党提出的“积极引导宗教与社会主义社会相适应”,还是“发挥宗教在促进社会和谐方面的积极作用”,以至“发挥宗教界人士和信教群众在促进经济社会发展中的积极作用”这些对于宗教正面肯定、具有指导性的结论,都是基于政界与学术界对于宗教问题的相当雄厚的基础性研究,基于宗教工作干部的实践总结,基于广大宗教界人士的多方努力,才有这样高度科学的概括。她认为,在没有充分的调查研究、没有准确把握情况、没有找到最佳解决方式时,不要轻易动用专政力量对付宗教。头痛医头、脚痛医脚、就事论事,也许是处理宗教问题的一种较为明智的权益之计。

国内伦理学界、宗教学界知名专家这次会议上从关注国家建设中的文化、道德和价值重建的角度切入,从宗教和伦理的精神价值和现实功能上来思考当代中国社会体系及其内在支撑如何构建的问题,以其当下思考以及发展前瞻性而体现出其及时性、必要性、和重要性,获得了丰硕的成果。可用万俊人教授的即兴对联纪念此次盛会:“西子湖畔天地会,梅竺雨中神人情”。



**The English Title:**

**To Carry forward the Idea of Community,**

**To Construct the Common Spiritual Home of Chinese**

**——Review on the Academic Conference of “Religion and the Construction of Chinese Social Ethic System”**

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## Report on “the First Nordic Forum of Sino-Western Studies”

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The First Sino – Western Forum, which was held on October 4th 2011 in Helsinki, was co – organized and co – hosted by the Department of Systematic Theology, Faculty of Theology, and the Department of Comparative Religion, Faculty of Humanities, of the University of Helsinki. It was chaired by Prof. Dr. Miikka Ruokanen and Prof. Dr. Paulos Huang, who also functioned as a translator. The forum attracted a number of participants, most of them from different faculties of the university, others from the Finish Lutheran church.

The Forum concentrated on the dialogue between Chinese culture and Christianity and on the development of Christianity in contemporary China. Special attention was paid to what kind of a role religion (especially Christianity) had in the fast development of modern Chinese society, and to the question about what kind of contribution religion can bring to the moral reconstruction of China and to the building – up of a welfare state.

Six Chinese scholars from Mainland China were invited as key speakers to attend the forum. They are: Professor Li Xiangping from East China Normal University, Shanghai; Professor Sun Shangyang from Beijing University, Beijing; Professor Zhao Lin, Su Dechao, and Zhou Xuanyi from Wuhan University, Wuhan; and Professor Wang Aiming from Nanjing Union Theological Seminary, Nanjing. All of them are among the best Chinese scholars in their own field of research.

Before the forum began, the Chinese scholars visited the Faculty of Theology, and had meetings with the dean and the administration. The conversation focused particularly on the continued cooperation on academic affairs between the faculty and the Chinese universities.

The forum was opened with words of welcome by Prof. Miikka Ruokanen, director of the Department of Systematic Theology, Faculty of Theology. Each speaker was then given 40 minutes each for their presentation.

The first speaker, Prof. Wang Aiming (Ph. D. from Basel University, Switzerland) gave his presentation on “The Continuing Growth of Christianity in China”. Prof. Wang looked at the Reformation and Enlightenment as the background for understanding Christianity in China from the missiological perspective, and pointed to both strengths and weaknesses in the fast – growing Chinese Protestant Church. He also offered his suggestions for solutions to tackle these problems or challenges which the church is facing. According to his understanding, Christianity in China “should be interpreted as the principles of the faith in Jesus Christ in the Chinese society.” The theological meaning of the term “the church in China” is the universal church in China. It is different from the visible church and the denominational churches. On the one hand, Prof. Wang observed that “Until today, Protestantism has grown up by huge quantities in Chinese society.” On the other hand,

he acknowledged that “the quality of the Christian groups, churches, and organizations remains an urgent, serious problem. We must pay serious attention to the low level of the Faith in the Chinese church.” Prof. Wang recommended to create a theological foundation for the faith of the church as the starting point of the solution, and then return to Reformation tradition for “transplanting well the teachings of the Reformers, especially Martin Luther and Jean Calvin” in order to “motivate the consciousness of the theological sense in the church”.

The second speaker was Prof. Li Xiangping, whose special field is religious sociology. His topic was “Christianity and Chinese Civil Society”. In his research, Prof. Li has combined a case study with literature studies. Based on the discussion of the concept civil society, the direct and indirect relationship between Christianity and civil society in the contemporary China was explored. Through a study on the working mode of the Christian church and its relationship with social public affairs and official powers, the speaker discussed how Christianity, as a faith community, can become an element of civil society in the construction of contemporary China. Prof. Li argued that Christianity could give its contribution in the building – up of a Chinese civil society. In the context of Chinese language, it seems that relations among “the religious basis of citizenship”, “the common community of religious faith”, and “the membership qualification of the common community” could constitute “the essential facts of the civil society” in the process of religious movement. The Christian church is a leaven in society, and the church has close relations to society. By allowing people to gather and form a “common community of faith”, religious organizations can be social resources to make Chinese society turn to a civil society. Therefore, the contemporary Chinese Christianity can contribute something to build up the Chinese society.

The third and last speaker in the morning session was Prof. Sun Shangyang. Prof. Sun has earned his fame not only because of his academic achievement on religious sociology but also because of his contribution in the field of Chinese church history, especially the Chinese church history before 1840. The topic of Prof. Sun’s presentation was “Chinese Traditional Culture Study Fever, Scarcity of Meaning and the Trend of University Students’ Attitude toward Religions: A Survey in Beijing”. This presentation was based on a survey on university students in Beijing done by the author. Based on the analysis of the data, Prof. Sun presented several conclusions. First, attention should be paid to the fact that there is indeed a scarcity of meaning among university students. They keep thinking of the problem of meaning, but it is not easy for them to find satisfactory answers. Second, although believers of religions constitute less than 20 percent, only 21.9 percent report that they are not interested in any religion. Third, among non – believers, the number that reports that they are interested in Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism (49.6 percent of the total) is higher than those who report that they are interested in Christianity (17.6 percent of the total). This shows the influence of Chinese traditional culture study fever. Fourth, the more the students think of the problem of meaning, the more likely is it for them to resort to core functions of religion. Fifth, when they are in need of a spiritual source to help them to pass through the crisis of meaning, most of them (62.1 percent) turn to a scientific view of life and world and non – Marxist philosophy, but not religion. They are indeed as secular as their counterparts in Western society. Sixth, those who report that they turn to religion (10.6 percent) are more than those who turn to Marxism. This indicates that the dominant ideology is losing its hegemony.

Prof. Zhao Lin’s speech opened the afternoon session. Prof. Zhao is a well known in the field of philosophical and religious studies in China. The topic of his presentation was “Global Development Trend of Christianity in the Post – Colonial Era”. Beginning with Philip Jenkins’ widespread idea that God is going southward, Prof. Chao confirmed that “Christianity has been changing from a religion of the rich, the white and the capitalist to one of the under – privileged, colored and people

in the developing countries". However, the situation of Christianity in Asia is quite different from that of Latin America and Africa. A revival of traditional religions in most parts of Asia presents a serious challenge to Christian development in the region while it upholds the Hindu and Islamic positions and advantages. Religions, cultures, and the social – political status are stepping stones for Christianity in the region. As for China, Christianity is expecting a time of disentanglement. As is the case with Islam and Hinduism, China is desperately trying to find a way to modernization without westernization. Although Christianity has been growing fast recently, it is challenged by both Chinese politics and the traditional Chinese culture. Moreover, secularization is another big challenge to the development of Christianity in China. On the other hand, Christianity meets also in China a favourable attitude among the poor as well as the conscious (what does he mean?). We should look for answers to the question "when will God, if he does, go eastward where he was made known to the world?"

The following speaker Su Dechao, a young professor from Wuhan University, delivered his presentation on the topic "The Golden Rule: A Comparison between Confucianism and Christianity". His presentation identified and critiqued a widely accepted view defended by some Chinese scholars nowadays that there are many important differences between the Christian version of the Golden Rule and its Confucian counterpart. He calls this view "differentism". While details of differentism vary from scholar to scholar, some central arguments could be seen in the writings of most differentists. On the one hand, his presentation aimed to examine relevant formulations applied by some leading differentists, such as Deng Xiaomang, Wang Xiaochao, Zhao Dunhua and Zhou Xuanyi, and showed that the differentist strategy does not provide a credible argument to support their differentism. On the other hand, his presentation argued strongly that the two versions of the Golden Rule are equal to each other in some core respects. The conclusion which was finally reached by Prof. Su is that "generally speaking, Confucianism and Christianity are equal regarding the Golden Rule."

The last key speaker, Zhou Xuanyi, another young professor from Wuhan University, gave a speech on the topic of "Cultural Adaptability of Confucianism and Christianity". In his view, culture adaptability should be considered as the main topic of cross – cultural studies between Confucianism and Christianity. He used two approaches for the corresponding research. First was the method of paratactic analysis, which means to treat them as two independent entities and to compare their replies to similar great challenges and transformations in their own histories. Second is the method of interactive analysis, which means to treat them as a counterpart and to compare their reaction to each other's impact. Through both historical and contemporary analysis, the author came to a conclusion that Confucian strategy of cultural adaptation is more diffusible and realistic, focusing on social – life and self – fulfillment; whereas Christianity is more abstract and shows much more attention in the religious identity with the consciousness of Other's (God) presence. With regard to these different strategies of cultural adaptability, there should still be strong tension between Confucianism and Christianity in the reconstruction of Chinese culture in the 21st Century.

The forum was closed by Prof. Sakaranaho Tuula, director of the Department of Comparative Religion, Faculty of Humanities.

中文题目：

## 首届国学与西学北欧论坛简讯

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# 《国学与西学：国际学刊》 (中英文双语半年刊)

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黄保罗 Huang Baoluo,《汉语学术神学》*Hanyu xueshu shenxue* [Sino-Christian Academic Theology],(北京 Beijing:宗教文化出版社 Zongjiao wenhua chubanshe [Religion and Culture Press],2008),155-159。  
Paulos Huang, *Confronting Confucian Understandings of the Christian Doctrine of Salvation: A Systematic Theological Analysis of the Basic Problems in the Confucian-Christian Dialogue*, (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2009), 88-89.

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罗明嘉 Luo Mingjia、黄保罗 Huang Baoluo 主编,《基督宗教与中国文化》*Jiduzongjiao yu zhongguo wenhua* [Christianity and Chinese Culture],(北京 Beijing:中国社会科学出版社 Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe [Chinese Social Sciences Press],2004),155。

Miikka Ruokanen & Paulos Huang, eds., *Christianity and Chinese Culture*, (Grand Rapids & Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2010), 3.

##### 3. 译著 Translated literature:

麦克·阿盖尔 Maiké Agaier,《宗教心理学》*Zongjiao xinlixue* [Religious Psychology],陈彪 Chen Biao 译,(北京 Beijing:中国人民大学出版社 Zhongguo renmin chubanshe [The Press of Renmin University of China]),2005,30。

Fung Yulan, *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, tr. by Derk Bodde, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), 150.

#### 4. 外文稿件引用中文资料 Chinese literature in non-Chinese articles:

Liang Qichao, 《古书真伪及其年代》*Gushu zhenwei jiqi niandai* [The Genuinity of Chinese Ancient Books and their Dates], (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan [The Commercial Press], 1923), 20.

#### 5. 文集集中的文章 Articles in collections:

张敏 Zhang Min, 《基督徒身份认同——浙江温州案例》*Jidutu shenfen renting — Zhejiang Wenzhou anli* [The Personal Identity of Christians], 张静 Zhang Jing 主编:《身份认同研究:观念、态度、理据》*Shenfen renting yanjiu: guannian, taidu, liju* [A Study on Personal Identity], (上海 Shanghai: 上海人民出版社 Shanghai renmin chubanshe [Shanghai People's Publishing House], 2006), 101 – 105.

Zhuo Xiping, “Comprehensive Theology: An Attempt to Combine Christianity with Chinese Culture,” in Miikka Ruokanen & Paulos Huang, eds., *Christianity and Chinese Culture*, (Grand Rapids & Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2010), 185 – 192.

#### 6. 报纸中的文章 Articles in newspapers:

曹曙红 Cao Shuhong, 《信仰之旅 慈善之行 - 上海玉佛禅寺觉群慈爱功德会参访团西藏行纪实》*Xinyang zhi lu, Cishan zhi xing - - - - Shanghai Fochansi Juequn ciai gongdehui canfangtuan Xizang xing jishi* [The Trip of Faith and the Travel of Charity], 《中国民族报》*Zhongguo minzubao* [The Newspaper of Chinese Ethnic Minorities] (2011年8月23日), 第5版。

David E. Sanger, “U. S. and Seoul Try to Ease Rift on Talks with the North,” *New York Times*, (11 June, 2005).

#### 7. 期刊中的文章 Articles in journals:

李炽昌 Li Chichang, 《跨文本阅读策略: 明末中国基督徒著作研究》*Kuawenben yuedu celue: Mingmo Zhongguo jidutu zhuzuo yanjiu* [The Strategy of Readings in Chinese Christian Writings], 《基督教文化学刊》*Jidujiao wenhua xuekan* [Journal of Christian Culture], No. 10, (北京 Beijing: 中国人民大学出版社 Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe [The Press of Renmin University of China], 2003), 168.

J. R. Carrette, “Religion and Mestrovic's Postemotional Society: The Manufacturing of Religious Emotion,” *Religion*, vol. 34, (2004), 271.

#### 8. 会议论文 Conference papers:

田海华 Tian Haihua, 《汉语语境中的“十诫”: 以十九世纪基督新教的诠释为例》*Hanyu yujing zhong de “Shijie”: Yi shijiu shiji jiduxinjiao de quanshi wei li* [The Ten Commandments in the Chinese Context], “第四届‘基督教与中国社会文化’国际年青学者研讨会”*Disijie “Jidujiao yu Zhongguo shehui wenhua” guoji qingnian xuezhe yantaohui* [The Fourth International Young Scholar Conference on Christianity and Chinese Social Culture], (香港 Xianggang, 香港中文大学 Xianggang zhongwen daxue [Chinese University of Hong Kong], 2008年12月5-9日), 3。

John Barwick, “Liu Tingfang, Chinese Protestant Elites, and the Quest for Modernity in Repu Xiping Republican China”, presented in “The 4th International Young Scholars' Symposium on “Christianity and Chi-

nese Society and Culture”, ” ( Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 5 – 9 December, 2008).

#### 9. 学位论文 **Dissertations:**

刘家峰 Liu Jiafeng,《中国基督教乡村建设运动研究(1907 – 1950)》*Zhongguo jidujiao xiangcun jianshe yundong yanjiu* [A Study on the Movement of Chinese Christian Countryside Construction], (武汉 Wuhan: 华中师范大学博士论文 Huazhong shifan daxue boshi lunwen [Ph. D. dissertation in Central China Normal University], 2001), 55。

Nathan C. Faries, *The Narratives of Contemporary Chinese Christianity*, (The Pennsylvania State University, PhD dissertation, 2005), 22.

#### 10. 互联网资料 **Internet source:**

<http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool/wilson03.doc>, 2005 – 03 – 27.

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同上书, 第 19 页。

Ibid., pp. 73 – 75.

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Stanley A. Erickson, “Economic and Technological Trend Affecting Nuclear Nonproliferation,” *The Nonproliferation Review*, vol. 8, no. 2, 2001, p. 43, quoted from Michael Wesley, “It’s Time to Scrap the NPT,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 59, no. 3, (September 2005), 292.

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U. S. Agency for International Development, *Foreign Aid in the National Interest*, ( Washington, D. C. , 2002), 1.

## International Journal of Sino-Western Studies

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